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# ***Daily Report***

## ***Supplement***

# **Sub-Saharan Africa**

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8 September 1989

# Sub-Saharan Africa SUPPLEMENT

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8 September 1989

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## Congo

### \* Realities of 1989 Austerity Budget Discussed

34000766a London AFRICAN PREVIEW  
in English Aug 89 p 4

[Text] Congo will celebrate the 29th anniversary of its independence on Tuesday, 15 August. It will also commemorate the 26th anniversary of the uprising of the Three Glorious Days from 13 to 15 August, 1963 during which the first president of the country, Fulbert Youlou, was overthrown. He was replaced by a revolutionary regime which, after President Ngouabi took over in 1969, changed the name of the country to the People's Republic of Congo, established the Congolese Workers Party (Parti Congolais du Travail-PCT) as the only legal party in the country and in July 1979 proclaimed Congo a Marxist-Leninist state.

The Three Glorious Days—les Trois Glorieuses—are now immortalised as the title of the national anthem. The present Head of State Denis Sassou-Nguesso became president on 5 February, 1979. But these anniversaries are taking place at a time when under an IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme the country is being forced to accept large doses of capitalist medicines. This is the result of declining incomes which have caused serious balance of payment and foreign exchange problems.

Congo, which covers a territory of 342,000 square kilometres and has a population of two million people, is the fifth largest producer of oil in Africa. Agriculture occupies only two percent of the land, and out of this cassava (manioc), the staple food, occupies 14 percent. Although cocoa and coffee are also produced they contribute very little to foreign exchange earnings. This is because the country has been depending on oil for several years for the bulk of its income. The black gold constitutes 45 percent of GNP which in 1988 was about £2bn, and brings in about 83 percent of the country's revenue. But falling oil prices and a weak dollar have reduced the revenue considerably: while in 1985 there was an income of about 235bn FCFA the country earned only 35bn FCFA in 1988—although production has risen from four million tonnes to seven million tonnes since 1983.

To deal with economic problems by this change of fortunes the government has adopted an austerity budget (as in the last four years) under an IMF programme. The budget for 1989 will total 235.8bn FCFA, of which 46.8bn FCFA will be allocated to agriculture and 189bn FCFA to other sectors including civil service payments. Nearly 40 percent of export earnings and about 50 percent of the state budget will go to service the external debt of about £2.86bn. But for a Marxist-Leninist state perhaps the most bitter prescriptions to swallow are the other conditions imposed by the IMF and World Bank.

A number of public service employees have been declared redundant, public employment blocked and salaries have been reduced, but the fund and the Bank

expect more action in this area. Of the public enterprises only seven, considered strategic, will remain in state hands: the rest will be closed down or sold to private interests, including foreign interests. The government has adopted a generous investment code and the World Bank has approved £70m to bolster private enterprise. The government intends to pay more attention to the development of agriculture than before.

## Gabon

### \* Bongo: Close Ranks Within Single Party

34190298a Libreville L'UNION in French 5 Jul 89 p 7

[Article by Dady Bouchard: "'There Is No Government Crisis in Gabon,' President Bongo Said Yesterday In Bitam"]

[Excerpts] Yesterday in Bitam, the departmental capital of Ntem, the president of the republic was welcomed by the people. An enthusiastic crowd had gathered at the airport to greet him. He was visiting Bitam to inaugurate an hevea [rubber-producing tree] plantation there. In that northern provincial city, the president delivered an address that he himself termed the "Bitam statement," to the extent that he addressed all the guessing that had come to light and enlightened his fellow citizens as to the directions of his policy. Since his accession to the country's highest post, the key word in this policy has been "renewal."

The Gabonese president expressed surprise over the fact that the international press would comment harshly on the situation prevailing in our country. There is talk of a government shuffle, a club of reformers, and the imminent legalization of a multiparty political system. All of this is quite false and directly opposed to the principal ideas of the chief of state. "I do not intend to shuffle my government, there is no government crisis, and there is absolutely no point in returning to a multiparty system, given all the divisiveness we have witnessed." These are words every Gabonese should interpret in a positive light.

### No Return to a Multiparty System

For President Bongo, even if he must look to the examples set by other countries and even if he must listen when young people tell of what they have seen and heard, there is no question of deviating from his political vision, one that squares nicely with conditions here. He asked the intellectuals and politicians of Bitam to stop playing the political factions game. "We must close our ranks within the party." This, in a nutshell, was the head of state's address. He congratulated all who had worked on the Bitam hevea project. [passage omitted]

### The Bitam Statement—An Historic Message

The historic address that the president of the republic delivered will mark a milestone in the political history of our country. In Bitam, President Bongo fine-tuned his

political thinking. In this agricultural town, the head of the Gabonese nation dismissed factionalism, which has no place in the way our society is organized. Gabon is currently suffering through an economic crisis, not a political or a governmental one. There is no basis for the political effervescence we are now seeing.

There are neither barons nor dukes nor counts in Gabon. All of our energy must henceforth be channeled into getting the economy going again. On the subject of the current political effervescence, the president sharply denounced and condemned those who claim to be reformers. He was upset over rumors in circulation concerning some so-called currents or the impending rebirth of a multiparty political system.

He affirmed his conviction to retain his political friends and companions as long as they stuck to his ideals and faithfully worked along his policy lines. Indeed, he stated that he would not buckle under any pressure, whether it came from people claiming to be reformers or elsewhere. Gabon is a republic in which democracy is in fashion.

Thus, all ideas and every initiative of national, popular significance must be seriously and deliberately considered by the governing powers, namely, the party, the government, and the National Assembly. Any move even initiated or organized outside this precise framework will not be approved by the president of the republic. Beginning with the 1986 presidential elections, the president has been making the people aware of the economic difficulties that were seeping into our social fabric, and measures have been taken at that level to improve this poor economic situation.

President Bongo passionately invited the Gabonese people to work steadfastly to get our economy going again. President Bongo has thus just thrown light onto his political thinking. Renewal has just been reaffirmed as the cornerstone of our political and social geometry. Now it is up to the Gabonese to ponder on the terms of this historic address which, for the moment, is a highly important statement.

#### **\* Timetable, Process of Democratization Sketched**

34190292b Paris *LA LETTRE DU CONTINENT*  
in French 29 Jun 89 p 1

[Unsigned article on President Bongo's political moves and on economic developments]

[Text] A change of scenery or a democratic opening? President Omar Bongo has begun a process of broadening the political spectrum in his country to better prepare himself to play, first, a regional, and then, a continental role, provided his entering into orbit does not suffer from a delay.

The [initial] take-off has gone well. With the support largely from a minority team of "renovators" led by his son, Ali Bongo, the highly placed representative of the chief of State, the Gabonese president has recalled to the

country his principal "moral" opponent, in exile for thirteen years, the abbot Mba-Absessolo, president of the National Recovery Movement (Morena). None of the regime's barons—who already had their wings clipped during the re-shuffling of 17 October 1988 (LC No. 79)—was associated with the operation. Leon Mebiamé, the prime minister, a relative of Father Abessolo, took this return as a personal offense.

With the barons weakened, the chief of state will launch a debate throughout the country—and no doubt a referendum—on the revision of the Constitution to open up the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) to factions, first, before envisaging the creation, a little later on, of three or four parties. Since the constitutional change of 22 August 1981, the government has been headed by a prime minister named by the president of the republic, and responsible to him as well as to the national assembly and the PDG central committee. This change of setting should be accompanied by campaigns for raising the moral standards of public life in order to prepare for "the exit" of the most recalcitrant of the fellow travelers.

A benevolent nation will not return them to their village, but will install them in an upper chamber. The creation of this second chamber, of the senatorial kind, will only be announced if the initial take-off has succeeded. This political renewal has another more practical objective: satisfy the International Monetary Fund, whose experts are becoming less and less flexible as they realize that next year Gabon will again find large financial resources. Thus, in order to avoid a return to the "Central African Emirate, easy money, and Okoume juice," [as published] the adjustment and cutting back should take place within the next six months.

The experts have been in Libreville since the beginning of the week, and are asking for another 10-percent reduction in the wage mass (LC No. 94). However, that is politically acceptable only if the number of ministerial portfolios—still at the record level of 46—is reduced. The upper chamber would then take in a part of the "casualties" of the future re-shuffling. Gabon is avoiding paying its creditors while awaiting this agreement, which will open the doors of the Paris Club to it.

With a new team, a democratic image, restored finances, a barrel [of oil] at \$16, and American companies fighting for mining rights, President Bongo is ready to take off across the frontiers. For this new beginning, he is counting on his anchor points in Morocco just as much as in South Africa.

#### **\* Opponent's Return Strengthens Bongo's Faction**

34190288c Paris *LA LETTRE DU CONTINENT*  
in French 1 Jun 89 p 7

[Text] The return home on Sunday 15 May, negotiated by the Cameroonian journalist Ananie Bindji (see the "Men of the Day" column), of Father Mba-Absessolo, president of the National Recovery Movement (MORENA)—after a 13-year exile—goes well beyond a



simple national reconciliation. In spite of MORENA's welcome in some governmental circles in Paris—which for that matter were opposed to this return—it did not represent a serious danger for President Omar Bongo's regime. All the more so since several representatives of this opposition movement, including Andre Mba-Aubame, counselor for investments at the Presidency—and who had participated since 1986 in the negotiations of Mba-Abessolo's return—have returned since 1984. But the latter's return will no doubt permit the Gabonese chief of state to extricate himself from the political game in which the regime's "barons" have at a minimum held him tightly.

In fact, Mba-Abessolo was received on Wednesday 17 May at the Presidency in the presence of Prime Minister Leon Mebiame and of three deputy prime ministers: Georges Rawiri, Etienne Mouvagha-Tchioba, and Emile Kassa-Mapsi. None of them was involved from near or afar with the negotiations. Only Ali Bongo, high-ranking representative of the president, and Samuel Mbaye, secretary of state in charge of coordination of the secret services and former ambassador to Paris, went to Paris twice as the negotiations were concluding to complete the documentation in Bindji's apartment. The confrontation with Prime Minister Leon Mebiame was very acrimonious. The prime minister, who was extremely nervous, could not put the cap back on his fountain pen and asserted "that he did not know this gentleman and even less MORENA." Father Mba-Abessolo demonstrated to him that they are without any doubt both "relatives from Kango," which did not ease the tension. In return for disbanding his movement, Paul Mba-Abessolo was promised that a commission for reflection on the political future of the country would be created. Meanwhile, the principal Gabonese oppositionist, who refused any cabinet position, was to enter the national university in at the end of June.

LA LETTRE DU CONTINENT Commentary—The prime minister appears to fear that some day Father Mba-Abessolo could be preferred over him to represent the Fang [a tribe] in the government. Mba-Abessolo's return should also strengthen the "reformers" within the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG), represented by Ali Bongo, Jean Ping, Mba Obam, Jean-Remi Pendy, Leon-Paul Ngoulakia, and Francois Engonga, among others. The creation of "currents" within the one party is already being mentioned. As much as the "Makaya" column (in the daily L'UNION), which often targets the regime's barons, the more and more caustic tone of the PATRIOT, the publication of which is very "irregular" but the targets of which are very accurate, are part of a will to redistribute the political game in which President Bongo appears to hold the trump cards. After having isolated the "clan of Madame" with the dismissal of his brother, Jean-Boniface Asselle, as head of the police (LC No. 85), the Gabonese chief of state will endeavor in the coming months to moralize public life by forcing the principal public officials to greater openness under the combined spotlights of "Makaya" and the PATRIOT.

A cabinet reshuffle is therefore expected in Libreville that will serve as "measures of political accompaniment" for a new 10 percent cutback in wage structure (a cut of 108 to 90 billion CFA francs) that alone will be able to unblock the negotiations with the IMF. The budgetary gap this year is, in fact, 125 billion CFA francs, including 45 to 50 billion CFA francs in ready cash. The 30,000 Gabonese Government employees—whose wages have already been reduced by 45 percent—do not appear, in fact, ready to undertake any new effort without seeing some cabinet positions closed down. Once this matter is settled—no doubt during the summer—all that will remain for the chief of state to do is to remarry, undoubtedly Edith Sassou Nguesso, the Congolese president's daughter (LC No. 90).

#### \* Japanese Bank Studying Investment Prospects

34190298b Libreville L'UNION in French  
30 Jun 89 p 8

[Article by Claude Moissavou: "Gabon-Japan: Exim Bank Would Like To Invest In Our Country"]

[Text] A Japanese mission from Exim Bank headed by Mr Kijima, the assistant director of that bank's loan department, conferred yesterday afternoon with the Minister of Finance, Budget and Participations, Jean-Pierre Lemboumba-Lepandou. With the head of finances, the Japanese bankers studied and examined prospects for involvement by Japanese businessmen in the Gabonese economy.

They also took note of efforts to restructure our economy, given the fact that the IMF and the World Bank have imposed a certain number of measures on the government so as to extricate the country from its present difficult financial and economic crisis.

Exim Bank has serious plans to invest in Gabon, Mr Kijima said, and the visit his delegation is making is connected with this. To begin with, then, the bank wishes to propose an initial general budgetary financing [as translated] to Gabon and, in the future, the bank is thinking of stepping into some key and specific sectors of our economy.

However, the chief of the delegation was discreet with regard to the sectors of interest to them. But with regard to this bank's willingness to cooperate, it goes without saying that a better future is dawning for relations between Gabon and Japan.

#### \* PRC Wishes To Increase Manganese Imports

34190298c Libreville L'UNION in French  
24-25 Jun 89 p 7

[Article by Pierre-Marie Mbongo'e: "Audiences at the Chamber of Commerce: ECA and China; Subject of Expansion of Commercial Exchanges Brought Up"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Earlier Mr Ngomo-Obiang had conferred with Mr Wei Jianguo, the new commercial

councilor of the Chinese Embassy in Gabon. Mr Wei Jianguo, who was paying a courtesy call, discussed with his host prospects for expanding exchanges between China and Gabon. China would like to increase its purchases of wood (okoume) from 20 [as published] to 30,000 cubic meters and its purchases of manganese from 40,000 to 100,000 metric tons. On the other side, our country would

like to increase its imports from China. The Chinese diplomat would also like to establish fruitful contacts between small and medium-size Gabonese businesses and Chinese businessmen. Taking part in these two audiences were some of Mr Ngomo-Obiang's closest advisers, notably Mr Tchitching, the head of the patrimony division, and Mr Nze-Bengono of the legal department.



## Djibouti

### \* French Aid Amounts to \$160 Million Dollars

34000625b Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN  
NEWSLETTER in English 24 Jun 89 p 2

[Text] Two issues dominated President Hassan Gouled's first official visit to France from June 20 to 23: maintaining the number of French troops stationed in Djibouti (3,800 in total) and being allocated substantial budgetary aid. For several months, rumours have been circulating in Djibouti about a French project to reduce the number of Foreign Legionnaires in Djibouti by 60 percent. The possible departure of several hundred men would not have any consequence on the efficiency of the forces stationed there, however, it was very worrying for Djibouti's leaders as such a decision would have immediate economic consequences on Djibouti. Ismael Guedi Hared, director of President Gouled's cabinet, interviewed by THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER on the subject on June 20, confirmed that, "the French authorities informed the Djiboutian government in writing, before Mr Gouled arrived in France, that it intended to maintain its military forces in Djibouti in their present number." This decision was reiterated to Mr Gouled personally during his visit. According to a confidential study on France's contribution to the economy and to the Republic of Djibouti's budget, and the total amount of French contribution to the economy and to the Republic of Djibouti's budget, and the total amount of French public spending in Djibouti in the form of civilian and military cooperation and also, that spent by the French forces stationed there amounted to 1.1 billion French francs (about 160 million dollars) per year in 1986 not including the money spent by private expatriates. This figure represents 50 percent of GDP [gross domestic product]. Much of this spending is from salary transfers.

Throughout his stay, in interviews as well as in his public addresses, President Gouled repeatedly asked for the maintenance of the French in Djibouti as a "guarantee" of security, this being judged by even some of those close to Mr Gouled as "excessive". Although Djiboutian-Ethiopian relations are normal at present, the same cannot be said for Djibouti's relations with Somalia. The Somalis criticise Djibouti's government for having facilitated Somali National Movement [SNM]'s task of taking Somali towns Loyada and Zeila (the latter is the native town of Hassan Gouled, a Somali Issa like the majority of its inhabitants). Djibouti denies these accusations. Mr Gouled's strongly pro-French speech would also have added to Somalia's displeasure, according to some sources.

As far as economic cooperation is concerned, Djibouti is asking for aid to be stepped up. Djibouti's initiative to close the Somali-Djibouti border following the SNM's attacks on Loyada and Zeila, had the effect of depriving Djibouti of a sizeable commercial outlet. The border closure met several objectives: on one hand, to show the

government Mogadishu that Djibouti was not assisting the SNM, but above all, to prevent an influx of Somali refugees, of whom there are already about 20,000 in Djibouti. A Djiboutian official told us, "Djibouti did not rid itself of Ethiopian refugees (resettled last year in Ethiopia within the framework of a UNHCR voluntary repatriation scheme) to be overrun by Somali refugees."

Paris would have pledged to support increased budgetary aid beyond the expiry date, during the year, of a specific agreement signed in 1980. There is no doubt that aid in the form of military and civilian cooperation, worth 380 million French francs (approximately 55 million dollars) per year will be maintained if not increased. This aid puts Djibouti in third place among the countries receiving aid from France after Senegal and the Central African Republic, but before Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Algeria and Morocco with over 6 percent of total French aid. However, in terms of aid per capita of the Djiboutian population, it represented 25,000 Djiboutian francs (138 dollars) per habitant and was ten times that accorded to other Francophone African countries.

As regards the military presence, a French military source told THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTERS that Paris had pledged to maintain the budget for its troops in Djibouti for several years. But, the number of families accompanying military personnel will be limited.

According to reliable sources, one of President Gouled's aims in coming to Paris would have been to have presented his successor to the French government. Djibouti's leader, who is officially 73, but who in reality is slightly older, was accompanied by his cabinet director, Ismael Guedi Hared who is considered as being the best placed to succeed Gouled. The French, it is well known, would not be happy if Ismael Omar Guelle comes to power, who is the other likely option. He is the nephew of the President's cabinet director and controls Djibouti's security forces.

### \* Intensive French, Saudi Aid to Education

34000625a Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN  
NEWSLETTER in English 24 Jun 89 p 6

[Text] Education in Djibouti is undergoing certain changes, and both in Arab and in French. First, Saudi Arabia, which has been seeking to accelerate the "Arabisation" of this Muslim Country, member of the Arab League, is financing the construction costs of an Islamic Institute in Djibouti. The institute, when it reaches completion in 1990 will register some 450 students who, it is hoped, will become Arab teachers or preachers at the end of their studies. The overall cost of the institute is estimated at 705 million Djiboutian francs (3.9 million dollars).

France, with 227 expatriate teachers in Djibouti, which represents two-thirds of the entire Djiboutian teaching staff, has decided to grant four million French francs (about 600,000 U.S. dollars) for the construction and

equipment of a Staff Training Centre for State Education. It is to be opened in October 1990 and will give pedagogic training to Djiboutian students trained in France, and who will gradually replace (at a rate of 20 to 40 posts a year) teachers of French nationality posted in Djibouti.

#### \* French Civil, Military Aid Discussed

34190319b Djibouti LA NATION DE DJIBOUTI  
in French 22 Jun 89 p 1

[Text] Yesterday afternoon, President of the Republic Hassan Gouled Aptidon ended the official 3-day visit he paid to France at the invitation of President Francois Mitterrand.

The privileged relations between France and Djibouti, the situation in the Horn of Africa, and the crisis in the Near East were the main subjects discussed during the talks between the two chiefs of state.

The links between France and Djibouti remain firm and strong. They are characterized, in particular, by the substantial financial aid granted to our country every year, and the stabilizing influence of the French military presence.

The annual aid from France within the framework of civilian and military cooperation is estimated at 310 million French francs (9.3 billion Djibouti francs). This assistance includes bilateral aid, such as that from the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC), in the amount of 19 million French francs; technical aid (204 million French francs), which has provided 460 civilian and military cooperative workers, including 220 teachers; budget aid (between 82 and 85 million French francs); and scholarship grants (4.2 million French francs).

A little more than half of this aid goes to pay the salaries of the technical assistants and cooperation experts, for whom the savings rate is estimated at about 50 percent of the salaries.

Thanks to this French aid, Djibouti ranks third among the countries supported by France, following Senegal and the Central African Republic.

France is also financing the maintenance in the republic of French military troops numbering 3,800 men, in the three branches, at a cost of 37 billion Djibouti francs (1.3 billion French francs) annually. But, as is the case with budget aid, a part of these military expenditures does not pass through Djibouti. These are the funds that cover the direct expenditures effected in France, or salary savings.

While in Paris, moreover, the chief of state reiterated the need to maintain the French military presence in Djibouti as long as the tensions in our region remain acute.

Because of its geographic location and the weather prevailing in the region, the danger of destabilization in Djibouti would be very great without the benevolent

protection of friendly countries, that of France, in particular. It is a country, the chief of state acknowledged, which has never failed us. He received assurance that the French military deployment will not be altered.

President Gouled also expressed satisfaction with the French decision to cancel the public debt of 35 of the poorest countries in the world, of which Djibouti is one.

With regard to the public debt, which has reached a total of 36 billion French francs, Djibouti will benefit from the cancellation of about 220 million French francs it owes.

President Gouled met with French Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas; Minister of Economy, Finance, and the Budget Pierre Berezgouvoy; Minister of Defense Jean-Pierre Chevenement; and Minister of Cooperation and Development Jacques Pelletier. Minister Pelletier praised President Gouled especially for the "peace counsel" with which he has provided the leaders of the countries in the African Horn.

The French minister of cooperation emphasized the "quality of the friendship" that links the two countries, mentioning that more than 10,000 French citizens are living in Djibouti.

President Gouled came to France as the head of a sizable ministerial delegation, which included Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Moumin Bahdon Farah, Minister of Finance and National Economy Mohamed Djama Elabe, and Minister of National Defense Hossein Barkat Siraj.

Before returning to our capital on 25 June, 2 days before he is scheduled to preside at the ceremonies that will mark the 12th anniversary of the winning of independence, the chief of state will visit Iraq to attend the inauguration of the reconstruction work in the city of Fao.

#### \* Saudi Company Finances Refinery

34000625c Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN  
NEWSLETTER in English 24 Jun 89 p 8

[Text] Work is expected to begin on Djibouti's first oil refinery within the next few months. The government approved two bills on June 5 which settle the question over the concession for the refinery on one hand and over permits for exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons on the other. Disagreement on the duration of these permits held up the project for several months (ION No 369). The authorities have still not however, revealed the period of validity of the permits granted, nor the site where the petroleum complex is to be built.

Its capacity will be 100,000 barrels per day and it represents an investment of 750 million dollars provided by one Saudi private source, the Al-Rahbani Company, owned by Saudi businessman Sheikh Halim Fares Al-Rahbani. Originally, there was another Saudi businessman involved in the financing of this project.

Ahmad Abdul-Allah Bakhar, but he seems to have backed out. The Djiboutian State is not contributing to the financing of the project but has accepted to allow the refinery total tax exemption for fifty years on crude which is imported from Saudi Arabia and other neighbouring countries, including North Yemen, to meet the refinery's requirements. Discussions are said to have taken place between Somalia and Djibouti for the refining of crude from Loog Haya, 120 kilometres from Zeila, in Somali territory, should the existence of an oil deposit be confirmed after Chevron discovered traces there. But, Rahbani Co., will not be exempt from paying tax on profits, the Djiboutian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Moumin Bahdon Farah said in a statement to pro-government Djiboutian weekly, LA NATION. Djibouti itself only uses 6,000 barrels per day, so the rest of the refinery's production will be exported but for the time being the Djiboutian authorities are not disclosing who their future clients may be.

#### \* Perlite Deposit Considered Exploitable

34000625d Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN  
NEWSLETTER in English 24 Jun 89 p 8

[Text] The Bureau de recherches géologiques et minières français (BRGM) [Geological and Mining Prospecting Office] is expected to submit its report on quality of the perlite deposit discovered south of Ghoubet, 80 kilometres west of the capital within a few months and at the latest in January 1990. The deposit would already be considered to be exploitable. Perlite is most commonly used as thermal and sonar insulation as well as a filter in nuclear industry. But it is also used to help disperse oil slicks. Saudi investors have already shown their interest in the project and the Islamic Bank has provided 200,000 dollars for the first phase of the study of this deposit which could make Djibouti the leading Arab and African perlite-exporting country.

### Kenya

#### \* Country's Relations With Sweden Improve

34000699 Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN  
NEWSLETTER in English 8 Jul 89 p 2

[Article: "Kenya: Detente With Sweden"]

[Text] Sweden's mistrust of Daniel arap Moi seems to have dissipated. Now, the Kenyan leader could even make a State visit, which he cancelled two years ago for fear of attacks being made on violations of human rights in his country. When Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Robert Ouko, visited Stockholm from June 28 to 30, it gave the Swedish government the opportunity to renew its support to the government in Nairobi. Dr Ouko confirmed this when referring to his talks with his Swedish counterpart, Sten Anderson and with the Swedish Minister of Cooperation, Lena Hjelm-Wallin. "Sweden has never been opposed to Kenya as such," the Kenyan official said, inferring that Nairobi had perhaps

over-reacted in its reproaches to the Swedish for having allowed its Press to criticise Kenya and for having tolerated demonstrations. Sweden's warm welcome for Dr Ouko, although his visit had been programmed and organised at the last minute, seems to suggest that Sweden has altered its attitude and would like to maintain its interests in Kenya. However, Dr Ouko's visit will have been rather a disappointment. Contrary to what some may have believed, the Minister had not come to Stockholm on a "peace mission" after the President's amnesty offer to all the "dissidents" who would agree to repent. He did not meet any of them, although the wife of a former member of Kenya's Air Force, involved in an attempted coup d'Etat in 1982 was present at the reception organised by the Kenyan Embassy in Stockholm. Moreover, the scheduled press conference was cancelled [due to] "time pressure" and more likely because the Kenyan official wanted to avoid any embarrassing questions about the amnesty or the professional reintegration of government opponents. The case of Kenyan dissident Andrew Ngumba, a former vice-minister of the Plan and National Development under Dr Ouko himself, was mentioned by Dr Ouko during his talks with Mr Anderson, mainly to inform the Swedish government of the misappropriation of funds Mr Ngumba is said to be responsible for. According to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jans Erlander, Stockholm "only listened". Mr Anderson would have perhaps favoured a more conciliatory approach to dissidents. However, in Nairobi, the Swedish charge d'affaires, Hakan Damiu, said on July 2 that the immigration services were planning to expel Andrew Ngumba. As for Mr Ngumba, according to those in his entourage, he was disappointed at not having had the opportunity to meet Dr Ouko.

### Uganda

#### \* Guerrilla Operations Increase in South

34000597a Kampala THE GUIDE in English  
19 Jul 89 pp 1, 6, 12

[Article by Saul Katabalum: "Guerrilla Activities Now Spread to Buganda"]

[Text] Rebel activities which have for the last two years been going on in Eastern and Northern Uganda, have now found their way into Buganda, the Administrative Centre for Uganda.

Reports of rebel infiltration into Buganda had surfaced in the press but there had hitherto been no word from Government until late last week when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) number two Aï Haji Moses Kigongo called an urgent meeting of Mpigi District Resistance Council (RC 5) which he chaired.

The meeting was also attended by all Cabinet Ministers hailing from Mpigi District, high ranking NRM officials, all NRM members from Mpigi, and an NRM Officer at the rank of Colonel.



Most of the rebel infested areas are in Mpigi, a district that surrounds the capital, Kampala and Entebbe International Airport.

The purpose of this meeting according to the NRM Vice Chairman Al Haji Moses Kigongo, was to establish, with the help of district Councillors, why the Baganda who gave maximum support to the NRM right from the bush to the time now in government, had decided to turn against it.

Places pointed out as being rebel bases were, Mpenja and Kigesi in Gomba County, Kibibi and Kayenje in Busiro county about 20 kilometres north of Entebbe International Airport.

Reasons raised for Baganda's return to the bush includes NRM's alleged failure to honour its bush promises to the fighters, its alleged unfair distribution of the "calos" (power), the alleged unfair promotions in the army and insufficient, social and welfare provisions to the security forces, the prevailing economic situation and the uncertainty over NRM's stepping down after the promised four years.

On NRM's failure to honour agreements, a Councillor who said he was quoting what people in his area say, pointed out that some Baganda went to the bush anticipating that Kingdoms would be reinstated after the fall of the UPC [Uganda People's Congress] government and the successive regimes.

The Councillor said the NRM has since coming to power, not made its position on Kingdoms clear.

On the sharing of power, the Councillor said that all key positions in the army are occupied by one particular tribe and the Baganda remain in the cover cadres.

The Councillor went on to say that soldiers are not properly maintained thus forcing them to steal to get money.

On the economy, the peoples representative said that Ugandans were experiencing the worst poverty ever, adding that sugar, soap, and salt were readily available but too expensive for the "ordinary" man.

"All these, I think, have forced the Baganda to go back to the bush", the Councillor said.

All the reasons advanced were commented on in terms by the Ministers and other NRM officials.

Ministers present included Deputy Ministers; Abbey Kafumbe Mukasa Deputy Minister of Finance, Israel Kayondo of Commerce, Yafeesi Sabiiti of Agriculture, Mrs. G. Njuba of the Prime Minister, and Steven Kavuma of Finance in charge of Departed Asians Property Custodian Board.

From the NRM high echelons was Captain Mrs. Olivia Zizinga an NRC [National Resistance Council] (Bush) member.

Responding to the question of Kingdoms Mr. Kayonde said there was no point in going to the bush when such an issue could be discussed in RCs and eventually in the NRC.

On whether NRM intended to stay in power indefinitely, Hon. Kayonde NRC (bush) said NRM still maintain its commitment to stay in power for four years. But he added that given the prevailing political and economic situation in the country, RCs were free to pass resolutions calling on the NRM to stay on, if they so wished.

On the welfare of the army, Mrs. Getrude Njuba appealed to the people not to poke their noses in army matters.

Regarding promotions, Mrs. Zizinga said that these are carried out bearing in mind a soldier's academic qualifications. She said that currently there are fewer qualified Baganda in the army than the tribes people claim, are occupying key positions in the army.

Col. Godfrey Bamwesigye the First Division Commander who also pointed out the location of rebel bases and was not challenged by any Councillors from the affected areas, spoke of the welfare of the army as excellent.

Councillors referred to guerilla activities as unfortunate incidents and blamed them on NRA [national Resistance Army] deserters and ex-FEDEMUS [Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda] bush fighters who refused to join the NRA.

The District Forestry Officer of Mpigi was also pointed out as having contributed a lot to acts of banditry by issuing Timber Licences to people who were said to masquerade as cutting timber but were discovered to be guerrillas.

To illustrate his point a Councillor from Kasanje Sub-County in Busiro county said there were people cutting timber in one of the forests, with many bags of beans and maize flour who, when interviewed, were found to be in possession of a valid licence from the forestry officer.

Asked to comment on guerilla activities, the District Police Commander (DPC) Mpigi said he had not yet established whether there were guerrillas in the district or not but reported that at one time Policemen confronted armed men in Gomba County who later disappeared into the forest. He described these as robbers.

As a solution, Councillors urged FEDEMUS Officers who joined the NRA to seek audience with their men still in the bush so as to forward their (rebels) suggestions to government.

It was also agreed that delegations from government should visit and talk to the people in various places in the district about the dangers of going to the bush.

Use of force to flush the rebels out of the bush was however not mentioned as a possible solution to the guerilla problem.

**\* Allegations That NRA Operates Dungeon**

34000601b Kampala *THE CITIZEN* in English  
21 Jun 89 pp 1, 6

[Article by John B. B. Nyanza: "New Trends in Rwenzururu Movement"]

[Text] Rwenzururu Freedom Movement of the Bamba and Bakonjo is steadily losing popularity among the people. It has been diverted from its original popular objectives by some self-seeking individuals who have used it to achieve personal, political and economic ends.

In the politics of Kasese, the movement has been used as a scare-crow. It has also been used by individuals to amass wealth. At its inception Rwenzururu had popular and genuine objectives. The movement was fighting against imperialism and oppression by foreign leadership imposed on the people on Rwenzori mountains. It was fighting against a kingdom which was controlled by undemocratic principles.

As early as 1921 three Bakonjo freedom fighters were hanged and buried in the same grave at Kagando in Kisinga sub-county, Kasese District. This created fear among the Bakonjo and the movement took a low profile but it was indeed a time bomb.

Towards Uganda's Independence, Rwenzururu became awake again. The Bamba and Bakonjo were also seeking recognition as organised tribes with an organised leadership. They requested that this recognition should be envisaged in the constitution of the independent Uganda. However, the kingdom of Toro refused and categorically denied the existence of Bamba and Bakonjo as two ethnic groups different from the Batoro.

Their request was timely. They were awake that without being constitutionally recognised among other tribes of Uganda and without a separate district, services from the central government would not reach them directly.

In the council of Toro kingdom, the Bamba and Bakonjo representatives had also wanted a resolution to be passed that appointments to the key posts like the prime minister of the kingdom be rotated among the tribes. It was difficult for the kingdom of Toro to accept such demands.

On March 13, 1962, the Bamba and Bakonjo representatives in the council of the Toro kingdom walked out of the council in a great and determined protest. They were demonstrating to the leadership of Toro kingdom and to the whole of Uganda that it was high time their genuine demands became manifested.

Rwenzururu under the leadership of Isaya Mukirane had its first meetings at Kibito. At that meeting the main reasons why they were to wage a war were clearly

outlined. That the Bamba and Bakonjo be recognised like other tribes of Uganda; that a separate district be granted to them; that the education in the areas receive special consideration and that Bamba and Bakonjo be considered for high ranking offices both at national and local levels.

Isaya Mukirane and his colleagues then decided to go into the mountains where they would feel more secure and of course where they had total support of the people. They were to organise the Bamba and Bakonjo into a strong fighting force. In the meantime Isaya Mukirane and his colleagues promised that discrimination of any kind would not be heard of in Rwenzururu Territory.

Unfortunately a big rift occurred when Isaya Mukirane declared that schools in the areas claimed by Rwenzururu be closed, that Rwenzururu be a kingdom and Isaya Mukirane was the first king of Rwenzururu to be referred to as Ile-mangoma.

The majority of the Bamba and Bakonjo were very suspicious. They knew I. Mukirane was not belonging to the clan of the kings as far as the customs and traditions of the Bakonjo were concerned. This particular issue caused many deaths in the district. People became divided and consequently the movement leadership.

Some individuals turned the movement into a business enterprise. Every Mwamba and Mukonjo tax payer was forced to pay graduated tax and other revenue contributions to the kingdom, which money was not accounted for. Whenever one wanted to know how the money was being used he was termed *omulihanda*, an imperialist or a foreigner.

Isaya Mukirane died on May 17, 1966 and his son Charles Welsley Iremangoma succeeded him as Ile-mangoma II'king of Rwenzururu. The struggle continued.

At a public rally at Bwera trading centre Milton Obote declared that the demands of Rwenzururu were never to be considered. He likened the Bamba and Bakonjo to the forest monkeys in the mountain. This annoyed every Mwamba and every Mukonjo. In anger the two antagonistic groups united again because it was then clear that a round table discussion would not solve any problem.

Amin topped Obote in 1971. This ushered in some new hope and a delegation was sent to Kampala to meet Idi Amin. In 1972 another strong delegation consisting of representatives from Bwamba and Bukonjo was sent to Kampala to meet Idi Amin again. Amin took positive stand to Rwenzururu demands and on March 29, 1972, he directed that Rukonjo language be introduced on Radio Uganda. In 1974, Amin created more districts in Uganda and under the same cover, the districts of Semuliki and Kasese were created.

The rigged elections of 1980 saw Rwenzururu being used as a scare-crow at the same time as a killer force. The late victor Muhindo was scooped from near Saad Hotel in

Kasese town and handed over to the Rwenzururu soldiers and they butchered him. Amon Baziira and his colleague Amos Kambere then declared themselves unopposed having used the banner of Rwenzururu.

On August 15, 1982, Charles Iremangoma surrendered to Obote's government. He was given a lot of gifts which included a luxurious house, a lorry, a Pick-up and many others. He was given the powers to make certain key appointments in the district but with the guidance of Amon Bazira. All the appointments were biased in favour of Amon Bazira who was at that material time the master planner for the district.

There was one grave mistake Bazira and Iremangoma did in their appointments. They did not consider the commander of Rwenzururu soldiers for any gift or even a simple job. So, Richard Kinyomusitu, the commander of Rwenzururu Army decided to remain in the mountains of Rwenzori with some few soldiers.

In 1985, the NRA [National Resistance Army] moved to Rubona-Western Uganda. Kinyomusitu emerged from the bush to meet the NRA commanders and confirmed this solidarity with them. Some of the Rwenzururu soldiers joined the NRA and confirmed their solidarity with the movement.

When the NRA took over Kampala Kinyomusitu who had pledged solidarity with the gallant soldiers of NRA was supposed to have come out of the bush to join hands with the rest of the Ugandans in the rehabilitation of the country.

He did not. He still poised a lot of questions. Richard Kinyomusitu had been encouraged to stay in the bush by some individuals who saw an opportunity to use him again under the banner of Rwenzururu for their selfish gains.

Many people challenged the ideas of creating another Rwenzururu again under the leadership of Richard Kinyomusitu. Some peace lovers argued and advised that the demands of Rwenzururu in their original form, could be forwarded to the NRM [National Resistance Movement] leadership through the RCs [Resistance Council].

Considering the advantages and the disadvantages of Rwenzururu movement especially in the present Uganda, those individuals who want it promoted might find themselves in a dilemma. It is unfortunate that some people in Kasese still want to use it to achieve personal ends. This is controversy to the present people's revolution in the country.

It is very dangerous to the innocent people of Kasese to see that there are a lot of facts concerning Rwenzururu which are not yet revealed to government for the good of the people. Rwenzururu of today does not represent the totality of the revolutionary feelings of the Bamba and Bakonjo. It is sectarian and it practices favouritism of

the highest order. Rwenzururu should join hands with NRM government and try to achieve their objectives without violence.

#### **\* Opposition Party Outlines Its Platform**

34000602b Kampala THE CITIZEN  
in English 12, 13 Jul 89

[Article: "DP Advises NRM Once Again"; A Circular to all DP Leaders and Supporters Throughout Uganda issued by the National Executive Committee; paragraph numbers as published]

[12 Jul 89 pp 4-5]

[Text] This communication is the first of a series of circular letters to DP [Democratic Party] leaders across the country intended to encourage serious reflections and dialogue regarding the underlying philosophy of the Party as well as its political objectives and policies - and the strategies adopted to achieve them. Resort to this method of communication has been prompted principally by the prevailing official attitude not favouring political parties and political meetings, conferences, etc. whereby there are certain official - constraints against political parties organising national political activities.

DP strongly believe that, in the absence of systematic intellectual interaction between and among party leaders and members, a great disservice will be done to the country and to our own members. Silence is not an alternative and will be misunderstood. Hence, it is our considered opinion and duty that the Democratic Party should vigilantly and constantly review and interpret Uganda's future. It would be an abdication of duty to leave this job to others. Furthermore, there is a considerable demand from leaders and supporters of the DP everywhere for this kind of communication arising mainly from unresolved political issues such as the future political system, the future of political parties, the electoral law, size and role of the army, the new Constitution, the rule of law, human rights, etc.

#### **DP on the Record - 35 Years of Unwavering Dedication to Democracy.**

The Democratic Party is one of the oldest political parties in Africa; it is now in its 35th year of existence - since it was officially launched in 1954, in Kampala.

The Party's objectives are crystal clear and it is a covenant for it to fulfill the pledges the founding fathers ordained, namely:- 1. To transform Uganda into a state in which people can live in harmony without fear, want, or discrimination based on tribe, religion or race.

2. To establish a democratically elected Government for the good of all the people of Uganda. 3. To maintain strongly the rule of law and justice based on recognition of human rights and respect for every individual's right to own property. 4. To create facilities whereby every individual can attain all the benefits of



the land, wealth, health, education and all social amenities. 5. To see that Uganda prospers and advances in all spheres and attains a dignified position in the world.

The Democratic Party pledges to do its utmost to see that these aims and objectives are fulfilled and adhered to so that the people in Uganda may live in peace and tranquillity. 3. From its inception therefore, DP is committed to the development of Uganda as a united and economically viable country in which, above all, freedom and equality are harmonized. This philosophy of "free and equal" is the party's inspiration for strongly defending democracy, multi-party system human rights, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary.

4. As a strategy for the establishment of a truly democratic society, the DP places great emphasis on the building of independent institutions which are logically consistent with democracy as a political concept. Thus as a general policy both before and after Independence, the DP has relentlessly advocated for the necessary democratic reforms in all political institutions in the country, most notably the Constitution itself, central and local government structures, institutionalization of political parties, the cooperative movement and the trade Unions. 5. In their words and deeds, DP leaders throughout the country, have over the years and almost always at considerable personal risk, demonstrated unwavering dedication to democracy and all it entails. Since Uganda has had the misfortune of being subjected to many political leaders with dictatorial and fascist tendencies, the DP consistent of undiluted democracy and the multi-party regime in particular, has made Party leaders and followers the targets of state-inspired terrorism and various forms of persecution, discrimination and degradation. Many DP leaders and followers have suffered death in this process, many more suffered political imprisonment and economic deprivation. 6. DP upholds that the classical arguments in favour of democracy and human rights notably freedom of conscience, speech and association are, in the modern state best guaranteed in a multi-party system of governance in addition, the DP believes that the multi-party system, properly functioning and commanding the support and respect of the majority is the best institutional guarantee for orderly and peaceful change of government. The multi-party system is, by its very nature, well endowed with built in incentives for ensuring public accountability and for promoting individual initiatives for development. It is a tragedy for Uganda - that whereas the potential exists a properly operating, multi-party system, the country's successful - political leaders have taken various measures to stifle and destroy it.

For instance, this was a sub-item under discussion with the NRM [National Resistance Movement], whereby DP maintained that the multi-party systems was an insurance for sustained democracy. NRM/NRA [National Resistance Movement/National Resistance Army] was not convinced that the multi-party system was necessary for democracy but rather that it was injurious to national unity. However, the debate is not yet closed since they had indicated willingness to continue the discussion.

### Peaceful Change of Government

It has been a great tragedy for Uganda that all change of government since independence has been effected by violence. In the process, considerable blood has been shed and a lot of property destroyed both at the material time of the overthrow of the previous government and during the preparatory period. The Democratic Party is, by conviction and on principle, committed to advocate for the necessary reforms in the structure of power and government institutions as well as in electoral laws that will enhance the prospects for orderly and peaceful change of government.

Indeed, DP maintains, Uganda's insecurity is a consequence of serious differences, dissension and mutual mistrust and fears within the ruling circles; and the mismanagement of such political problem.

The resort to violence and, in particular, to the military, cannot and has not helped to solve such political problems, DP also believes that Uganda's problems are basically political in nature and as such can only be solved politically.

### 8. National Unity

The DP has always trusted Uganda as one country and fearlessly worked for national unity. The party holds that there is some truth in arguing that ethnocentrism and, therefore, ethnic or tribal and religious differences can and sometimes do, lead to prejudice, intolerance, conflict and violence, but, by the very nature of mankind, it is not natural that such an unhappy and unproductive relationship between people can be a permanent feature; and that enlightened leadership will not be able to do something about it.

The Uganda experiment demonstrates that, given good leadership, ethnic and religious differences can be turned into assets. The development of Christianity and Islam in this country is an illustration and example: first: how tribal prejudice can be overcome and second, of how religious leaders of different denominations can strike a common and happy accord for the fruitful co-existence of their followers. And the history of the Democratic Party well illustrates how this Party has grown from strength to strength as it has cut across tribal and religious frontiers. Internally the DP has never suffered a tribal or religious rift, let alone violent confrontation. But unfortunately the same cannot be said to all the other Parties. What makes the difference must be the quality of leadership.

Among the ordinary population there is no evidence that tribal and religious differences always lead to conflict and violence. On the contrary, there is strong evidence that social interaction alone, has led to the breakdown of the prejudice and to the establishment of happy relationships - including inter-marriages across tribal and religious frontiers.

Where, therefore, the tribal and regional appears to be the distinguishing characteristic between parties in conflict the blame ought to rest largely on the shoulders of the leaders. Or else national unity as a concept is often over emphasized to justify some undemocratic, restrictive and unpopular moves against multi-party system.

### 9. Peaceful Approach

As a method of work the DP has all along opted for a peaceful, positive and constructive approach in an effort to persuade and win acceptance and support for its objectives. The Party believes that this is the right approach for the Party and for the country. Skeptics and detractors notwithstanding, the record shows that the DP has, by its vision, principles and approach contributed significantly towards the evolution of common national objectives; there is now common national support for a truly democratic Constitution and for a mixed economy along the lines advocated by the party since inception.

[13 Jul 89 pp 4-5]

[Text] This is the second installment of a statement issued by the Democratic Party recently. In the first part DP called upon the NRM to continue exploring avenues for a peaceful change of government national unity and to try to solve armed conflict through peaceful approach. Now read on:

### DP and the NRM Government

In the interest of the country and in the hope that there was room for a DP input in matters of public policy and administration, the DP leadership decided in the earliest days of THE NRM/NRA government to give its goodwill and cooperation to the new government. In this regard, the party has encouraged its members and other people to participate in the Resistance Councils and in government. The Party leadership has in addition engaged in a dialogue with the NRM leadership.

A joint Committee consisting of six representatives each from DP and NRM was set up in 1986, to examine possible ways of laying foundation for cooperation between DP and NRM in future, but particularly during the four years interim NRM administration

The broad items agreed to be discussed were: (a) Respective norms of democracy. (b) Possible modes of co-operation. (c) Political Party, activities during the interim period. (d) Programme of activities during the interim period.

By November 25, 1986 both sides were agreed that on principles and ideals there was a lot in common, as exemplified by a comparison between the DP 1980 Manifesto and the NRM Ten Point Programme. This position was generally reiterated at a meeting the joint Committee had with the President on February 26, 1987 to appraise him of the progress of the dialogue.

Then there was a prolonged lull and the joint Committee did not sit for about a year. It finally met on March 11, 1988 to discuss multi-party political system, size of the national army and modes of co-operation.

On multi-party, DP maintained that the system is the main insurance for sustained democracy. The NRM at the beginning remained non-committal and wanted DP to convince it on the merits of the system. However, during the last meeting with the President he stated that NRM/NRA was not convinced that the multi-party system was necessary for democracy but rather that it was injurious to national unity. He said that the only acceptable compromise was for a period of time to be agreed and set during which time the political parties would be in 'limbo' (abeyance) and thereafter the question would be put to a referendum whether multi-party system should be upheld or abolished!

Recent events on the political scene have tended to support the view that far from wishing to co-operate with DP or other political parties the NRM is headed for a course that would render political parties irrelevant. One major indicator is that it imposed at the commencement of the NRM administration, elections to RC [Resistance Committee]s and the NRC [National Resistance Council] are not permitted to campaign or to directly or indirectly disclose or indicate political party affiliation. All these and similar matters appeared harmless as long as they were associated with lower levels of RC and were thought to be for the duration of the interim period. However, recent legislation has applied the restrictions to NRC elections and has given them the force of law. And so it is that a candidate may be charged, and convicted of an offence and may be disqualified from being elected, if in the course of seeking to be elected he discloses that he belongs to a particular political party. There is only one apparent exception. It appears to be in order for one to proclaim affiliation to the "Movement"-NRM.

Other disturbing features of the recent legislation are, the role given to the 'Army' in the political governance of the country, and the apparent supremacy vested in the new organ to be known as the National Executive Committee of the NRM.

The full extent of the impact of all these legal provisions will depend on whether they applied to the interim period of the 4 years of NRM/NRA administration or will go beyond. Indeed the most crucial point must be whether the interim period is to remain as it was originally proclaimed i.e. ending in January 1990!

### 11. The Interim Period

The DP is well aware of the peculiar circumstances that preceded and surrounded the assumption of power by

the NRM in January 1986. Paragraph 14 of the proclamation under Legal Notice No. 1 of 1986 provides as follows:-

"14. The National Resistance Movement Government shall be an interim government and shall hold office for a period not exceeding four years from the date of this Proclamation."

The proclamation is deemed to have come into force on 26th January, 1986. By virtue of paragraph 2 of the same Proclamation the "supreme authority" of the government of Uganda was vested in the National Resistance Council 'NRC'. The original composition of NRC is what is loosely referred to as the "bush" NRC.

The composition has been expanded and now includes county and municipality representatives, district, youth and workers representatives as well as nominees of the President and of the Army Council. By virtue of the above cited provision of the Proclamation the NRC must therefore cease to hold office on (or before) 25th January, 1990. Although the new legislation providing for election and appointment of the additional members did not stipulate expressly

#### DP Warns NRM on Uganda's Political Future

##### The Insurgency in Country

The Democratic Party, as its history bears out, believes strongly and steadfastly in peaceful positive approach, and in constitutional, legal and democratic solution to political problems.

Hence DP rejects, abhors and condemns violence and terrorism as a means of either gaining or retaining power. Similarly the DP protests at, the objects to all unconstitutional, illegal and undemocratic policies and actions.

The DP is prepared at all times to co-operate with anyone, and in particular with the government, to discourage recourse to violence as a means to political ends. But the length of the term of office of the new members it must be understood to be the balance of the interim period since they are part and parcel of the NRC which is governed by the proclamation mentioned above.

Members of the expanded NRC and NEC should take cognisance of this fundamental proclamation and to ensure that the pledge is not renege by omission of commission. The people of Uganda abhor lost promises which in the past have plunged this country into catastrophies and nightmares. Our history is full of examples of lost opportunities and the country can ill afford repeat performances.

Such co-operation will be fruitless, unless the government itself is fully committed to constitutional, legal and democratic procedures; and unless and until the government sincerely believes in and firmly adheres, in practice, to the doctrine of fundamental human right.

It is, therefore, a matter of great regret that armed conflict persist in some part of the country. Peaceful as it is, DP supported and continues to support all reasonable steps taken to end this fighting which has brought so much suffering to whole populations of innocent people and retarded Uganda's recovery and development. In keeping with its policy for encouraging peaceful resolution of conflict, the DP has supported and continues to support all peaceful initiatives undertaken.

#### \* Police Personnel Call for Changes to Force

34000598c Kampala THE NEW VISION  
in English 11 Jul 89 p 3

[Article by Yunuou Abbey: "Police Officers Pass Resolutions"]

[Text] Senior Police Officers have called on the government to resuscitate the Police Fire Brigade now crippled by lack of fire-fighting equipment. They also called for the immediate expansion of the Police Airwing which is currently in a dilapidated state.

These were some of the resolutions passed at the end of a four-day seminar for police officers held at their mess in Kampala last weekend. It attracted over 150 participants. The police officers noted that the fire Brigade had been greatly incapacitated by the acute lack of fire fighting and life-saving equipment like trucks, ladders, helmets, uniforms, ropes and many others.

They noted that this had in turn rendered the fire brigade incapable of fulfilling its obligations to both the public and the country at large.

Last year, over three shops on Kampala road were gutted by fire and just last month, the Uganda Motors stores burst into flames and the fire brigade did very little to extinguish the fire. Currently, the unit has only two fire-fighting trucks.

The officers were also disappointed about the current state of the Police Airwing which not only lacks helicopters but also trained manpower and other relevant equipment. They, therefore, called on government to re-equip and expand the Airwing to enable it to link up with all other force operational units in combating crime throughout the country.

On promotions of senior ranks in the force, they appealed to the Internal Affairs Minister, Mr Ibrahim Muldibi, to speedily legalise setting up of the proposed Police Council which would duly handle the issue of promotions. According to them, the council's long absence since 1983, has bogged down promotions of senior ranks in the force.

Closing the seminar, former Internal Affairs Minister, Mr Kahinda Otafiire, appealed to government to consider setting up a retirement loan scheme for all members of the police force. According to Otafiire, such an arrangement would encourage officers to work harder with the hope of

leading a comfortable life upon retirement. "Many police officers are still hesitant to go on retirement because they lack anything to fall back on once out of service," he noted.

In his remarks, the Acting Inspector General of Police, Mr David P'somgen, called on the retiring officers to encourage a spirit of harmony between the university graduates in the force and themselves, saying they should prepare these graduates to take over full responsibility of the force once they retire.

The Acting Permanent Secretary Ministry of Internal Affairs, Mrs Florence Mugasha, urged those administering public funds to observe strict discipline in financial management.

The seminar whose objective was to acquaint departmental heads and district police commanders with accounting instructions, was hailed by police officers as the most successfully organised in recent times.



**\* ANC's Constitutional Guidelines Explained**

34000765c Lusaka SECHABA in English  
Jun 89 pp 2, 4-10

[Article by Zola S.T. Skweyiya: "A Vital Contribution to the Struggle Against Apartheid"; first paragraph SECHABA comment]

[Text] This paper was delivered by Zola Skweyiya at the meeting between the African National Congress [ANC] and Afrikaner Lawyers and Academics held in Harare in January 1989. We publish this article in the hope that it will help correct some misrepresentations in the western press and mass media and at home on the motives and intentions of the movement in issuing the guidelines. This article is also meant to be part of the on-going debate and discussion within our movement and at home.

In the last five years different constitutional models have been presented from different quarters, either to try to extricate the apartheid regime from its present crisis or to attempt to draw up a constitution for a post-apartheid South Africa. What is surprising is that the victims of apartheid tyranny, the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movement were never consulted nor were their views solicited.

It is significant that most of the attempts at constitutional modelling were presented at the apex of the struggles launched by the democratic forces which threw the apartheid system into an unprecedented crisis in the period between late 1984 and early 1987. The heightened mobilisation of the oppressed by the ANC [African National Congress], both in urban and rural areas, its concerted efforts at politicisation of the broad masses of our people and the effective actions of Umkhonto We Sizwe contributed towards shifting the balance of forces in the country towards a democratic transformation. Through struggle was built, within South Africa, the most formidable democratic movement our country has ever seen. Its consistency, its perseverance in the face of innumerable difficulties and the tenacity with which it, on a whole, weathered the storms of the apartheid state's onslaught, are worthy of the admiration of all democrats the world over. It bears testimony to the unshakeable foundations on which this democratic movement was built.

It is worthy of note that it was during this period that the democratic trade union movement demonstrated its strength, mobilising capacity and influence. The strike actions it initiated and organised on a nation-wide scale struck fear deep into the hearts of the apartheid rulers and their international supporters. They also demonstrated the latent strength of the alliance of class and national forces both at national and local level and underlined the need to solidify this unity at all levels. Through unity new possibilities for an intensified and sustained political offensive were created. The ANC and the broad democratic movement placed great emphasis

on building and solidifying this trend towards unity as a key link in forging an all-out offensive against apartheid.

What terrified the ruling circles in the apartheid state was the open political challenge that these actions posed to the Pretoria regime. Through their concerted actions the anti-apartheid democratic forces challenged the very legitimacy of the apartheid state and deliberately focused their attention on political questions and fundamentally the issue of the apartheid state, its political organs and administrative structures. It is most significant that one of the most important developments of this period was the establishment and multiplication of the organs of "people's power," arising directly out of the struggle to make South Africa ungovernable.

The emergence of street and area committees, people's courts, etc., was not only a rejection of the apartheid state's legitimacy but also represented the birth of new organisational forms, rooting the democratic forces among the people and creating new elements which contributed towards broadening the liberation struggle on all fronts. Welded together by the common perspective of a unified democratic, non-racial country, this movement challenged the Botha regime for political power and posed an alternative vision of a South Africa which cuts across everything that the apartheid system represents. It ushered in a new era in the struggle for liberation. In actual struggle, millions were moved to train their eyes on the strategic perspective of the National Democratic Revolution, a people's democratic state, with all the socioeconomic and spiritual benefits that will accrue to those consigned today, by the apartheid forces, to perpetual wretchedness.

**The ANC Inspires the Masses**

Although we in the ANC do not claim credit for each and every action taken by the democratic forces during this period, we can safely claim to have, directly and indirectly, assisted and augmented their actions. Through our country-wide underground network, we were able to respond to the increased resolve of our people to act, in fact to draw them into action as well as to expand the organised strength and capacity of the democratic forces. Meanwhile their inventiveness enriched our experience and understanding of the situation in each and every part of the country.

It was under these circumstances that several constitutional models by the apartheid regime, its international supporters and some individuals were presented. These constitutional proposals were part and parcel of the regime's programme of crisis management, which included its several declarations of the state of emergency and the introduction of the National Security Management System. These were coupled with even more brutal campaigns of repression than we had ever experienced. Clearly the regime sought to immobilise the people, paralyse the organisations, silence their leaders and thus leave the political stage clear for its futile attempts to prop up its doomed apartheid system.

Through these constitutional manoeuvres it planned to hide the reality of army and police control of the country both at local and national level.

These constitutional manoeuvres of the regime were an assertion that power shall continue to be in the hands of the White minority, that this minority is happy to attach powerless subordinates to itself and that the whole apartheid pyramid will always be presided over by a ruthless clique who call themselves a State Security Council.<sup>1</sup>

It is against this background that the leadership of our movement decided to examine different constitutional options and models for a future democratic non-racial South Africa. It had to reassert the illegitimacy of the apartheid regime and the right of the oppressed to struggle for a democratic alternative to apartheid, a system of one person, one vote, in a democratic and non-racial South Africa, as the only solution that can bring justice, peace and democracy to our country.

The events during this period had made it abundantly clear that the crisis through which the apartheid system was going were an inevitable outcome of apartheid's own social contradictions which could not be hidden and which had reached a crisis point needing resolution. The old apartheid was no longer compatible with the elements of society. Apartheid laws and institutions had become so many fetters holding back the progress of the majority of the South African people in the interest of White minority rule. They were beginning to burst asunder. Hence the international alarm amongst investors and friends of the Pretoria regime and hurried attempts at constitutional modelling.

It was at this time also that different groups and individuals, both domestic and international, started to seek consultations with the ANC. Their objectives differed. Some were anxious to stave off apartheid's final demise and to persuade the ANC to compromise. Some came to hammer out with the ANC new strategies and tactics to hasten the downfall of apartheid and map out a post-apartheid blueprint for a free and democratic non-racial South Africa.

It is in this light that the formation of the Constitutional Committee of the ANC in January 1986 and the issuing of the Statement on Negotiations in October 1987, should be seen.

### On Negotiations

In its October 9, 1987 Statement on Negotiations the ANC expressed its serious doubts about the Botha regime's desire to engage in any meaningful negotiations to end apartheid. It pointed out the twofold objectives of the apartheid regime on the issue of negotiations, namely:

- To defuse the struggle inside South Africa by holding out false hopes of a just political settlement which the Pretoria regime has every intention of blocking.

- To defeat the continuing campaign for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions.<sup>2</sup>

The statement went on to state that the "struggle will not end until South Africa is transformed into a united democratic and non-racial country," and underlined that:

"A non-racial democratic transformation of South Africa is the only solution which would enable our people, both Black and White to live as equals in conditions of peace and equality. The overwhelming majority of our people accept that the Freedom Charter provides a reasonable and viable framework for the construction of a new society."

The statement reiterated the fact that the ANC had never at any time been opposed to a negotiated settlement of the South African question. It reaffirmed the ANC's willingness to enter into any genuine negotiations provided they are aimed at the transformation of South Africa into a united, non-racial democracy. This and only this, should be the objective of any negotiated process.

The statement emphasised the fact that the conflict in South Africa is between the forces of national liberation and democracy on the one hand and those of racism and apartheid on the other. It underlined the fact that any negotiations would have to be conducted by these two forces as represented by their various organisational formations. It rejected without qualification the proposed National Council as a genuine and acceptable mechanism for negotiating a democratic constitution for South Africa. Any constitution for a democratic and non-racial South Africa, the statement underlined, would have to:

- Define and treat our people as equal citizens, without regard to race, colour and ethnicity;
- Guarantee this by including an entrenched Bill of Rights to safeguard the rights of the individual;
- Oppose any attempt to perpetuate the apartheid system by advancing the concept of so-called group and minority rights.

The statement went on to stipulate the minimum conditions which the apartheid regime should fulfil to convince the ANC of its serious intention to negotiate. It was stressed that all negotiations would have to be centred around the theme of transforming South Africa into a united, democratic and non-racial country and not the amendment of the apartheid system. It emphasised the ANC's rejection of any "secret negotiations" behind the backs of our people.

Pursuant to this statement the ANC issued its constitutional guidelines in late January 1988. They were the product of two years' work by the Constitutional Committee and protracted discussions and consultations between it and the National Executive Committee (NEC). After the NEC's Negotiations Statement the ANC was compelled to explain and expand on its



thinking on a post-apartheid blueprint for South Africa and a constitutional model occupied a central place in this post-apartheid strategy. It is however, not meant only for a post-apartheid South Africa.

It is an ideological instrument, a morale booster and a clarification of our objectives in our present struggle against apartheid. At this time when the signs are clear that the apartheid regime has been shaken to its foundations, its allies frightened and confused and its overseas supporters put on the defensive, the guidelines are meant to strengthen the confidence of the liberation forces, and deepen the conviction of all those who have lost their faith in the viability of the apartheid system. They are meant to increase the pressure on the apartheid regime on all fronts and make our force irresistible. They are a response to the demands of the situation the struggle has reached.

#### **Guidelines Are Not a Constitution**

The history of the liberation struggle in South Africa demonstrates clearly that the ANC has never underestimated the apartheid regime's offensive on the constitutional front. Our opposition to the constitutional manoeuvres of the apartheid regime from the 1960s, when it introduced its bantustan system, up to its 1983 constitutional manoeuvres are a clear demonstration of this. They have nothing to do with "Glasnost" or "Perestroika" and there never was any pressure from the Soviet Union or any other quarter as Belinda Berret tries to suggest.<sup>3</sup>

All such suggestions are products of fertile imaginations and lack serious academic honesty. It should be clear to our adversaries, if they could once be honest and objective in their analysis of the struggle against apartheid, that the ANC offensive against the apartheid regime on all fronts cannot be slackened as this would give advantage to the regime. Our experience and that of colleagues in independent Africa and the Front Line States, has taught us that constitutional modelling should occupy a more crucial place in our political strategies. It should not be allowed to become the monopoly of our adversaries or those who operate within the existing framework and structures of apartheid's political and administrative institutions. Besides its moral, political, strategic ideological and diplomatic advantages, it assists in promoting a clearer understanding of our motives and objectives to the world at large, and deepens the conviction of our membership, contributes towards a mass understanding of the deficiencies of the apartheid system and magnifies its criminal and oppressive nature.

It is in this spirit that the ANC has tabled these constitutional guidelines. They are no constitution, as some seem to suggest and were never meant to be one. The ANC is of the opinion that the drafting of a constitution for a democratic non-racial South Africa can only be the task of elected representatives of all the people of our country in a constituent assembly. These guidelines are being tabled for discussion by all our people, irrespective

of their political inclinations, ideological leanings or party affiliation. They are meant to set in motion a process of national debate. It is hoped that finally a position will emerge out of these discussions which will reflect the broadest national consensus. It is in this spirit that these guidelines have been tabled for consideration by all South Africans.

#### **The Guidelines and the Freedom Charter**

The document is divided into two sections, the Preamble and the main principles, composed of 25 clauses. In reading and assessing the document, one finds that the connecting link between the Preamble and the main principles is the Freedom Charter which remains to this day the main policy document of our movement. The Freedom Charter has a double value in the history of the constitutional development of our struggle.

In the first place it became part and parcel of the constitution of the African National Congress and has in the last ten years been adopted as a programme by a series of organisations in the democratic movement in South Africa today.

Secondly, it projects a vision arising out of the struggles and demands of the people, which are bound to underly any future constitution for a non-racial democratic South Africa.<sup>4</sup>

The Guidelines are meant to carry the Freedom Charter forward, and to distil its essence in a set of constitutional formulations especially declaring what the African National Congress believes the foundations of government in a liberated South Africa should be.

The Preamble is meant to underline this link between the Guidelines and the Freedom Charter.

It is meant to stress and emphasise that the Guidelines present no change whatsoever in our demands for full political, economic and social participation in the government of South Africa.

The Preamble underlines our demand for the creation of a just and democratic society in South Africa that will outlaw all forms of discrimination and inequality and dismantle all apartheid structures and institutions. It emphasises the need for corrective action in a post-apartheid South Africa which will guarantee a rapid and irreversible redistribution of wealth and the opening of facilities to all.

It stresses the need for the protection and extension of human rights to all and the redistribution of land. It rejects completely the notion of "group rights" and regards that as an entrenchment of the existing apartheid inequality of property ownership.

The terms "just" and "democratic" permeate the whole text of the Preamble. They are used in a clear and unambiguous manner to underline our objectives. They emphasise the centrality of justice and democracy in our day-to-day carrying out of the struggle and the significant

role they will play in the solution of political and socioeconomic problems in a post-apartheid South Africa.

#### **The Role of the Personality and the Individual**

The Guidelines advocate an independent centralised, unitary, democratic, non-racial state with the sovereignty belonging to the people as a whole and exercised through one central legislature, executive and administration. Powers will be delegated by the central authority to subordinate administrative units for purposes of more efficient administration and democratic participation. The guidelines advocate universal suffrage based on one person one vote. The promotion of the growth of a single national identity and loyalty binding on all South Africans shall be the central concern of the state. The quest for a single national identity—the creation of a sense of territorial nationality transcending parochial loyalties of race, ethnicity, religion, language and region will not only be a crucial political task but will also be a commanding target for socioeconomic and cultural reconstruction. The adoption of a unitary and centralised form of government as suggested in the Guidelines will contribute to strengthening the moulding of a single national identity and national consolidation.

Judging from independent Africa's experience, the majority of whose nations have adopted the presidential form of government, the role of the leader of the ruling party has been critically important in moulding this single national identity and focusing on national development. To fulfil such a role, such a personality must not only possess intellectual and policy-making skills and a clear vision of the future but must also be morally capable of inspiring both devotion and selflessness. He must possess the rare gift of projecting a sense of moral purpose and inspire widespread popular loyalty and trust. Possessing such qualities he should be able to enhance not only the legitimacy of his government but also its political system and policy. His skills, and political and moral integrity, coupled with his popularity would be indispensable to the new government's strategy of development and national unification.

To foster national unification and to strengthen the moulding of a single national identity, the government would have to sketch carefully a policy to counter all the vestiges of apartheid, especially the forces of ethnicity. Government policy should aim at generating a capacity to reach all the people in all areas, especially the rural areas where the bantustan system is presently rooted. To achieve this the policy should attach more importance to the individual roles the ordinary citizens, especially the peasantry and workers, play in developmental policy and foster a spirit of self-respect and honour in each individual.

In this way, each individual would regard himself as an integral part of the new nation. Each individual's and each community's contribution would hopefully be

viewed as a contribution to the national effort. Individual and local action would thereby be conceived as intimately bound to the pursuit of national goals and the creation of a single national identity and nationhood.

The consolidation of national identity and nationhood would be complemented by the government's policy of recognition of the cultural and linguistic diversity of the country. The development of our languages and cultural heritage would be prime factors in the broad national development strategies.

#### **The Bill of Rights**

The inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the constitution is advocated in the document aimed at guaranteeing the fundamental rights of the citizen, eradicating all forms of discrimination and outlawing the advocacy or practice of racism and incitement of ethnic or regional exclusiveness or hatred. It guarantees a multi-party system, the right to education and social security and protection of the right to work. The Bill of Rights guarantees the centrality of socioeconomic liberties in the post-apartheid reconstruction policy. It places great emphasis on affirmative action because, as Albie Sachs puts it:

"It is not just individuals who will be looking to the Bill of Rights as a means of enlarging their freedoms and improving the quality of their lives, but whole communities, especially those whose rights have been systematically and relentlessly denied by the apartheid system."<sup>5</sup>

According to Albie, such a Bill of Rights should have "an appropriate corrective strategy stating clear and irreversible goals with an undeniable social and moral purpose but considerable flexibility."

The Guidelines propose no definite election system. This is left to the people of South Africa to choose. In assessing the centrality of a Bill of Rights in any constitutional proposal for a post-apartheid South Africa it should always remain in our minds that the enjoyment of human rights in any society although predicated by the economic system, does not hinge on it alone. Vastly influential is the political regime, the level of democracy, traditions, the spiritual climate in society and cultural development. Particularly important is the political consciousness of the citizenry which determines the level of enjoyment of human rights. This also, has to be in the back of our minds, in the formulation of any constitutional dispensation for a post-apartheid South Africa.

We assume that the post-apartheid era will be a dynamic period creating a society rapidly advancing along the path of social progress. The transition from one stage of its development to another, we hope will bring about broader rights and freedoms and stronger guarantees for their implementation and effective protection. Conclusive proof thereto would not only have to be provided for in the constitution, the fundamental law of the country, but also be proved by daily practice.

### Human Rights and Democracy

In the minds of millions of the oppressed in today's South Africa, the removal of apartheid is not only associated with the improvement of the political climate and their standards of living but also with the broadening of their enjoyment of human rights. Hence the progressiveness and humaneness of our post-apartheid regime will be judged by its human rights record. It will be expected not only to conform to standards set up by the international human rights covenants, but will have to make all possible efforts to excel them. Its human rights concept would have to proceed from the close relationship, interlinkage and equal value of all categories of human rights; i.e., economic, political, social, cultural and personal.

They should all be regarded as equally important and necessary for securing a normal life and standards for the whole of society.

Such a concept of human rights should not only stress the dependence of these rights and fundamental freedoms on the state of the national economy, but also emphasise their linkage with the purpose, direction and content of the state's social programme and the level of democracy in the country.

The Guidelines recommend a mixed economy in which the state will play no minimum role, ensuring that the entire economy serves the interest and well being of all sections of the population. The state will determine the general context in which economic development takes place. There will be a public sector and a private sector, which will co-operate with the state in the realisation of the broad development goals of the country. Cooperation between the state and private enterprise will provide the state with the most pragmatic and feasible opportunities in its endeavour to enhance the welfare of the individual and uplift the living standards of the most disadvantaged groups by providing more jobs, better educational opportunities and housing and health facilities. Cooperation between the state, private investment and individual entrepreneurship may contribute to a faster growth rate thus creating possibilities of eliminating presently-existing disparities in income, employment and other opportunities.

Entrenching the mixed economy in the constitution will provide opportunities for maintaining and consolidating the unity of the anti-apartheid forces which has been forged in the anti-apartheid struggle and channel it to the task of national and economic development.

The examples of the developing world, especially those of independent Africa, have shown that the adoption of a mixed economy is always accompanied by the development of extreme social and economic stratification of society. Unlike the present racial and political problems under apartheid, which hopefully will be transitional and will find solution in the democratisation of a post-apartheid South Africa, the problems caused by severe

stratification are always endemic and sometimes inevitable. They are a by-product of economic development, urbanisation and the growth of the bureaucracy. Whether they can be kept within manageable bounds depends fundamentally on the economic regime adopted.

### The Land Question and Workers' Rights

Experience has shown that the solution of the land question in such situations is fundamentally central. For most Africans in the countryside who will have experienced apartheid's forced removals and bantustan repression, land acquisition will be a matter of great concern. The Guidelines propose a land reform programme that will:

- Abolish all racial restrictions on ownership and use of land;
- implement land reforms conforming to the principle of affirmative action, and taking into account the status of the victims of forced removals.

The land question has always been central in the demands of our people. It should be one of our primary concerns in post-apartheid South Africa. Like the question of the economy it needs careful attention. If not handled rightly it could be a source of grievances and unfulfilled hopes and aspirations. It needs extremely thoughtful and sensitive handling.

In the present stage of the struggle, the working class has emerged as the dominant social force opposing apartheid tyranny. As such the Guidelines will not have fulfilled their task if they have not spelt out the role of the workers in a post-apartheid constitutional dispensation. The document advocates the incorporation of a Charter protecting workers' trade union rights, especially the right to strike and collective bargaining.

### The Gender Question

For the solution of the gender question, the Guidelines advocate equal rights in all spheres of public and private life for women. The intervention of the state through affirmative action to eliminate inequalities and discrimination between the sexes is foreseen. This is in recognition of the role women are playing in the struggle against apartheid today and a stimulus and an encouragement for their more and broader participation in the post-apartheid socioeconomic development strategies.

The onslaught by the apartheid regime on the family has always been a source of concern to us, hence the Guidelines advocate its protection and that of parenthood and children's rights.

The struggle against apartheid is indissolubly intertwined with the struggle for international peace and democracy. Hence the guidelines envisage South Africa's commitment to nonalignment, and the principles of the OAU [Organization of African Unity] Charter and the Charter of the United Nations. A post-apartheid South



Africa will declare its solidarity with the forces of national liberation, world peace and disarmament.

### Conclusion

The Guidelines lay down broad and general principles of government structures and powers and the fundamental rights and liberties of the people. They are framed in a broad pragmatic and flexible style. It is this flexibility that makes them a lethal weapon in the struggle against apartheid. They are the product of a deliberate assessment of the present stage of our struggle. They are not only meant to spell out the rights of the people and the responsibilities of the individual to society, but are meant to keep pace with the developments of society and the times. For we regard constitutions as living documents dealing with the real problems of our contemporary generation.

They have been tabled for deep study, and bold and realistic discussions by the broadest spectrum of our people. Through this debate we hope that they will be further enriched. Through them we hope to achieve the greatest mobilisation and organisation of all possible motive forces in the struggle against apartheid.

We strongly believe that the campaign around the Guidelines will have achieved its success only when it has reached our people at grassroots level and succeeded in focusing their imagination on the achievement of a unitary, democratic and non-racial South Africa.

### Footnotes

1. Oliver Tambo—ANC January 8th, 1988 Statement.
2. ANC Statement on Negotiations SECHABA, December 1987 (p3).
3. Belinda Barrett—An Analysis of Recent Constitutional Developments Within the ANC and Its Stance on Negotiations, Inkatha Institute for South Africa, September 1988 (p 32).
4. Alfred Nzo—Opening address, ANC In-House Seminar on Constitutional Guidelines, 1-4 March, 1988, Lusaka (unpublished).
5. Albie Sachs—Towards a Bill of Rights in Democratic South Africa (p 12); Contribution—ANC In-House Seminar on Constitutional Guidelines 1-4 March, 1988 (unpublished).

### \* POW Status Demanded for ANC Captives

34000769 Lusaka SECHABA in English Jul 89 pp 1-2

[Editorial: "We Demand POW Status for Captured Combatants"]

[Text] Jabu Masina, 36 Ting Ting Masango, 30, and Neo Potsane, 28, undaunted soldiers of Umkhonto We Sizwe, join over 60 men and women who are known to be currently awaiting execution on Pretoria's death row. Charged with treason, terrorism and murder, they and a fourth co-accused, Joseph Makhura, 27, were found guilty of murder and attempted murder after a month-long trial.

On April 27th, 1989, they were sentenced. The three received the death sentence plus 25 years for murder and attempted murder, while Makhura was sentenced to 25 years for attempted murder.

The four have asserted that, as soldiers, they should not be tried by a civilian court. Their courageous stand, in spite of the possibility of the death penalty, comes at a time of growing calls for captured combatants to be accorded the status of prisoners of war.

The South African people have never doubted the legitimacy of the armed struggle waged by Umkhonto We Sizwe. The ANC [African National Congress] has argued long and hard in the international community that it was forced to embark on armed resistance by the violence and terrorism of the apartheid state. This is now widely accepted, but we must argue further that the apartheid regime is illegitimate, and that international law permits us to wage war against it.

Force was used to colonise and enslave the people of South Africa. The Act of Union of 1910 created a parliament without consulting the majority of people in the country. The African people are denied the vote. The Land Act of 1913 gave the African people 13 percent of the land. Having stripped Africans of their citizenship, the regime has created bantustans, and has used force to remove millions of African people into them. The statute books of Pretoria are filled with laws to subjugate the majority people and to maintain White supremacy, and these laws are reinforced through the brutal use of the state of emergency and a multitude of repressive 'security' laws.

Clearly, the apartheid regime rules without the authority of the people, and this is in breach of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which declares:

*"The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government; this will be expressed in periodic and general elections."*

Apartheid has been declared a crime against humanity. The illegitimacy of the apartheid regime has been recognised by international bodies, including the General Assembly of the United Nations, which has declared that it has no right to represent the people of South Africa. Further, in 1966, the General Assembly described the acts of the apartheid regime as war crimes. The apartheid regime has unleashed its aggression against both the people of South Africa and the peoples of its neighbours.

The ANC is entitled to oppose this illegitimate regime, and to combat it. The right to self-determination is an established principle of international law; and the United Nations has declared that, in pursuit of that right, peoples are entitled to seek and receive support from other nations. Hence, the ANC has a right to engage in armed struggle; and, since 1979, the General Assembly has explicitly given its support to this.

Given that the people of South Africa, led by the ANC, are at war with the apartheid regime, captured combatants must be entitled to claim POW status under the Geneva Conventions. The original Conventions of 1949, narrowly drawn, were widened by the 1977 Protocols. Protocol I of 1977 covers international armed conflicts, including struggles against colonial and alien dominations, and racist regimes. Since 1980, the ANC has been a party to the Conventions, and has observed its obligations under international law in accordance with the Conventions.

The courts of South Africa derived their authority from the illegitimate regime, and have no authority to try those upholding international law. The combatants of the ANC have every right to demand POW status. Those who should stand in the dock are the criminals of apartheid.

#### \* AZAPO's Banning Challenge Dismissed

34000764c Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English  
18 Jul 89 p 20

[Text] Durban—An application by the Azanian Peoples Party which challenged its banning was dismissed in the Supreme Court, Durban, yesterday.

The party, also known as AZAPO [Azanian People's Organization], was banned in terms of the Security Emergency Regulations proclaimed on June 10 last year.

AZAPO claims the regulations were invalid and of no force and effect in law.

It also claims that its banning in terms of the regulations was also invalid and of no force and effect in law.

The State President and the Minister of Law and Order, who are cited as respondents, disputed these claims and submitted that the emergency regulations and the banning of AZAPO were valid. They asked that AZAPO's application be dismissed.

In his judgment, Mr Justice Booysen quoted a number of cases dealing with similar issues which had been decided in the Appeal Court.

He found that the State President had acted within his powers in promulgating the regulations. He did not agree with the AZAPO submissions that the regulation were contradictory and vague.

He also found that the Minister of Law and Order acted within his powers in banning AZAPO in terms of the Security Emergency Regulations.

Mr Justice Booysen dismissed AZAPO's application and ordered it to pay the legal costs of the action.

#### \* Police Say No Evidence White Wolves Exist

34000767a Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English  
11 Jul 89 p 3

[Text] There was no evidence to prove that the group made famous by mass murderer Barend Hendrik Strydom, the so-called "White Wolves", existed, police reiterated yesterday.

A police statement released yesterday said media reports attributing crimes to the White Wolves, and in some cases the Black Wolves, were all thoroughly investigated, but no evidence had been found to prove that such groups existed.

A police witness said during the trial of Strydom, who killed seven Black people and injured 15 others during a wild shooting spree in central Pretoria on November 15 last year, that the White Wolves organization was a product of the mass killer's imagination.

During his trial Strydom said he was the leader of a three-member cell of the White Wolves and claimed other cells were in operation.

He said the organization operated on a highly secretive basis, and normal White Wolf members did not know the identity of members outside their own cells.

Prior to the mass murder incident, an anonymous telephone caller or callers claimed responsibility—on behalf of the White Wolves—for several crimes, including an arson attack on THE NAMIBIAN newspaper in Windhoek.

A black man claiming to be a member of the Black Wolves group wreaked havoc in the Eastern Cape recently, stabbing several white people in a shopping center with a knife.

Police said yesterday it appeared as if the name "Wolf" was being used for sensation—Sapa.

#### \* Efforts Made To Buy Secret Guidance System

34190337 Paris LA LETTRE DU CONTINENT in French  
28 Jul 89 p 2

[Text] South Africa made an attempt in Paris on 25 April to purchase not a stolen model of the Blowpipe missile, as was reported, but the guidance system for the Starstreak, which is considered the most modern of the portable ground-to-air missiles, 4 years ahead of the comparable American or Soviet weapons. This revelation was one of the results of a major investigation, on which the SUNDAY TELEGRAPH reported at the beginning of this month. That British newspaper had managed to interview Douglas Carlos Bernhardt, the American who served as an intermediary between the three Irishmen—Noel Little, Samuel Quinn, and James King—and the representative of the South African Embassy in Paris, Daniel Storm. Bernhardt, who is 41,

withdrew to a village near the Swiss frontier in France when he was "provisionally released" by the French court authorities.

In the course of the interview granted to the SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, the indiscreet weapons merchant said that the transaction that took place in a large Parisian hotel had to do with three essential parts of a supersophisticated guidance system known to the experts as the ACLOS [Automatic Command-to-Line-of-Sight]. It is the "brain" of the Starstreak (literally, this word refers to the luminous trail left by a star). As it approaches a target, it operates like a video screen—luminous rays steadily illuminate the outline of the object to be destroyed, so that the explosive charge of the missile inevitably makes contact. Because it does not rely on any heat-seeking principle, the ACLOS cannot be lured away by a decoy, as can the Sam-7.

It is reported that Pretoria decided to purchase the Starstreak "by any means and at any price" following the attack by a flight of Cuban MiG-23s, which cost 11 white South Africans their lives last November. The attack took place at Cualeque, in the extreme southern portion of Angola.

In connection with the Starstreak affair, the British secret services are said to have urged the French DST [Territorial Security Department] to arrest the Irishmen "as soon as contact is made" in Paris, because of the Canadian Bombardier company's plan to buy back the Starstreak from its manufacturer, Shorsts Brothers. In the end, according to sources close to the British services, Israel and South Africa were to share the stolen technology, and would allow the Ulster loyalists to buy the weapons seized by the Israelis in Lebanon (RPG-7s and Kalashnikovs) with South African funds.

As to the affair involving the French Mistral ground-to-air missiles (LA LETTRE DU CONTINENT, No 89), the Congolese Government now believes that highly placed Congolese officials were bribed by South African agents during the negotiations on Angola in Brazzaville (LA LETTRE DU CONTINENT, No 76). The investigation is continuing in Paris, and a female judge is scheduled to travel to the Congo shortly.

#### \* Commentator Views Botha-Mandela Meeting

34000746b Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES  
in English 16 Jul 89 p 15

[Article by Tertius Myburgh: "The Mandela Thunderbolt"]

[Text] Suddenly, out of a clear blue sky, flashed a series of political thunderbolts that allow us, for the first time in decades, to think the unthinkable. For optimists, the prospects are dizzying.

Could it be that South Africa has at last taken a tentative - though muddled - step across that threshold which leads, ultimately, to a negotiated and more or less serene future?

Indubitably, the most startlingly significant occurrence was last week's meeting between President Botha and Mr Nelson Mandela.

It hardly matters what brought it about.

It could have been a careful, jointly planned ice-breaker by two septuagenarians who, each in his own way, is semi-detached from mainstream politics - Mr Botha because he is seeing out his last days as a head of state unencumbered by party attachments; Mr Mandela because age and long incarceration have elevated him to an almost mystical status above the daily grind of the power struggle.

On the other hand, it could simply have been a case of two ageing adversaries curious to meet each other before their personal circumstances are altered one way or another.

#### Fateful

Alternatively, Mr Botha, now sulky, isolated and anxious about his place in history, many simply have wanted to place a final, indelible stamp on his political reign.

The reasons matter less than the consequences of that fateful encounter in Tuynhuys last Wednesday morning.

For one thing, others who talk to representatives of the ANC [African National Congress] can no longer be accused of treason or naiveté.

After all, here we have a once venerated State President who was an energetic propagator of total onslaught theory taking tea and little cakes with the head ANC man himself - the occasion engineered by the Government's Minister of Justice and, so we are assured, in the full knowledge of the NP [National Party]'s leader.

And another point: Until quite recently the formal status of Mr Mandela has been that of a prisoner convicted of a criminal offence. But heads of government do not usually take tea with common prisoners, so we must assume that the eminence from Victor Verster is now officially (and quite properly) regarded in another light.

Thus, almost stealthily, Mr Mandela's status has been altered in many important ways. His place, and that of the body of opinion he leads, must now surely be secure at the table when - and if - negotiations ever begin in this country.

Could one have imagined, barely a few months ago, that a statement from inside prison - by Mr Mandela, as the SABC now respectfully calls him - would be the main item on the evening news and read by the announcer with a gravitas that is usually reserved for very important people indeed?



### Changes

Whether through circumstances or by design (in the event, probably a mixture of both), one thing is certain: Rarely before have captors been so captive of their own prisoner.

And consider the wider background against which the Tuynhuys tea-party took place.

Mr F. W. de Klerk to meet Mozambique's President Chissano before going to Washington and, possibly, the Oval office ... Inkatha's Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi to meet Mr Oliver Tambo ... Mrs Albertina Sisulu at No 10 Downing Street (on her way back from the White House).

In white politics we have a ruling party that has committed itself to a bill of rights, no domination by one group of another and the achievement of all this - and more - through negotiation.

Leftist of centre, a new alliance of modernising politicians in the DP [Democratic Party] show encouraging signs of success in attracting significant support from across previously impenetrable tribal lines.

The Idasa ferry to Lusaka operates at full steam, exposing an extraordinary range of South Africans to the thinking of the exiled ANC leadership, and vice versa.

At the same time, the sub-continental landscape has undergone unimaginable changes. Both Namibia and Angola have been set on a new course; Mozambique is being systematically wooed out of an Eastern orbit; and throughout the region economies are collapsing and leaders are belatedly recognising the folly of an ideology that is being abandoned even in the country from whence it was exported, the USSR.

And from Moscow itself comes a new message: Armed struggle is not the way to liberation south of the Limpopo; work, instead, for a negotiated political settlement so that South Africa's economy (mixed, not marxist) remains intact.

Across this changing southern sky flashed that thunderbolt last week: Botha and Mandela had agreed - they confirmed their support for peaceful development. It was one of those symbolic events (undeniable even by those, to left and right, whose first reactions reflected lamentable confusion) that can change the course of history.

Mr Pik Botha was not exaggerating when he said it was one of the most important occurrences of our time.

Does this mean, as speculation has it, that Mr Mandela is about to be freed? It is irresponsible to conclude that the authorities are edging towards such a step, but we should probably not expect the doors of Victor Verster to swing open before September 6.

A ruling party that faces its toughest election in 40 years is unlikely to inject a new issue that is so loaded with volatile and unpredictable consequences into the campaign.

It is, therefore, much, much too early to light the triumphal fires on Meintje's Kop.

For the moment, only three things are certain as we contemplate the different pieces that have been so unexpectedly put into play.

### Utopians

First, the political landscape is being irreversibly transformed.

Second, it will require painstaking statecraft to pull all the threads together in a practical peace process. There will be many stops and starts, and progress is unlikely to meet the timetables of impatient and insensitive utopians both within South Africa and without.

Third, we must remember that this is Rubicon country and the consequences of failure must constantly be borne in mind. Expectations are being raised perilously high. To frustrate them would be to trigger consequences - in white as much as black communities - that could be terrible to behold.

Rather, we should remember Edmund Burke's dictum: "All that wise men ever aim at is to keep things from coming to the worst."

### \* Commentator Explores Forums for Negotiation

34000746c Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES  
in English 16 Jul 89 p 15

[Article by Brian Pottinger: "Why Not 'Privatise' the Process of Negotiation?"]

[Text] South Africa [SA] is loaded to the gunwales at the moment with a new official buzzword - privatisation.

Yet, in perhaps one of the most crucial areas of all, constitution building, the concept is remarkably by its absence and perhaps for that very reason is the front on which the least progress has been made in recent years.

Cynics will no doubt laugh at the idea of privatising something as critical as the ordering of power relations within our fractious countries by, as it were, putting it out to tender.

They should not laugh too soon: The process is to a considerable extent already under way. We are, to all intents and purposes, in a situation of pre-negotiations.

The impasse that has developed over the years has as one of its problems the finding of a neutral forum for negotiating a future South Africa.

Nearly every constitutional initiative undertaken by the Government has fallen flat on its face because nobody,

least of all black South Africans, was really prepared to trust the National Party - perhaps with reason.

That sad situation is unlikely to change in the short term - no matter how pyrotechnic Mr F. W. de Klerk's reform rhetoric.

To an extent, that reality if already accepted by the Government. It was the "non-partisan" President's Council that did the running on the tricameral Parliament proposals and the Urban Foundation on a new urbanisation policy - with the support of the Government.

If we are looking for new forums, perhaps we need not look much further than the South African Law Commission. This body, established in terms of the SA Law Commission Act of 1973, is chaired by a judge and consists of a committee of six appointed by the President and charged with advising on the reform or improvement of the country's legal regimen.

#### Options

The commission, under the chairmanship of Mr Justice Pierre Olivier, recently brought out a report on a Bill of Rights for South Africa which fundamentally changes the race-based nature of our constitutional and political order.

This body, granted, is a government-created structure, but it does possible represent the nearest politically "neutral" State forum for thrashing out constitutional options in a country so deeply divided that it cannot even agree on the symbols of statehood, such as flags and anthems.

The commission's most recent report, although certainly not drawing loud public praises from the ANC [African National Congress], has certainly evoked considerable interest from points north.

The commission cannot unilaterally decide a constitution and then impose it on the nation. It cannot negotiate a constitution.

But it can, at least, take evidence, weigh up options and come up with some proposals - in other words do a little pre-negotiating. These can then be debated by the real power-brokers in Pretoria, Ulundi and Lusaka.

The National Party in its Five Year Plan has already hinted at the need to start tackling concrete constitutional proposals and Dr Dennis Worrall, when still an independent, suggested that the Chief Justice be required, in consultation with experts, to provide a range of constitutional options. What about the ANC and Inkatha?

This is where the other leg of the argument comes into effect. Having once decided on a neutral forum for talks in the pre-negotiation phase it will be incumbent on the Government to make it possible for as many players as possible to take part.

It can do this by doing two things and not doing a third.

First, it must effectively place a temporary moratorium on future constitutional changes. Creating more "own", "general" and "open" groups and structures will merely complicate the issue. The decision not to impose Regional Services Councils on Natal, for example, is a hopeful first step.

Second, it must, as the Americans say, lighten up. It should work towards creating a stabilised political climate in which it becomes the norm, not the exception, for people to confront and publicly debate political view-points.

Third, it must not haphazardly grab at any good idea that comes along and slap it into its inchoate programme of principles or actions - as it has done by hijacking the Law Commissions' Bill of Rights and seriously misapplying it in its Plan of Action. That way, the Government just makes a good idea bad.

#### \* Afrikaans Alternative Press Surveyed

34200003 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
RUNDSCHAU in German 23 Jun 89 p 14

[Article by Chris Louw: "Timid Glances Beyond the Boer Laager. Opposition Newspapers Publish in Afrikaans. Using the 'Language of the Oppressors' a Ticklish Business"]

[Text] [Boxed item: The 1976 Soweto street battles began in 1976 over language, when millions of black students demonstrated their opposition to the introduction of Afrikaans as the language of general instruction. For years Afrikaans, a variant of Dutch, was considered the hated language of the Boer oppressors; no one in the opposition was willing to use that language. Recently for the first time in South Africa, Afrikaans newspapers and magazines have begun to appear whose purpose is not to serve as the mouthpiece of apartheid policy but to express their distance from and criticism of the apartheid state in the language of the Boers. Chris Louw writes about their external difficulties as well as their internal contradictions; his article appears in the May/June edition of INFORMATIONSDIENST SUEDELICHES AFRIKA.]

A recent headline in the ARGUS, an established English-language newspaper in Cape Town, summed up the problems of the "alternative" publications in Afrikaans: "Financial Crisis Threatens VRYE WEEKBLAD," was the title of a short article in which the publisher of the VRYE WEEKBLAD (Free Weekly) sharply attacked private capital for its lack of financial support.

"We have done all we can to seek a response (in the form of advertising) from local business people, but the concept of our newspaper has not appeared worth supporting to them," Max du Preez was quoted as saying. "Obviously they do not appreciate the role that the VRYE WEEKBLAD hopes to play among the Afrikaner

population. I fear they believe that the Boers should be left alone to remain in the hands of the National Party—which they feel means stability and profits.”

Du Preez's dissatisfaction illustrated the contradictory situation in which each “alternative” Afrikaans-language publication finds itself with respect to financial support. Today South African politics is dominated by symbolic gestures rather than by political decency and political substance. Capital would rather persuade radical blacks that it favors a more just society. In practice that means that it places its human rights advertisements in mainly leftist English-language “alternative” publications, which boast far more black readers than the Afrikaans-language magazines and newspapers, which have just appeared on the scene.

There is an additional factor that prevents capital from identifying openly with the Afrikaans publications: Afrikaans is the language of the government. Financing Afrikaans-language newspapers opposing the government would immediately be interpreted as a subversive act against the Boers. Leading South African businessmen still remember the Chris Ball affair only too well. Ball was criticized by President Botha for contributing to an advertisement in English-language newspapers that was viewed as pro-ANC (African National Congress). An investigatory committee was set up to discover who financed the advertisement. All this meant extremely bad publicity for the First National Bank, whose chairman Ball was at the time.

#### **Afrikaans as the Language of the Oppressor**

To understand the rather precarious position of the “alternative” Afrikaans press, it is necessary to take a glance at the role of Afrikaans as a language in the highly-politicized society of South Africa.

Afrikaans is a language with strong Creole characteristics. It originated in the Dutch spoken by the first white settlers at the Cape of Good Hope after they came into contact with the cultures of the native population in the 17th century. For years it was the language of subjects, of rebels against the Dutch colonial regime, and later against British imperialism.

Then in 1948 Afrikaans became the most powerful instrument of political mobilization for the National Party's racist policies. Language and culture, traditionally shared by just as many nonwhite speakers as by whites, were literally confiscated by the Boer establishment for its own political purposes.

During the past 40 years of nationalist rule, Afrikaans has increasingly been considered the “language of the oppressors”—the language of the “Bantu Administration.” Then in 1976 it was the cause of the Soweto revolts when thousands of blacks rejected Afrikaans as the medium of instruction.

The masses' rage at Afrikaans drove the 3 million Afrikaans-speaking blacks into an identity crisis. Suddenly they found themselves in the unenviable situation of being the victims of the apartheid system and at the same time being identified with the “language of the oppressors”—the object of their fellow victims' rage.

At first they showed a strong inclination to use English. The problem, however, was that rural “coloreds” did not speak English. Afrikaans was the only language they knew and loved.

#### **SAAMSTAAN**

In 1983 when journalists from the progressive magazine GRASSROOTS arrived in the conservative city of Oudtshoorn in the Karroo to help found a new community newspaper, this was precisely the problem they faced. People like Mansoor Jaffer were determined to help politicize the local people to sensitize them to the injustices of apartheid. But the only language they spoke was Afrikaans. This is how SAAMSTAAN (Standing Together) was founded, the first “alternative” community newspaper in Afrikaans. Later it became trilingual, and today it also reports in Xhosa, the language of the local blacks, and in English.

This was the first time that the struggle for a just society had been carried on through the medium of Afrikaans—although it was rather difficult at first: The terminology and all the slogans of the liberation struggle have been developed in English, but idiomatic expressions first had to be found in Afrikaans.

SAAMSTAAN was published by very ordinary black members of the community. The original editorial staff was made up of a housewife, a student, a dismissed teacher, and an unemployed rugby player. The newspaper concentrated on community problems—housing shortages, lack of recreation facilities, and low pay—but made itself part of the “broad democratic struggle, as embodied by the United Democratic Front (UDF), whose rights were sharply curtailed by the state of emergency.

#### **[DIE] SUID-AFRIKAAN**

It was not only extraparlimentary circles that saw the need for “alternative” sources of information. The political revolts also had a direct effect on the small number of liberal Boer academics who no longer could identify with the excesses of the brutal system. Something must be done, they believed. The summer of 1984 saw the first attempt to provide liberal “alternative” sources of information with the foundation of DIE SUID-AFRIKAAN [The South African] in the small university town of Stellenbosch. The founders of the magazine were history professor Hermann Giliomee and Andre Du Toit, professor of the history of political thought. Ironically enough, both academics have since taken posts at the English-language University of Cape Town, where there is more room for independent thought.



Originally DIE SUID-AFRIKAAN took a rather reserved line: It approached political problems in a highly intellectual, balanced way in an effort to begin a liberal debate in Afrikaans. However, the political crisis, which led to the brutal state of emergency, compelled the academics to take a stand on it. Thus it came about that the entire staff of DIE SUID-AFRIKAAN, including the two publishers and two journalists, went along on the "Dakar Safari" to meet with top ANC leaders in Senegal in July 1987. In the pioneering spirit that prevailed at the time, DIE SUID-AFRIKAAN published a complete interview with Steve Tswethe, today the number two man in Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC's armed branch. A courageous step, as anyone familiar with the sensitivities of the paranoid National Party government can confirm.

Since then, however, the magazine's focus has split, with the emphasis more on gradual change than on fundamental opposition to the regime. In a sense this division within DIE SUID-AFRIKAAN simply reflects a new debate that has arisen among liberal South Africans.

At the high point of the 1984-86 political crisis, leftist whites flirting with socialist ideas considered themselves morally in the right. Since then the defenders of the free market economy have launched a concentrated campaign to defend their point of view. These efforts were led by Ken Owen, the stubborn publisher of BUSINESS WEEK, supported by people of the caliber of economics expert Charles Simkins. Their goal was to detach the liberals from the socialist rhetoric of the "rebellious democratic mass movement," and to instill in them a new confidence in the advantages of the free market economy.

Afrikaner circles, too, were deeply affected by the political crisis. A large group of Boers were compelled by their conscience to choose between democracy ("one person, one vote" in a united state) or division (with the dream of an Afrikaner homeland as the final goal). Such a situation leads to tremendous confusion—political, moral, and intellectual.

#### VRYE WEEKBLAD

This uncertainty is manifest on the pages of the Afrikaans-language "alternative" press and most of all in the weekly VRYE WEEKBLAD, the latest attempt to break out of the Boer laager.

The VRYE WEEKBLAD was founded late last year by a group of disillusioned Boer journalists headed by Max du Preez. Du Preez had previously been a political correspondent for BUSINESS DAY. Like other Boer dissidents, Du Preez's journalistic self-awareness had compelled him to break with the Afrikaans paradigm late in his career and seek employment with an English-language newspaper. The simple reason was that there was no medium in Afrikaans through which to disseminate opposition thinking. Dissidents like Du Preez were therefore forced to join an entirely different discussion in a different language—a discussion the arguments of

which were summarily dismissed by the loyal Boer press as being due only to "boerehaat" (hatred of the Boers, English contempt for the Boers).

Something of this schizophrenia is visible also on the pages of the VRYE WEEKBLAD. The Afrikaner's traditional inclination to mock English speakers (a result of the concentration camps in the British-Boer War at the beginning of the century, where thousands of woman and children died) sometimes shows up in the VRYE WEEKBLAD's otherwise rather "radical" line. Some time ago, for instance, a caricaturist in an English-language newspaper was summarily dismissed as a Boer hater because he portrayed rightwing Boers as ill-mannered.

The VRYE WEEKBLAD seeks to bring the discussion of justice and human rights to the Boers in their own language. There is a contradiction in this as well: The struggle for justice will inevitably work to the detriment of precisely the medium they are using to express themselves, because there is no doubt that the great majority of South Africans prefer English as their lingua franca. Another contradiction is the Boers' open identification with their history—a history that the ANC at least certainly views as part of the disreputable colonial invasion of Africa.

#### Ally?

An interesting aspect of all this, however, is that the good reputation enjoyed by both the VRYE WEEKBLAD and DIE SUID-AFRIKAAN appears to be accepted without question by the South African extraparliamentary movement. Gabu Tugwana, for instance, the publisher of the NEW NATION, a large weekly for blacks, describes his relations with the VRYE WEEKBLAD as "outstanding."

One possible reason for this is the recognition that the Boers hold power. Any development that helps break up their hegemony is welcomed virtually without reservation. Another possible cause is that in a country where capitalism and apartheid are often equated, the Boers are not much felt to be part of "big business" (over 60 percent of South African capital is still concentrated in English hands). Dissident Afrikaners' break with the apartheid system is therefore accepted as sincere. They are viewed as potential allies in the struggle against exploitation by capital. The ease with which someone like former National Party Member of Parliament Wynand Malan has been accepted by extraparliamentary opposition organizations since breaking with his party provides a striking example of this.

This could also be why DIE SUID-AFRIKAAN, for example, counts such well known political prisoners as Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu among its subscribers. Clearly the magazine is able to provide them with valuable insights into the thinking of liberal Boer intellectuals. And the discussion on the pages of DIE SUID-AFRIKAAN is gradually coming to form a part of the larger Boer debate, inasmuch as the dimensions of



Boer thinking are gradually shifting so much that they are becoming aware of the political realities facing South Africa in the next decade.

Nonetheless, the influence of the "alternative" Afrikaans publications should not be overestimated at the present time. They have a limited circulation: 6,500 for DIE SUID-AFRIKAAN and 6200 for the VRYE WEEKBLAD; they are all totally dependent for survival on donations from abroad because they get no support from local business; and they are characterized by manifest contradictions and schizophrenia in their thinking—all signs of the uncertainty marking the Boer community's gradual progress toward intellectual enlightenment.

Nonetheless, the contribution they are making should not be dismissed. They are playing a vital role in expanding the Afrikaner's consciousness—and they truly are part of the broader democratic discussion of the country's future.

#### \* Turkish Navy Interested in Purchasing Vessels

34000744b Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English  
18 Jul 89 p 1

[Article: "Turks Want SA Naval Vessels"]

[Text] Capetown—The Turkish navy is interested in buying "at least" four of SA's [South Africa] new River-class mine counter-measures vessels (MCMVs) and a number of patrol vessels, according to a recent issue of the international naval newsletter NAVINT.

NAVINT adds that the Turks are "particularly attracted" by the price of the MCMVs, believed to be 20 percent cheaper than their European-built equivalents.

SA was recently one of the largest exhibitors at the annual Turkish arms show at Ankara, and was said to have a chance of selling its world-beating G-5 155mm howitzer to the Turkish army.

According to NAVINT, it "seems likely that Turkish interest centres on the design of the SA Navy's...coastal minehunters (whose) mine-hunting electronics are understood to be as advanced as any in Europe, with the exception of the Lessey system in the new British Sandown Class single-role mine-hunters.

"Much of the South African technology originated in Israel, it is believed, although the sidescan sonar is American."

If the deal goes through, it will be the first time SA has sold warships to another nation. Yesterday an Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] public relations spokesman refused to comment.

#### \* Paper Examines Forces Dividing Country

##### \* Optimists Versus Pessimists

34000764 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 21-27 Jul 89 pp 4-5

[Article by Anton Harber: "Our New Great Divide: Optimists and Pessimists"]

[Text] South Africans have many ways of dividing themselves: by race, class, language, ideology. Now there is a new division: between the optimists and the pessimists.

The optimists—who seem to dominate the media—are telling us that negotiations are in the air, that State President P. W. Botha's meeting with his prisoner Nelson Mandela was a breakthrough in this process, and there is a real possibility of the government sitting down to talk to the African National Congress [ANC] in the near future.

The pessimists, like most other South African groups, have already splintered into two camps. The first one is made up of those who say there is nothing happening, there was no significance in the Botha-Mandela tea party, and this country is still ruled by a bunch of white racists who are determined to hold onto power.

The second category of pessimists would argue that a great deal is happening, but all it really adds up to is that Mandela and the ANC are selling out by getting involved in negotiations without any real transfer of power. They are, in this view, contemplating a political half-settlement that will not go all the way to satisfying popular demands.

What all these groups have in common is a belief that substantial negotiations over the country's future are a real possibility in the near future.

They have good reason to believe it, as other stories on this page indicate: growing international pressure, a deteriorating economy, the apparent failure of the secular-led attempt at an internal political solution after three years of Emergency, a disintegrating ruling party.... All of these things have combined to put the issue firmly on the political agenda.

The problem, however, is that while it is easy at the moment to see negotiations as a real possibility, there is little sign yet of anything actually happening. All we have so far is a secret tea party at which, according to both tea-drinkers, neither "policy matters" nor Mandela's release were discussed; and leaked hints that president-elect F W de Klerk has told Western leaders that he will be initiating drastic reform steps after the September election.

De Klerk's promises to the likes of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher fall into a similar category. South Africa's white leaders have often told the world that they will soon take drastic political action—and by

now the world is not going to get excited until they see real proof that such promises will be kept.

So lurking behind all the optimism about negotiations lies another dreadful scenario: that the government is raising expectations, partly as an election campaign and partly to buy time with the international community.

When it fails to meet what are by now very high expectations, then the country is in for a terrible onslaught: the combined wrath of the world, the possibility of more internal unrest, and all the economic and political implications of this. The government would then have no choice but to fall back on rule by repression, and turn back to the ever-present Emergency regulations to maintain power.

There is one other interpretation being bandied around. Negotiations always start with demands and counter-demands being put on the table—and that has already happened in the sense that we know what both sides are demanding of each other. Once both sides are stating their positions, and responding to each others' statements, then the process has already begun, even if it is only at a very early stage.

The problem is that at this point both sides still mean very different things when they use the word "negotiation." It is one of the many words—like "democracy," "moderate" and "non-racialism"—that have become so cheapened by rhetoric and abuse that they can be used to mean entirely different things by different parties in the South African conflict.

All one really can do at this stage is weigh up the forces pushing the country in one direction against those pushing the government in the other—as the WEEKLY MAIL attempts to do on this page.

#### \* Pressure on State

34000764 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 21-27 Jul 89 pp 4, 6

[Text] The glee in the Conservative Party [CP] over the recent "courtesy call" discussions between President P W Botha and Nelson Mandela shows that talking to the African National Congress [ANC] is not regarded as a sellable commodity among conservative white voters.

For the CP, the Mandela-Botha meeting was manna from heaven.

There was also some relief in the Democratic Party [DP] that the ANC, the very issue the government exploited so effectively in the May 1987 election against the Progressive Federal Party, had been defused and confused.

There was good reason for the CP and DP reaction: bashing the ANC—whether Mandela in prison or the organisation in exile—has been a major vote-getter in previous elections.

To white voters, the ANC has been portrayed as the symbol of everything they fear—black takeover, communism, one-party state, murderous terrorists who put bombs in supermarkets, nationalisation of assets.

The state has mobilised enormous resources, from the security establishment to its propaganda wings, to perpetuate this image.

This tactic, however short-sighted, was very successful: by unsuitably linking the ANC and the PFP [Progressive Federal Party]—indeed, during the 1987 election, white voters might have thought they were virtually the same thing—the NP [National Party] was able to inflict a serious setback on the PFP, capturing a number of their seats and making the CP the official opposition.

Now, suddenly, the very man behind the 1987 strategy to scare white voters into the NP, President P W Botha, is talking to the leader of the ANC—and, what is more, in the midst of an election campaign.

The NP will undoubtedly try to exploit the same white fears again before September 6. For instance, a concerted anti-guerrilla attack or a cross-border strike in August would help show voters that the government is not "soft" on security.

But it won't be the same: the "tea party" has changed that forever. And Mandela has not renounced violence as Botha insisted is necessary to secure his release.

Undenied reports, particularly in Western capitals, that Mandela is to be released after September 6 also complicates the issue for the NP.

The Nationalist dilemma has been demonstrated by the statements made by its chief information officer, Con Botha, MP for Umlazi.

Botha told Canadian Broadcasting Corporation this week that the P W Botha/Mandela meeting could be likened to commanders-in-chief in a war situation "sounding each other out about the possibility of a truce."

His comments implied the government was at least considering a ceasefire with the banned organisation. Con Botha also described the jailed ANC leader as a "key figure" in any future negotiation about South Africa's constitutional future.

The NP leader, F W de Klerk, is expected to talk about these issues when he makes the closing address at the NP's Cape congress tomorrow, but his publicity chief has highlighted the party's dilemma.

The NP will continue to condemn violence, it will reaffirm its determination to confront all those who use violence, it will again attack the revolutionaries and the communists and it will try to portray the DP as "soft" on these issues.

But, the fact is its approach and preconditions have changed, marginally but significantly.

For white voters, the issues have changed. The unsellable commodity of 1987—talking to the ANC and releasing Mandela—is now on the cards. One question in the 1989 election is whether the voters will buy it.

#### \* Financial Pressure

34000764 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 21-27 Jul 89 p 4

[Article by Hilary Joffe: "Stamping Hard on Our Achilles Heel"]

[Text] The line from business, government and anti-apartheid leaders is the same: the debt crisis is South Africa's Achilles heel. Far more than trade sanctions or disinvestment, it's been financial sanctions which have crippled the country.

With negotiations due next year between South Africa's financial authorities and its foreign bankers, and with the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves having fallen to dangerously low levels, the foreign debt situation is providing a powerful pressure for positive political signals, in other words, for negotiation.

Financial sanctions have been crippling because of their blanket effect on economic growth. South Africa's economic growth rates have in the 1980s fallen far short of population growth rates so that the country's ability to provide jobs or infrastructure for its people is severely limited.

For the government, that places a limit on its ability to finance its reform policies. It also means high tax rates, high inflation and high interest rates, all of which make life difficult for electioneers. For business it places a limit on profitable investment opportunities and is a barrier to confidence. For ordinary people, it means high inflation, high unemployment and declining living standards.

Some R25-billion has flowed out of the country in the past four years. Reserve Bank estimates show that if South Africa continues to have capital outflows equivalent to four percent of its total output a year, as it has done since 1985, the economy can grow by only two percent a year. But if instead the situation were reversed and capital flowed in at this rate, the economy could grow by four or five percent a year.

Anglo American chairman Gavin Relly offered his own version of the conflicting pressures on economic resources in his annual statement this week. Stressing South Africa's need for a five to six percent annual economic growth rate (and its inability to achieve this as long as the country remained a capital exporter), he said: "The South African pot is never big enough to feed the claims of a civil service spawned by white nationalism; an army bred to cope with an assumed communist onslaught; the demands for education, health services,

housing and infrastructure for a population growing at a self-destructive rate; and not least the expectations, personal as well as political, of those who have been willing to participate in the tricameral parliament."

The financial sanctions issue has come to centre stage for two reasons. One is that the economy was in better shape in 1987/88 than it had been for some time, showing positive growth in contrast to the economic decline of 1985/86. But the result was that it came up against the limits imposed by financial sanctions and started running rapidly out of gold and foreign exchange reserves.

The second looming pressure is the debt negotiations between South Africa and its foreign creditor banks due early next year, which cover some \$9-billion owed to the banks. The current agreement between South Africa and the banks expires at the end of June 1990. While it's almost certain the negotiations will happen and the debt will be rescheduled (the foreign banks do, after all, want to get their money back), the question for South Africa's financial authorities is whether the terms of the agreement will be harsh or manageable.

What they are trying to do is to get foreign banks individually to roll over the debts until 1997 and they have had some success in persuading Swiss and United States bankers to do so, relieving some of the pressure.

Such successes have met with protest from anti-apartheid movements abroad. And with the debt negotiations coming up next year, activists here and abroad have taken the opportunity to strike at the "Achilles heel" in an attempt to push for negotiations. So this week in Britain, the Anti-Apartheid Movement [AAM] and End Loans to Southern Africa announced they planned a "major international campaign" against UK-based National Westminster Bank, aimed at stopping the rescheduling of South Africa's foreign debt.

The AAM's move follows a campaign initiated last month by South African church leaders, including Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Rev Allan Boesak, who wrote to foreign creditor banks demanding they refuse to reschedule South Africa's debt next year unless the government committed itself to a series of conditions, including negotiations towards a non-racial democratic society and an end to repressive measures.

The bankers have, in response, shown no signs of refusing to reschedule the debts. But they have been pressured to come out against apartheid and NatWest [as published], for one, said this week it would make rescheduling conditional upon certain changes.

The anti-apartheid movements' and leaders' new strategies arrive against a backdrop of the relative failure of the old ones. They have not managed to achieve comprehensive mandatory sanctions by the government's major trading partners. And while trade sanctions and disinvestment have had an impact on the economy this has been unquantifiable and is far from bringing the country to its knees.



But the effect of financial sanctions has been clear—and the pressure to address them politically will intensify in coming months.

#### \* Pressure From Abroad

34000764 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 21-27 Jul 89 p 5

[Article by Shaun Johnson: "For Now, the United States Will Let Britain do the Batting"]

[Text] In both Pretoria and Lusaka, political strategists are being subjected to a severe arm-twisting. The pressure is being exerted from a distance, but is acute nevertheless.

It is now conventional wisdom that the foreign policy paths of the West, East and Frontline states have effectively converged—a "negotiated political settlement" in South Africa is suddenly alluring to all.

But how much pressure can the international community invoke? And how tractable are the objects of their attention? In plain language, can they force a settlement of their choosing?

The answers, respectively, are: a lot, quite, and of course not.

Two recent working documents on the issue of negotiations—the product of discussions between ANC [African National Congress] and "mass democratic movement" leaders—explicitly address the question of international machinations.

In a "Report on Consultations" dated June 6, it is noted that "as a result of increasing pressures being placed on the regime...and as a result of initiatives being taken by imperialist forces, the issue of negotiations has arisen again."

Britain's initiatives appear to give cause for most concern: it is feared that Whitehall could be envisaging a negotiated "solution" which falls short of one-person-one-vote in a unitary, non-racial democracy.

The documents refer to Margaret Thatcher's alleged acceptance of Pretoria's concept of "group protection," and her natural affinity (due to his commitment to "free enterprise") with KwaZulu's Mangosuthu Buthelezi.

It is not Britain's initiatives in isolation that are giving most pause for thought, however. The United States appears content—according to new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen—to let the British make most of the running for the moment.

The style of British diplomacy has altered markedly since the arrival of activist-ambassador Sir Robin Renwick in 1987. His hands-on approach has placed Britain as the foreign power most integrally interested in this country's future.

Cohen is happy to concede that "the British have a major role to play" in finding solutions. "We welcome British leadership in this problem," he said at the end of last month.

This does not imply U.S. inactivity, however. Cohen foresees "greater efforts at what I call multilateral diplomacy.... You will see greater efforts at consulting with (other industrialised countries, especially the UK and West Germany)...co-ordinating our policies. I have already been to London and Bonn to begin these consultations."

Resistance groups are convinced that Whitehall is in favour of a revamped "Eminent Persons"-type contact group, which, in the words of the discussion paper, could well include longstanding allies of the ANC, like Zambia.

British sources say it is far too early to consider such a specific step—and indeed deny that they are playing quite the Machiavellian role ascribed to them—but the fears of the resistance strategists persist.

"Even the chairman of the FLS (Frontline states), President Kaunda, has called for negotiations now," it is remarked somewhat laconically in a "Discussion paper on the issue of negotiations." Kaunda's open-ended invitation to F W de Klerk for a meeting, issued this week, lends weight to the impression.

Further, it is thought that the Soviet Union, China, and Frontline state leaders such as Angola's Jose Eduardo dos Santos, would not be averse to such a "contact group" proposal.

It is accepted that there are potential benefits for all. The Soviet Union is said now to be less concerned with regional influence than regional prosperity, and that prosperity would be most welcomed by South Africa's beleaguered neighbours.

The state has been far less frank to acknowledge diplomatic pressure. Foreign Minister Pik Botha was quick to remark, after the meeting between Nelson Mandela and P W Botha, that it had not been brokered by an outside party.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the government's new (and still little more than rhetoric) commitment to some form of "negotiations" has a lot to do with the messages it is receiving from abroad.

It is clear that neither Thatcher nor U.S. President George Bush will offer Pretoria an indefinite period of grace.

Serving notice that the Bush administration would play "a more activist role on the issue of internal constitutional change in South Africa," Cohen let it be known that "if progress...is not made, say, over a two-year period after the new government takes office in September, it would be very difficult for the U.S. government to hold back the forces that are looking to increase pressure...."



"I think this would be true not only in the United States, but would be true in western Europe and Japan as well."

Cohen added, quite starkly, that "sanctions have had a very major impact on the development of new thinking in South Africa."

#### \* Pressure on Right

34000764 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 21-27 Jul 89 pp 5, 6

[Article by Ivor Powell: "Spectre of the 'Hung' Parliament"]

[Text] When they comment on the forthcoming elections, there are three people far rightwingers refer to. Oddly, none is a candidate—but all three, they say, contribute to the likelihood that after the elections, there will be a hung parliament.

The first member of the improbable triumvirate is General Jan Christiaan Smuts. Our rightists remark: "Remember how Smuts was talking to the king, touring around Europe, playing the great international statesman during the run-up to the 1948 elections? He was more concerned with his international image than domestic politics—and he got a big fright when he got back home."

F W de Klerk, they predict, though his party is unlikely actually to lose at the ballot box, is going to get a similarly rude awakening when the Conservative Party [CP] sweeps the platteland of the Transvaal, most of the Free State, the Northern Cape and the north of Natal.

The second person the ultrarightists talk about is Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging [AWB-Afrikaner Resistance Movement] leader Eugene TerreBlanche. After allegations made by SUNDAY TIMES columnist Jani Allan that TerreBlanche had been, often drunkenly, pursuing her and had once passed out at her front doorstep for the night, as well as his ignominious withdrawal from the parliamentary battle, the political future of the former independent Rustenburg candidate is seriously in doubt.

But mostly, the right is talking about jailed African National Congress [ANC] leader Nelson Mandela. The news of his tea party with President P W Botha cost the National Party [NP] an estimated four percent of the vote, according to a survey published last week in RAPPORT—a result which will, according to rumour, be confirmed by a different poll scheduled for publication in this week's SUNDAY TIMES.

"Anything below 45 percent support for the National Party," predicts Professor Sampie Terreblanche of Stellenbosch University, "and we're in for a hung parliament."

But more importantly for many observers, PW's bombshell has led to very significant clashes and disagreements over election policy within the National Party itself.

While, up to this point, the NP has been following the rather surprising strategy of fighting the election to the left, hoping rather to stem the Democratic Party threat than to keep voters from crossing over to the Conservative Party, now the party's approach seems less coherent.

This week NP information officer Con Botha all but publicly repudiated the president by reaffirming his party's oft-repeated refusal to enter negotiations with the ANC until the organisation was prepared to renounce violence. Mandela, meanwhile, was telling the world that he still believed what he believed 28 years ago when he was a driving force in the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC.

"The earth has moved for the Nationalists since the PW-Mandela meeting," Mark Swilling of Wits University's Centre for Policy Studies comments. "The whole context has changed, and to them it looks very scary indeed. They're shedding to the right far faster than they anticipated, and in the general panic the party orthodoxy is starting to reassert itself."

While the NP grows increasingly frantic, the CP can hardly conceal its glee. Deputy leader Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg was quick to brand the Mandela tea party as "a breakthrough for the banned organisation" which signalled a "new relationship" with the ANC.

Predicting that the Mandela issue would become a major focus in the coming elections, he added ominously: "The CP will see to it that the NP's new approach to the ANC will be brought to the attention of every voter in the country."

CP foreign affairs spokesman Clive Derby-Lewis predicted that the Mandela affair would "bring far more patriots into the CP fold."

According to Derby-Lewis, the CP is likely to capture a minimum of between 59 and 62 parliamentary seats. Such is the manifest support in the platteland that nobody outside of the NP is predicting that the party will hold many more than 80 seats—raising the possibility of a coalition government.

Derby-Lewis also draws attention to the fact that the CP's strongest support base is the Transvaal, and that the Nats are likely to be relatively weak in that province.

NP leader De Klerk is also Transvaal leader of the party. His position, especially in view of the threat posed by Finance Minister Barend du Plessis—now leader of the strongly NP Cape Province—places him in a very vulnerable position if the battle for leadership is renewed.

But these are not the only reasons that CP supporters are smiling. Finally the millstone that is TerreBlanche has been cast off from around their neck.

When the Jani Allan scandal first broke at the end of last year, a senior CP spokesman compared him to an animal wounded through the lung, not visibly in distress, but bound, sooner or later, to fail.

Now on the withdrawal of his ill-starred Rustenburg candidacy, suggestively followed by the latest round of allegations regarding the AWB leader and the SUNDAY TIMES columnist, it seems TerreBlanche's power may finally be broken.

According to far-right sources, TerreBlanche's pre-election defeat in Rustenburg had more to do with threats from the AWB's financial backers to withdraw funds if he persisted in his candidacy, than with CP leader Andries Treurnicht's direct opposition.

According to former AWB publicity chief Dries Alberts, the AWB's financial affairs have been "irresponsibly and informally" managed for some time. Before his summary expulsion from the movement in January this year, Alberts was calling for a full investigation of the movement's finances.

Other problems beset the AWB. According to Alberts, of the 200 members of the AWB Hoofraad, which returned a seemingly overwhelming vote of confidence in TerreBlanche's continued leadership when the Jani Allan affair first became public, something less than 50 percent remain. The rest of the AWB leadership has left what they perceive to be a sinking ship.

#### \* Pressure From ANC

34000764 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 21-27 Jul 89 p 6

[Article by Gavin Evans: "The 'Total Onslaught' and Beyond"]

[Text] The rapidly-changing regional and international scenario, combined with internal pressures, have pushed the government so far that the rhetoric of "total onslaught" has had to be replaced with the rhetoric of negotiations.

But this in turn has placed the "mass democratic movement" [MDM] and the African National Congress [ANC] in a position where they need to flesh out a coherent position on the process of reaching a negotiated settlement.

For the ANC the issue is not a new one. The rationale for its armed struggle has always been that it is a means of ensuring a democratic solution—either through negotiations or through an armed seizure of power.

Greater focus was given to this question in October 1987 when the ANC's national executive committee spelt out what the government would need to do to "create a climate conducive to negotiations."

The release of political prisoners, the unbanning of organisations, the ending of the State of Emergency and the withdrawal of troops from the townships were emphasised as moves the government would have to make for negotiations to begin.

Over the past few weeks discussion papers arising out of a recent meeting between ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions [Cosatu] and United Democratic Front [UDF] representatives have been widely discussed within the country.

In one paper, the ANC emphasises that "the question of a negotiated settlement is being raised with growing insistence," necessitating widespread discussion on the issue by "the ANC and the democratic movement as a whole in order to arrive at a common view."

At the same time, it is stressed that this should not affect the "strategic task" of "destroying the apartheid regime and the transfer of power to the people."

According to UDF leader Murphy Morobe the key aim of the process of discussion is to "harmonise areas of difference which exist between various areas and organisations in order to reach a uniform position."

In addition, he said, there was a need to reach a greater understanding about the process of negotiations.

The differences which exist appear to be minor, and concern emphasis rather than principle.

For example at last week's Cosatu congress, one of the conditions for negotiation agreed on was the "confinement of South African Police/South African Defence Force to barracks." The ANC however has limited this to "the withdrawal of the SADF [South African Defense Forces] and paramilitary forces from the townships."

While in the past some groups suggested the demand for the repeal of all apartheid legislation as a condition, this has not been expressly stated by either Cosatu or the ANC.

The ANC instead calls for the "abrogation of those apartheid laws that seek to criminalise legitimate political activity."

In general both the ANC and the MDM have shifted away from talking of "pre-conditions," and instead emphasise "removing obstacles to negotiation" in order to create a climate for a political settlement.

At the recent Five Freedoms Forum-ANC meeting in Lusaka, a senior ANC representative stressed that the "present climate was hostile to negotiations" and that the onus was on the government to remove the obstacles blocking a negotiated settlement.

"For example, in order for the ANC to participate meaningfully in the negotiations there must be conditions that make it possible to consult with constituency," he said.

The need for free political discussions prior to a negotiated settlement was stressed at the Cosatu congress.

There was a strong sense that any bogus negotiation process should be avoided, and that the question of full

mandates should be linked to creating a free political climate, said a Cosatu representative.

Exactly what an acceptable process would involve is still being discussed in MDM circles.

"What is clear," said Morobe, "is that there needs to be an acceptance by all parties about what we are negotiating about—that the end point is a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa."

ANC President Oliver Tambo suggested recently that the movement would be prepared to suspend violence once the process of negotiation was embarked upon.

ANC representatives have however rejected any "unilateral moratorium" to suspend violence.

The issue of the mechanism for negotiation is still being canvassed by the MDM, though there appears to [be] a strong view favouring the election of a constituent assembly.

"A constituent assembly would prevent the negotiations being conducted in terms of skin colour and the claims of each group to representivity could be tested. It would also draw the people into the process, give it legitimacy and ensure that the decisions were supported," a senior ANC representative said.

#### \* Barcom Electronics Comes of Age; Growth Seen

##### \* Extensive Product Range

34000763 Johannesburg ARMED FORCES  
in English Jul 89 p 9

[Text] Barcom Electronics, founded in July 1968 to design and manufacture VHF communications equipment, comes of age with an extensive product range comprising not only tactical radios, but also mine detection and navigation systems.

"Our strength in the VHF market was built in two pillars: the fact that Barcom managed to grow with the VHF technology on which it was founded, and a vigorous quality assurance programme covering all facets of design and manufacture," says Chris Leah, Barcom MD.

The growth of Barcom over the past 21 years into a full tactical communications house has seen its approach gradually changing from individual product design to include the design of entire systems, in keeping with the growing awareness of the value of logistics as an integral part of the design philosophy.

This approach led to the establishment of a fully-fledged hybrid micro-electronics design and manufacturing division, through-hole and surface-mounted circuit board design and assembly, a range of environmental product-testing laboratories, computer-aided design facilities and a sophisticated technical handbook division.

The 9,500 square meters factory space at Barcom's new Germany premises is a far cry from its humble beginnings, when Barlow Communications, as it was then known, occupied 200 square meters in the factory of Barlow Manufacturing Company.

Barcom also has nearly 500 square meters laboratory space at Halfway House.

Barcom was formed by Barlow Rand when it was realized that the opportunity existed for a company capable of designing and manufacturing tactical communications equipment.

For the first 18 months the company struggled but managed to produce products like its first mine detector and the R8 15A home beacon. Its first successful pack set, the A63, was followed by a similar product, the A30.

At this time the requirements for short-range tactical communications for the SADF [South African Defense Forces] were being formulated by the Armaments Board, I Armscor's forerunner. These requirements were later incorporated into the A55, the B56 and the A53 radios—the products largely responsible for establishing Barcom as a successful supplier of tactical communications equipment.

By 1973 the company had set up facilities for printing front panels and printed circuit boards, and subsequently manufactured its own metal and plastic parts.

Barcom entered the micro-electronics field in 1977 with the development of a data input device for radios.

By 1979 sophisticated through-hole-plated printed circuit boards were being made. Barcom had expanded into the UHF field, and the manufacture of precision mechanical parts warranted the formation of Aserma Manufacturing as a separate company.

##### \* MD Discusses Future

34000763 Johannesburg ARMED FORCES  
in English Jul 89 p 10

[Article by Chris Leah BSc Eng.; NSc RadarMD of Barcom Electronics]

[Text] Barcom Electronics has historically been a product based company in which individual products have been developed to meet the particular needs of the various clients and markets.

This strategy is no longer viable given the current demands for greater sophistication, greater commonality of equipment and lower effective costs.

Barcom is therefore gearing itself to the future by implementing a systems approach to design and development, coupled with an integrated logistics support capability.

The systems approach is leading Barcom to a base of modern sophisticated communications and navigation



equipment which include, for example, advanced features such as frequency-hopping and real-time encryption of speech and data in the new-generation radios.

Perhaps the most important pointer for the future is the concept of integrated logistics.

The cost of equipment is of significant concern to the Barcom's clients for many reasons—primarily when the usual service life of 10 to 15 years is coupled with the cost of maintenance in terms of personnel and spares over this life cycle.

By applying the principles of logistic support right from the design phase, it is possible to reduce the total equipment cost over the life cycle without sacrificing performance or any other special attributes.

Further, this concept, when applied correctly, ensures that the equipment is easily upgradeable to meet the changing demands of the customer—rather than the customer having to reinvest in totally new equipment, with the consequent acquisition cost coupled with costs of aspects such as re-equipping service centers and training personnel.

Barcom is applying the systems approach to design and ensuring that the principles of logistic support are firmly embedded within the company. This will lead to short and long term benefits for both the customer and Barcom when the new-generation communications and navigation equipment is released shortly.

#### \* Communications Equipment

34000763 Johannesburg ARMED FORCES  
in English Jul 89 p 11

[Text] The B46 VRC is the flagship of the series and incorporates all the system features including speech encryption into a single dedicated vehicular radio. Furthermore the VCR provides selective calling compatible with the Military Area Radio Network (MARNET), rebroadcast and intercom facilities. Additional features important for the vehicular role such as major parameter monitoring and built-in loud-speaker are included.

The A42 is primarily designed to be hand-held but can also be carried along with an audio handset/headset socket. Considerable attention has been given to antenna design which combines broadband matching with short and rugged mechanical properties. Both disposable alkaline and re-chargeable nicads packs are available. A battery low indication is provided. Lithium packs can also be accommodated. A simple-to-operate keyboard and numeric display are used for manual data entry and information readout.

The FMS (Fill Management System) provides a universal means for transfer of complex programming data from a central compilation point to field equipment. The system comprises a desktop microcomputer, a Data Transfer Station (DTS) and one or more Fill Guns. Interact graphics and soft keys facilitate quick and easy

data entry. Typical applications include encryption key distribution, where the algorithms for key generation are part of the editor, and frequency management which allows the Signals Commander to mould the frequency utilization and allocation.

#### \* Global Positioning System

34000763 Johannesburg ARMED FORCES  
in English Jul 89 p 13

[Text] Barcom Electronics is on schedule with its commitment to supply the South African navigation requirements with a range of three Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, designed specifically around local needs.

The programme to supply GPS receivers, which would not be affected by possible overseas sanctioning, price fluctuations and support delays, was launched in 1986 with fluctuations and support delays, was launched in 1986 with the formation of a joint venture between companies whose expertise is complementary.

Barcom Electronics, already at the fore-front of the high-technology manufacturing field with a proven product range including advanced tactical radios and mine detectors, is the local leader in this venture.

"GPS will revolutionize navigation at sea, as well as on land and in the air," says Chris Leah, Barcom MD.

"We stand on the threshold of a new navigational era, and in many ways GPS will be the navigator's dream come true."

GPS is a satellite-based navigation and positioning system developed in the USA. When operational, it will provide uninterrupted global high-accuracy navigational facilities at all altitudes.

Authorized users will have access to the Precise Positioning Service (PPS) which will provide accuracies of 10 to 20 meters (2DRMS), depending on the platform dynamics.

Civilian users will have access to the Standard Positioning Service (SPS) which will provide better than 100 meter accuracy. Such service is currently only available from other systems in certain specific areas, or for limited periods of time.

Of the ten Block I developmental satellites in orbit, only six can currently be used for navigation, providing four hours of three dimensional coverage (latitude, longitude and height) and in South Africa ten hours of two-dimensional coverage.

The recent launch of the first Block II operational satellite has sparked-off renewed interests in the GPS Programmes. The new launch schedule calls for a satellite launch every 60 days, which should lead to global, two-dimensional coverage sometime in the latter part of 1990.



This promising outlook has resulted in a number of new GPS receivers appearing on the market—mostly costly imported equipment which is not supported locally.

This situation is to change in the near future with a number of locally manufactured and supported GPS products.

The first phase of the programme established by Barcom and its partners called for a series of nationwide seminars to provide awareness of GPS and to determine the requirements of the South African navigation community. Building on user-feedback, three types of GPS receivers were identified and specified for design and manufacture.

Development models have been produced and field-tested under exacting requirements to prove the GPS concept under local conditions.

Work is currently being undertaken on a multi-channel marine unit for the requirements of the professional marine market. The release of this unit is expected to take place just prior to two-dimensional coverage being declared operational.

Following the introduction of this unit to the market, design of the airborne and mobile land receivers will take place.

Specialized receivers for survey and accurate timing are also planned.

Barcom's dedication to the manufacture of a locally designed GPS receiver and its commitment to the supply and back-up service of the product will assure the South African navigation community of a home-grown range of GPS products, designed around local requirements, and immune to the adverse conditions often associated with imported high-tech equipment.

#### **\* Implications of Toxic Waste Imports Examined**

34000744c Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 14-20 Jul 89 p 11

[Article by Alison Campbell and Eddie Koch: "Not in My Backyard: SA and the Global Junk Heap"]

[Text] Two freighters, left to wander the world's oceans in a desperate search for a port at which to offload their cargoes of toxic waste, last year came to symbolise the Third World's growing resistance to the prospect of becoming the globe's garbage heap.

After years at sea and being snubbed by at least 11 countries, the Pelicano was reported to have dumped 60,000 tons of arsenic, mercury, dioxin and other toxins on the floor of the Indian Ocean. The tanker Karin B suffered a similar banishment after secretly dumping barrels of industrial toxins in Nigeria last year.

Although the South African government is clearly sensitive to the stigma that accompanies the importation of

other countries's refuse, the possibility that fugitive shiploads of toxic waste may be welcomed here has become a real possibility.

Last week Director-General of Environment Affairs Bill Visagie rejected reports that the government had approved plans to build a plant capable of recycling 500,000 tons of imported industrial waste a year near Alexander Bay in the north-west Cape.

An application by a Cape Town businessman to undertake the project had been rejected and all plans to build a high-tech plant to deal with toxic waste had been frozen, said Visagie. The government was merely looking into the feasibility of such a scheme and it was unlikely that any construction would take place this century.

But the director-general's cautious statement was slightly out of step with Environment Minister Gert Kotze's report to parliament in February this year that Pretoria was seriously considering building a waste disposal facility in South Africa.

His statement came as no coincidence. Three months earlier MP [Member of Parliament]s had been supplied with a leader article from the FINANCIAL MAIL analysing the lucrative possibilities of such a policy, together with a suggestion that the scheme was worthy of parliamentary support.

Given the sorry state of South Africa's foreign exchange reserves and its balance of payments problems, the importation of toxic waste represents a seductive solution to Pretoria's fiscal stress.

"Vast sums of money are available ex-America to anyone who is prepared to handle their waste in a safe and professional manner," said company director Peter Petter-Bower in an interview with the WEEKLY MAIL. "We are talking about billions of dollars, enough to solve the country's balance of payment crisis."

Petter-Bower's firm, Prodev, earlier this year failed to persuade the Botswana government to sign a multi-million dollar deal to import and bury poisonous waste from the United States.

The company, based in Guernsey with four former Zimbabweans now resident in South Africa as directors, was also asked by a middleman in the US to approach the South African government about a possible deal. Petter-Bower says Pretoria rejected the offer in 1986.

The environmental group, Greenpeace, reports that stringent controls on recycling in the industrialised world have turned the eyes of those who trade in the toxins to Africa, where the cost of dumping can be one percent of that in the West. A major wave of dumping began after the European Economic Community introduced stringent controls in 1986. A recent BBC documentary reported that Guinea Bissau dropped plans to take just 15 tons of poison waste from industrialised countries—even though the consignment was worth three times the country's GNP [gross national product].

Kotze's assurance to parliament that government plans include a strict "no dumping" requirement, as well as his emphasis on the "circumspection" with which waste would be selected for import, have done little to convince environmentalists that financial considerations will be inevitably prevail over good sense.

Much of the outcry which has greeted official announcements about the possibility of toxic waste is in line with what the disposal industry calls the NIMBY syndrome.

"Not In My Back Yard", the rallying cry of environmentalists worldwide, say to those in the industry, poses something of a quandary for those who claim to be concerned with the welfare of the planet as a whole. After all, industrialised countries will continue to generate toxic by-products and the problem will not just go away by itself.

"Someone, somewhere is going to have to do it and it would be far better done responsibly by highly qualified scientists under international supervision than left to rot on some Third World shoreline," says economic geology consultant Dennis Toens, who used to work for the Atomic Energy Corporation.

The distinction between processing and dumping is also implicit in a United Nations convention on waste, adopted in March this year, which imposes a ban on the export of hazardous materials to countries not equipped to handle them properly.

The effective treatment and disposal of toxic waste requires technology, expertise and geologically suitable areas which private enterprise in South Africa claims to have access to. The aim is to make the toxins less dangerous, preferably inert, and dispose of residues in geologically suitable sites.

Waste too dangerous to dump in their raw form can be either organic (pesticides, phenols and fuel compounds) or inorganic (acids, alkalis, heavy metals and cyanide compounds). Treatment involves neutralisation, precipitation, oxidation or reduction which produces a solid residue that then goes to the landfill site.

Of greater concern are substances for which there is no treatment. Poly chlorinated biphenols (PCBs), arsenic compounds and others are merely sealed in concrete and dumped in half-a-dozen landfills which already exist in South Africa.

These landfill sites are classified as Class 1 or Class 2, depending on their suitability for wastes. Class 1 sites, suitable for receiving liquid and highly toxic materials, require meticulous geological and hydrological examination to ensure the ground is virtually impermeable so that contamination of groundwater will not take place. And once operational, the landfills and the water around them are constantly monitored.

But the fact remains that no amount of expertise can counter the havoc that could be caused by inadequate legislation and government control on waste disposal

operations. Professional waste disposers in South Africa confirm that South Africa's record in this area is a cause for nervousness and many have been putting the screws on the government in the hope that this will lead to a tightening of legislation.

There is also evidence of a lack of effective legislative control on the manufacture and use of pesticides in South African agriculture, allegations of abuse by a major recycling plant in Natal, and signs that high levels of toxins are already affecting the marine life off South Africa's shores.

The Indian Ocean site where the Pelicano dumped its toxic ash remains a mystery to ecologists. The ship's captain claims the load was left in a port but refuses to disclose where. What is known is that 15,000 tons of a similar ash killed a large part of the vegetation on the Guinean Island of Kassa where it had been dumped.

Ecological disasters on this scale are not likely to occur under South African conditions. But unless the government deals effectively with some of the problems that have already surfaced around toxic waste, it will not find it easy to make a comforting distinction between its own sanitised back yard and those which lie to the north.

In the meantime ecologists are likely to stick to their argument that countries which generate toxic waste should find solution—even if they are more expensive—in their own backyards.

## \* Figures Reveal 1989 Trade Up

### \* Partly Cloudy

34000765a Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL  
in English 21 Jul 89 pp 35-36

[Text] First-half figures are in and the picture is clear: 1989 is proving a banner year for foreign trade. The only cloud on the horizon, some economists say, is the rapidly rising import bill.

Exports jumped 22.2 percent on the first half of last year, and the full effects of the falling rand won't even show up until the second half. Total trade—the best measure of trade activity—was R49,4bn, up 21.5 percent on the first half of 1988. And the surplus—for those who worry about the balance of payments—now stands at R5,3bn for the year to June, a whopping 28.9 percent greater than a year ago. All these percentages are higher than the 15 percent inflation of the past year, so they show real gains.

The surplus has widened—by R1,3bn in June alone—despite the failure of the effort to curb imports.

Imports totalled R4,4bn, the highest ever, as demand soared for machinery, consumer electronics, motor vehicles and aircraft. Oil imports, apparently, are falling. The category in the government report that includes oil shows a 1.1 percent decline, more in real terms.

The export boom is taking place without gold's help. Gold normally makes up 40 percent of exports but this year, with the price low, that share is probably slipping. The trade-report category that includes mostly gold but also uranium, platinum and arms dropped slightly in real terms.

The star is diamonds, with year-on-year sales nearly doubling over the first six months to R2,4bn—R800m in June alone. Other big gainers: agricultural and mineral products and base metals.

Exports totalled R5,7bn and, like imports, set an SA record. The huge trade surplus was expected because of the good performance of the reserves in June, announced earlier.

### \* Bucking Sanctions

34000765a Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL  
in English 21 Jul 89 p 36

[Text] SA [South Africa] recorded double-digit increases in trade with all its top 10 trading partners, except Japan, last year.

Valued in dollars, trade with West Germany soared 33 percent. It replaced Japan as SA's leading trading partner. But the dollar value of trade increased by even larger percentages with Switzerland (54 percent), Hong Kong (38 percent) and Belgium/Luxembourg (37 percent). In dollar terms, trade with the UK jumped by 26 percent and by 23 percent with the United States, where sanctioners are strongest.

With the depreciating and spurring exports, trade with the major industrialized countries continues to boom. Trade with West Germany soared another 26 percent year-on-year in the 1989 first quarter, according to preliminary figures. U.S.-SA trade is up 5 percent for the first quarter and SA-UK trade is up slightly less in the year to May.

Only Japan is clearly making concessions to the sanctions lobby. Japan became SA's biggest trading partner in 1987, drawing the condemnation of the UN [United Nations]. Last year, after SA-Japan trade doubled year-on-year in the first quarter, the Japanese government pressured industry to limit trade to get away from being SA's top trading partner.

The arm-twisting worked; trade fell dramatically the rest of the year and 7 percent for 1988 overall, dropping Japan to No. 2 trading partner. The slide continues, by 8 percent year-on-year in the 1989 first quarter, mostly because of fewer imports from Japan.

Aside from Japan, trade figures show once again business is business and politics wields only limited influence on trade.

This should prod lazy businesses which use sanctions as an excuse for not developing export markets.

To stymie boycotts, SA stopped releasing country-by-country breakdowns of trade statistics three years ago. But the International Monetary Fund compiles an annual breakdown based on figures from SA's trading partners, and the SA trade offices of several countries report partial-year statistics. Here are highlights from figures released last week:

- Italy was SA's largest export market last year, at US\$1.97bn. Gold, silver and platinum to supply Italy's large jewellery industry make up about 70 percent of this. In fact, a sixth of SA's gold production goes to Italy—about 100 t. SA runs its largest trade surplus with Italy, nearly \$1.5bn last year;
- West Germany was only the third largest export market, behind Italy and Japan, but overwhelmingly the largest source of imports. SA bought \$3.3bn West German products last year, motor vehicles making up about 35 percent. Exports are led by copper, ferro-alloys and other raw materials. Overall, 12.6 percent of SA's trade is with West Germany;
- Platinum is the largest item on the U.S. shopping list, accounting for half the exports there. Office machine parts, digital computers, aircraft parts and aircraft led imports from the United States. SA is the U.S.'s largest trading partner in Africa after oil-rich Nigeria;
- Though its overall trade is too small to rank in the top 10, Spain is SA's ninth largest export market. Exports to this rapidly developing economy grew 21 percent last year; and
- Despite ostracism by most of the continent, SA does a fair amount of trade with African countries. SA sends about 6 percent of exports to African countries and buys about 3 percent of its imports on the continent.

Taiwan is a top trading partner, possibly as high as sixth, but figures are not available. The IMF does not provide statistics because Taiwan is not a member—the result of China's admittance—and Taiwan began keeping SA trade figures secret last year to avoid political pressure.

### Doing Business SA's Trade With Top 10 Partners

	1988	1987	% Change
W. Germany	4,902	3,683	33.1
Japan	3,824	4,113	-7.0
UK	3,215	2,532	26.0
US	3,136	2,553	22.8
Italy	2,467	2,081	18.5
France	1,213	997	21.7
Belgium/Luxembourg	873	636	37.3
Switzerland	793	516	53.7
Hong Kong	750	544	37.9
Holland	532	461	15.4



Figures in millions of US\$.

Source: International Monetary Fund

Taiwan not included because it is not a member of the IMF.

### \* Drugs Allegedly Keep Youth Activism Defused

34000746a Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English  
2 Jul 89 pp 1, 2

[Article by S'bu Mngadi and Sophie Tema: "Residents Allege Plot as Activists Turn to Drugs"]

[Text] Many township youths-generally known as "comrades"-have become hooked on mandrax and activists believe the drug has been introduced to defuse the political militancy of the youth.

The mandrax plague has hit townships around South Africa's three biggest cities-Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town.

A CITY PRESS investigation revealed that mandrax-abusing youths had become a common feature of life in Umlazi, Clermont, Kwa-Mashu, Lomontville, Chester-ville and Ntuzuma.

They are also often seen loitering near shops in Soweto, particularly in Orlando East, Eldorado Park and Noordgesig and in other Johannesburg townships.

The situation in Cape Town is much the same.

Little less than a year ago, these teenagers were toying and chanting political slogans-or they were in detention under the state of emergency.

A family in Chesterville, who were committed activists, have become "parliamentarians"-or mandrax middle-men. Neighbours say the family had been regularly raided in the past but now the police never visit them.

Although some of these mandrax abusers insist they are still activists, comrades brand them as drop-outs and counter-revolutionaries.

The drug plague in the townships has caught almost everyone off-guard.

In Natal, it spread so rapidly the atmosphere is now fraught with fear.

The commander of the SA [South African] police's Durban narcotics bureau, Captain PH Roux, confirmed police had received several reports that "comrades" had turned to drugs.

Mandrax "buttons" are usually crushed, mixed with dagga and smoked in a broken bottle neck. A "button" costs between R15 and R25.

Mandrax is generally imported but two huge local factories have been discovered by police. There the mandrax was packed in capsules known as "cockroaches".

Syndicates are also now manufacturing mandrax locally.

The director and head of clinical services for SANCA [expansion unknown] in Johannesburg, Dr S. De Miranda, said the drug problem in South Africa affected all races.

"The drug trade is no big business and, with urbanisation and industrialisation, more vicious drugs are around in addition to dagga and glue."

Mandrax users were often very aggressive and had been linked to many crimes of violence, he said.

Christian Welfare worker Iris Baltsoucos agreed.

She said mandrax users often suffered from extreme depression and personality change.

"Eight out of ten murders, rapes and crimes of violence are drug-related," she said.

Max, 18, is a typical example of a township mandrax user.

His hangout is the local shopping complex near a she-been, whose owner is a "parliamentarian".

Max spent 14 months as an emergency detainee at Durban's Westville Prison between 1986 and 1988. When he came out of detention he heard the comrades wanted to "discipline" his cousin, who was accused of being a gangster.

"Though I support the 'struggle', I had to protect my family."

He deserted the comrades and was soon introduced to mandrax by his cousin. However, he claims that even though he no longer associates with the comrades he is still an activist.

Meanwhile "Sipho", a "parliamentarian" in Clermont, is in a dicey situation.

The local community accuses him of working for the "system" because the drugs he sells have created divisions between local comrades.

Many Durban "parliamentarians" live in fear of being attacked by locals and many want arms to protect themselves.

They vow to "deal" with anyone who interferes with their trade.

"Drugs are here to stay," said Sipho.



**\* Diamond Exports Help Trade Surplus**

34000744a Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English  
18 Jul 89 p 1

[Article by Greta Steyn: "Diamond Exports Boost Trade Surplus"]

[Text] A massive increase in diamond exports helped SA [South Africa] achieve a trade surplus of R1,3bn in June—more than double the disappointing R456m recorded in May.

Total exports were R5,72bn in June—the highest level so far this year. The precious stones category, mainly diamonds, contributed R553m to an increase of R1,36bn in exports.

Also contributing a huge chunk to the rise in exports was the "unclassified" category, which rose by R543m from May to R2,18bn. Included in this category are gold and arms exports.

The expected dramatic improvement in agricultural exports began in June with a 41 percent increase in vegetable exports to R271,4m. Other categories that recorded increases included minerals, metals and chemical products.

Imports, still buoyed by continued demand for machinery, rose by R540m. Machinery imports rose by 20 percent from May to R1,4bn in June.

The unclassified category of imports rose by 44 percent, probably because of oil imports, to R616,6m.

Trust Bank economist Nick Barnardt says the surge in exports in June helped keep SA's foreign reserves from sliding in spite of massive foreign payments of debt, interest and dividends.

The average trade surplus for the first six months of the year is R887m—below the R,1bn needed to achieve the Reserve Bank's projected R4bn surplus on the current account (after net service payments are subtracted from the trade surplus).

To achieve a R4bn current account surplus—enough comfortably to meet commitments on the capital account of the balance of payments—the country needs a trade surplus of about R13,2bn for the year.

Economists say this looks possible as the trade surplus is likely to perform well in months to come, as long as the gold price remains stable.

Reserve Bank adjustments to diamond sales, which takes into account the eventual selling price of the stones, could also boost the current account.

**\* Homelands Still Attract Foreign Capital**

34000764a Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL* in English  
21 Jul 89 pp 72-73

[Text] SA's [South Africa] independent homelands still attract foreign capital, despite their pariah status and

the problems of foreign boycotts. But neighboring Swaziland, which has no such hassles, seems to be doing better.

In SA's homelands, investment is still heavily centered around Taiwanese and Hong Kong investors, mainly in the clothing industry. In Bophuthatswana, for example, they account for 55 out of a total of 61 foreign investors.

There are also some notable European investments in Bophuthatswana, including Samca tiles (part of the Italtile group from Italy), three investors from Germany and Luxembourg as well as two from Israel.

Total overseas investment in Bophuthatswana now stands at R90m, topped up by R35,5m from the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation (BNDC) in respect of buildings and infrastructure.

Similarly, foreign investments in the Ciskei total about R90m. These are mainly in clothing and textiles, which represent 23 percent of total industrial investment and 42 percent of industrial jobs created in the territory.

Ciskei has a wider spread of investors than Bophuthatswana. The largest investor is once again Taiwan (20 projects), followed by Israel (six), 14 from a spread of European countries and two from the United States.

Transkei looks set to gain from new European investments: three Italian companies are reportedly planning to invest R250m in three projects. Existing foreign investments include an Italian chipboard factory and a Taiwanese chopstick factory. Investments outside the timber industry include 10 television component factories from Taiwan, worth R40m.

But the stumbling blocks to further investment, as the BNDC admits, include a boycott of products from southern Africa by many overseas countries (notably the United States), a lack of entrepreneurs and, most of all, the lack of international recognition.

Says BNDC spokesman Linda Brown: "If this could be achieved it would open the doorway to foreign investors and exports. Development would excel, more jobs would be created and exports would earn foreign currency."

SA/German Chamber executive director Liesel Quambusch says German businesses have no intention of giving the homelands economic in place of political recognition. "Most German businesses wouldn't be attracted to homelands by decentralization packages. And we are used to working with unions—so the absence of unions in the homelands is no drawback for us."

Swaziland is more fortunate: the German overseas development corporation is a shareholder in the Swaziland Industrial Development Corporation (SIDC). Says SIDC GM Stephen Potter: "We don't try to compete with the homelands as we don't have the financial resources that are made available to them by Pretoria—but we can offer a five-year tax holiday, as well as preferential access to the EEC and North America."

Swaziland has worldwide credibility and the country won't allow itself to be used for sanctions busting, he stresses.

In contrast to SA's homelands, the majority of overseas investors in Swaziland are from the EEC and North

America—and investment is higher than for all the homelands put together. Most recently, Nestle, Cadbury-Schweppes and Pilkington Glass have set up in Swaziland. "We've even had inquiries from businesses in the homelands who want to relocate here," says Potter.

## Mozambique

### \* Chissano Discusses Angolan Peace Process

34420124a Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
27 Jun 89 p 8

[Press conference given by President Chissano on 23 Jun in Beira; reporters not identified]

[Text] In a press conference given last Friday in Beira, President Joaquim Chissano analyzed the solution reached in the Angolan conflict and its potential implications for the situation in Mozambique. Following is the full text of that press conference:

[Reporter] Mr President, in light of the complexities of the Angolan problem and the fact that until just a few months ago, apparently, no one anticipated an end to the war in Angola, how do you explain this speedy and satisfactory solution to the problem?

[Chissano] I don't know whether we can say that no one anticipated the end of the war in Angola, because we did observe that some external factors that were exacerbating the conflict in Angola were gradually beginning to disappear and that the Angolan Government, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and other leaders in the region were making very obvious efforts to find solutions, beyond the battlefield, to bring peace to Angola as rapidly as possible.

As you know, in addition to the meetings between some of the presidents in Central Africa, of which Angola is a part—because Angola is situated both in Central and Southern Africa—there were also some contacts between the Front Line states and the Angolan Government, and all these efforts and discussions culminated in a meeting that took place on 16 May, that we participated in, and which assigned tasks to all the heads of state in attendance.

So, from then on, continued efforts were made, but the objective conditions were such that it was inevitable that the response from all the parties involved and all persons interested in the subject would be positive. Then, several conditions were created. One of them was the process of implementing Resolution 435 for the independence of Namibia, and there were other processes such as the withdrawal of the Cuban troops which began later under the agreement between the Angolan and Cuban governments. And, finally, all the Angolans who were involved in the conflict became more aware of the possibilities available for putting an end to it. So this began some time ago, and I don't see it as a decision that was made suddenly. Purely and simply, in a process such as this one, it is impossible for all the work to be done in public view, precisely because solutions need to be carefully weighed and touchy situations nipped in the bud. Sometimes careless and ill-considered comments made in public can create sensitivities that become obstacles to a process that could otherwise have been easy. And working out everything in the open can also facilitate

interference by interests foreign to the interests of the people, who are solving their own problems.

So I interpret this outcome as being the result of a maturation of the objective conditions and a result of the joint efforts by several parties and by the persons concerned. Perhaps I can cite one more example, which is that the situation in South Africa, in the interior of South Africa, is undergoing some changes. We hope that this trend continues and moves rapidly, so that we will also see if some progress can be brought about in South Africa. This relates to the same discussion that culminated with the implementation of Resolution 435. And that's pretty much all I have to say in response to your question.

[Reporter] When you refer to the gradual disappearance of the external factors in the Angolan problem, do you mean to say that the countries that have a certain amount of influence are satisfied with this political resolution of the Angolan case?

[Chissano] I can say that as far as I know at this point, they are part of the solution. Even if some of them were part of the problem yesterday, they are part of the solution today. The consultations were very intense, and involved a lot of persuasion. Many very strong and positive commitments were made to ensure that peace comes to Angola, and if there was a lack of integrity on anyone's part, well it will come to light later.

But I don't believe there was duplicity, and to be direct about it, I don't think that the South Africans are going to do an about-face; they are not going to invade Angola, especially against the will of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] itself, or against the will of the Angolan Government. They are not going to stand in the way of the reconciliation of the Angolan people. UNITA itself has an interest in seeing its people enjoy peace, and the Angolan Government also has an interest in seeing the Angolan people take part in the reconstruction of that country.

The Americans will no longer have any interest in backing UNITA, and in fact that organization will disappear as all those who are now members become integrated into a national order in the existing democracy, so as to participate in the development of this national order, not only economically but—certainly—politically, socially, and culturally. And I don't know whether the Americans have announced, or are going to announce that cessation of aid or not, but everything indicates that they have every interest in really helping with the consolidation of peace in Angola and inaugurating a new era of relations with the people and Government of Angola.

As I said, they are all part of the solution. President Mobutu Sese Seko, from the border state that the Angolans and others have often complained about, was the one who played a role, perhaps the most important role, in the final phase, i.e., since 16 May, in order to accelerate this solution that we hope can come about



sometime in August, or in September at the latest. He really acted with a lot of courage and, with the support of all of us, succeeded in obtaining the results that we might say we celebrated yesterday when we witnessed the handshake between Savimbi and Eduardo dos Santos.

We were present, and it was a very emotional occasion. We all had an opportunity to shake hands with both men and congratulate them, and we saw that both were happy. That is why I say that the external factors, at least those that could be more or less anticipated will not, it appears, be capable of creating any obstacle. It may be that there are others who will want to create problems in the future, and we must take a stand against any of them coming along to create new situations of instability in Angola.

[Reporter] Mr President, in his conversations with us Dr Jonas Savimbi gave us to understand that his guerrillas are not prepared to begin the ceasefire process tomorrow. Doesn't this mean that this declaration of a ceasefire took Jonas Savimbi by surprise?

[Chissano] I don't think so. I don't think so because I heard Savimbi's words and saw his face, and I just had the impression that he was really imbued with patriotic sentiments and that he thought that the war in Angola had gone on too long to be allowed to continue, because the Angolan people were the ones losing by it, and there was no longer any reason for that war to continue. It was really nice that a reconciliation could take place in a spirit of African, and Angolan, brotherhood, the way they did.

I am convinced that most—if not all—of the guerrillas, the combatants who were on the UNITA side, will respond to the call for the ceasefire because what awaits them is truly very encouraging; it means integration into the political, military, social, and cultural life of their people, in complete freedom, on a fully equal footing. And so they will be in a position where they'll be able to defend what is essential for their country, i.e., economic development, an economic development that is going to diminish the factors that cause tensions, because sometimes we fight because we are poor and short of food, and then we fight over what little bread there is.

They understand that and realize that it is only by hard work and development and through a joint effort that one can really consolidate peace, can consolidate the building of the Nation.

[Reporter] Mr President, if you will permit me to say so, I think that what is going on in Angola is bound to have repercussions in Mozambique. How does our country's government think that influence will manifest itself?

[Chissano] Well, I hope that those who are fighting against the Government of Mozambique and against its population, causing these massacres we have been seeing, and wrecking the economy, will suffer an attack of conscience—and I hope, I'm certain, that many of them still have a conscience—and will then cooperate,

just as UNITA cooperated with its government, i.e., with the Angolan Government. These people will also cooperate with the Government of Mozambique in order to bring about peace. That way, we can bring normality back into the lives of all citizens in Mozambique and enable each of them to participate, freely and democratically, in the process of building the economy and in the development process and even in the leadership, in ways that will enable us to guarantee the right kind of leadership for the future of our country, achieve greater national unity, greater economic development, and consolidate the Mozambican nation that we are still building.

We don't see any basic contradiction in our situation. We in the Government of Mozambique are willing to continue on this road. It is enough that people renounce violence, that they recognize an order, and that is the existing one. This does not mean that the existing order cannot be changed. But the Mozambican people are the ones who must modify the existing order by acting within their unity, not because of pressures exerted by those who are backed by interests that are foreign to the Mozambican people, whether from the Left or the Right. The Mozambican people, in their unity, are the ones who really know with certainty what will satisfy their yearnings. What might be wrong today or tomorrow can be corrected the day after tomorrow, and history is a process of development.

Nothing is ever that perfect at a given moment. The day that happens, it means that the world has attained perfection, or else has stopped. We are for development, we are for evolution, but an evolution that is within the order, within the unity, within the progress, and not an evolution toward retrograde negative aspects. We don't want a retreat; we want to move ahead—and the people know what is progress and what is regression.

Today we are discussing preparations for the congress, and the people are the ones who will participate in it. You are journalists, and very critical of a lot of things. If things fit well together, then you criticize that. What is being done is not the criticism of a critical journalist, it's the voice of the people. The idea is not to destroy, but to build. It is in this order, in this unity, in this harmony that we want to move forward.

So what happened in Angola must have some influence in Mozambique, in terms of pointing out to those who are still afraid that nothing is impossible, after all.

[Reporter] Mr President: What are the reasons behind the fact that the efforts made to find solutions to the Angolan problem were not conducted in the context of a summit meeting of OAU [Organization of African Unity] heads of state? Especially since we know that other problems of similar, or even lesser, complexity received the attention of the heads of state at a summit meeting.

[Chissano] Well, as you know, within the OAU Africa is divided into regions. You have North Africa, Central

Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, and West Africa. Well, we have seen that some problems are handled in a regional context, although the OAU is familiar with them, and sometimes they are initially brought up in the OAU at a summit meeting and then the tendency is to set up a committee, sometimes a regional committee, other times a broader, continental committee. We always find ways to communicate.

In this case, there were two preponderant groups: the Front Line states and some Central African countries, because Angola is part of both Central Africa and Southern Africa. The Front Line group has become, because of its practices, what you might call a sort of instrument of the OAU. It is not an agency of the OAU but because of the way it does things, it is seen by the OAU as a group that has monitored and guided the study of the solutions to the problems of Southern Africa.

And so we had this meeting. We had met many times because of the Namibia issue, and along with the Namibia issue we talked about the problem of UNITA. The Front Line states were the ones that discussed the Namibia question; a group from the Front Line talked with a group known as the Contact Group made up of United Nations member countries, generally European. It was the Front Line that discussed the problem of Zimbabwe in talks with a group known as the Anglo-American group.

Angola borders on the Congo, it borders on Zaire, as well as with Zambia and Botswana—which share a border with Namibia and with Angola. Those countries were significant, and began discussing the problem when the issues had become somewhat more mature. After all, there is always an exchange of information, especially through the OAU. The problem is much discussed in the OAU. There are exchanges of delegations, special envoys, ambassadors, etc. Africa was watching the problem, the President of the OAU kept abreast of it, and the Angolans themselves visited the various capital cities. So, hardly any countries were out of touch with this question.

As you saw, even Morocco, which belongs to North Africa, participated with distinction because it was important for it to do so. The Ivory Coast and Morocco helped to find a solution to this problem of Angola.

Therefore, you can't say that the OAU remained aloof. A report on this success will be given at the next OAU meeting. There will be 50 or so countries in attendance. Well, with 50 or so heads of state, sometimes it's not easy to reach a solution to such a delicate problem, one that has all the delicate aspects that I talked about at the beginning of this conference. Each one has his own way of looking at a problem. Furthermore, there are some that are closer to the problem; others are farther away from it and don't have all the information they need to make the most accurate judgement.

That is why it has often been OAU practice to entrust the solution of the problems to a particular group, even

though the matter is of general interest. As we saw here, besides the countries of Central Africa, besides the Front Line states, and besides the officially Lusophone countries, Morocco and Nigeria were invited to join the effort. And the Ivory Coast was invited, too, but apparently it was impossible for its head of state to be at Gbadolite that day.

In my opinion it's the OAU [that's behind this], and you saw that Mali, the country that is the acting president of the OAU, was represented at the Gbadolite summit and spoke on behalf of the OAU, both at the opening session and when the group had to address the public via the press. Therefore, none of this is outside the spirit of the OAU.

Not everything can be resolved within the OAU structure. The issue of the Maghreb, for example. We are all watching it; they are not their problems, they are problems that interest the OAU, and how many times hasn't the OAU had to discuss those matters? But it was decided that it was more useful to listen to just a few voices in order to reach a solution. Now the Chad problem is a different case. It was the OAU itself that appointed a committee, but that committee doesn't always have to meet. There's a chairman of the committee who takes the initiative; sometimes he contacts one country, sometimes he contacts another, and the problem of Chad is being resolved. In East Africa there was a problem between Somalia and Ethiopia, which ended up finding its solution at a more restricted level after interminable discussions within the OAU. However, once the matter was dealt with in a more limited context, it became possible to reach a consensus and great progress was made. All this is just by way of citing many examples in which solutions were arrived at this way, yet the OAU always felt that it was associated with those solutions.

#### **\* Swedish Government Donates Vehicles to Maputo**

33420124b Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
19 Jun 89 p 1

[Text] A fleet of eight Scania trucks to be used to collect refuse on the main streets of the capital was formally delivered yesterday to the president of the Executive Council of the City of Maputo (CEM), Joao Baptista Cosme, by the Swedish Government.

The fleet, which is a donation, is part of a group of 13 trucks which that country is offering to the city's Executive Council. Their total value is calculated at 7 million Swedish kroner (each kroner being worth about 109 meticaís).

Ove Hansson, one of the representatives of the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), who turned over the vehicles in a formal ceremony at the Scania facilities just outside the capital city, said it was his country's desire to help Mozambique to clean up its environment while, at the same time, creating certain minimum conditions for the health of its citizens.

He described this donation as the result of the fine relations of friendship and cooperation that exist between the two countries—Mozambique and Sweden.

Then the president of the Executive Council, Joao Baptista Cosme, in accepting the keys to the trucks, expressed thanks for the offer and said that great care will be taken in using them so that they will last for years.

Baptista Cosme then noted that those units are the only ones that the CEM has received as a donation; the gift will help to reduce financial costs and make it possible to carry out other projects within the area of his responsibility.

The photo below shows two of the new refuse-collecting trucks being turned over to the CEM.

#### \* 500 Policemen Conclude Training

344420124c Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
19 Jun 89 p 1

[Text] "The career upon which you now embark requires continued study in order to keep your professional skills up to date, because learning does not end with the completion of the basic training course," said Superintendent Domingos Maita, personnel director at the Ministry of the Interior, on Saturday when he addressed 523 new Mozambique People's Police [PPM] agents moments after they had sworn allegiance to the flag. This brought to a close the second basic training course given since 5 December at the Regional Training Center for PPM Units in Nhangau, on the outskirts of the city of Beira.

In his final advice to the new graduates, the official made a point of saying that discipline must govern the conduct of a policeman. In carrying out his duties he must keep in mind that his reason for being is to ensure order, safety, and tranquility. "However, in order for this to be possible, we must work in close cooperation with the people, in whatever region we find ourselves. The criminal may escape from us because he recognizes us from afar because of the uniform, but this is not true of the people among whom he lives. That is why, I repeat, it is essential to maintain an attitude of deep respect toward that population, which we have sworn to defend," he continued.

Later, he announced that the Ministry of the Interior has launched a purification campaign that is intended to remove from its ranks those elements whose behavior is incompatible with the principles that ought to guide the life of a member of the PPM.

"I want to make it very clear that the career of a policeman is not as easy as one might at first imagine. It requires discipline, a fighting spirit, an intransigent attitude toward crime, and perpetual readiness to work 24 hours a day. And, furthermore, to be available for any

assignment in any part of the country. That's why some of you won't be going back to your native provinces," he explained.

It was noted that the Regional Training Center for PPM Units receives candidates from the provinces of Sofala, Manica, Tete, and Zambezia (central zone), and that the course which ended Saturday is the second since that center began to operate last year as a training site for Mozambicans of either sex who are entering the ranks of the police.

It was also said on the occasion that some of the new graduates, depending on the reading and writing skills they possess or may acquire, may be selected for training courses leading to service as sergeants or junior officers.

#### Thrilling Ceremonies on Parade Ground

The ceremony of pledging allegiance to the flag, the marching in formation, and a demonstration of some of the skills learned during the course were held on the parade ground prepared for the purpose. The first two events took place to the beat of the FAM/FPLM [Mozambique Armed Forces/Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique] band, which began by playing the national anthem.

But the truly solemn act was the pledge to the flag, in which the policeman commits himself to defend the people and the revolution, even if this means risking his own life. Serving as parade marshal was the academic director of the center, Inspector Fernando Binda, whose voice commands were obeyed by the more than 500 trainees in an exercise in which no errors of consequence were observed.

#### \* Economic Cooperation With RSA Explored

##### \* Bright Outlook

34000762 Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN  
NEWSLETTER in English 22 Jul 89 p 2

[Text] Future South African President and current leader of the ruling National Party, Frederik W. Klerk's visit to Maputo on July 19 is related to the peace process in Mozambique, and also in the preparation of a regional summit, in the presence of South Africa. His visit was preceded by two important events, one political, the other economic.

Politically, the United States has just given their approval for South Africa's direct participation in negotiations between the government and RENAMO [Mozambique National Resistance], announced Herman Cohen, American Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs, on July 13. He reiterated his appeal to Pretoria for all South African aid to RENAMO to be ceased. In a prior statement on Southern Africa, Mr Cohen said that the United States considered that South Africa was the "motor for economic development throughout the whole African continent." Of Mozambique he said on June 22



that President Chissano believed that if South Africa assumed its responsibilities as under resolution 435 and led Namibia to independence, then all types of agreement could be possible with South Africa in the domain of regional cooperation. It has since been made known that Zimbabwe opposed direct contacts with South Africa and does not want to communicate with Pretoria unless via the ANC [African National Congress].

It is likely that this question as well as the future of Zimbabwean presence in the Beira corridor should there be a cease-fire in Mozambique were the focus of the tete-a-tete meeting on July 9 in Beira between Joaquim Chissano and Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe. The Beira corridor is of prime importance as a supply channel for Zimbabwe and Harare is said to be worried about the consequences of a cease-fire on its security.

Another notable event: South Africa and Mozambique signed a commercial agreement for preferential treatment as of July 7. Under the terms of this contract, South Africa abolishes taxes levied on some Mozambican products entering South Africa and customs taxes have been lowered by 3 percent. These two measures are applicable only to products to be sold on the South African or Botswanan markets. The agreement should result in an extra 19 million dollars per year in revenue for Mozambique.

Initially, the agreement will apply to the following Mozambican products: fish, seafood, cashew nuts, citrus fruits, wood furniture, palm oil, cigarettes, tires, cement-fibre sheets and crafts. In a second phase certain textile products, mainly cotton should be added to this list.

Several South African companies are also prepared to invest in Mozambique. According to the news agency, AIM, African Explosives and Chemical Industries, is seeking to build an ammoniac plant near Pande natural gas reserves in Inhambane province. Anglo-American for its part, is interested in working Moatize coal mines in Tete province. Paper company, SAPPI, is in the process of carrying out a feasibility study for a forestry project in the south of Mozambique covering 50,000 hectares. The wood will be converted into paper pulp in South Africa which implies the construction of new roads. In the tourism sector, South African hotel chain, Karos Hotel is ready to take over the management of Polana, Maputo's top hotel.

#### \* Anglo American Chairman Speaks

34000762 Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL  
in English 21 Jul 89 p 69

[Text] Anglo American (AA) chairman Gavin Relly's statement this week that the company is "keen to help develop Mozambique" highlights a positive trend in SA [South Africa]'s business relations with the sprawling country on the eastern seaboard.

"Opportunities exist in forestry, mineral and agricultural development and the exploitation of natural gas," notes

Relly. Clearly only the security situation in the huge, underdeveloped country prevents SA investment from taking off.

Sappi [South Africa Pulp and Paper Industries] is investigating the feasibility of putting 50,000 ha under timber (Business July 14). For some time, harbour refurbishment, agro-industrial development and road upgrading have formed part of advanced forward planning for increased investment in Mozambique.

But, while many new business links—like Karos Hotel's plan to manage the Polana Hotel in Maputo—are still in the provisional stage, substantial developments have already taken place. Among the leading actors is Premier International (PI), foreign investment arm of SA's huge Premier group.

"The day after the Nkomati Accord was signed in 1984, we moved into Mozambique. Today we operate a bonded warehouse in Maputo, are involved in feeding about 1m Mozambican dependents of nationals working in SA, run a joint-venture chicken project with the Mozambican government (Sunridge Avicola, producing about 100t a month), and have the sole agency for importing cashew nuts into SA," says PI marketing director Katerina Yiannakis.

PI also runs the Lojas Wholesale Department, official import wholesaler for the State-owned retailer, Interfranca Stores. "We try to promote SA imports into Mozambique," she says.

"It is most encouraging to see the tangible improvements that are now taking place" adds Yiannakis.

Ed Wilson, who runs PI's Mozambican operations from Maputo, says new technologies, like a feedmill introduced at Sunridge Avicola, help to make operations profitable. "We are now in the process of registering Premier Mozambique Limitee, holding company for our Mozambican operations."

Wilson sees great scope for agricultural ventures, although security remains the major problem. But peace prospects are improving.

"We are also very active in Zaire, Malawi and Zambia and intend broadening our investment and trade operations into Africa," says Yiannakis.

An AA spokesman says the chairman of SA's largest corporation has a personal interest in developing the region. Relly visited Mozambican president Joachim Chissano in April 1988 and, as a result, various projects are being investigated:

- Mondi is looking at a timber project of "substantial size, similar in scope to that being investigated by Sappi;"
- whole range of mineral deposits could be mined in the north;
- AA is looking at refurbishing two cashew nut factories—it used to run Mocita, the "world's premier

- cashew nut brand," prior to independence.
- With AECI, AA is looking at the possible development of the Pende gas fields. Potentially a "very big project," Pende could provide feedstock for ammonia manufacture; and
- Amfarms is looking at various food growing and processing projects, which could become feasible as soon as peace becomes a reality.

Meanwhile, trade ties are also strengthening.

A preferential tariff arrangement between SA and Mozambique, announced by Trade and Industry (TI) director general Stef Naude on July 7, allows the rebated import of Mozambican fish, shrimps, prawns, cashew nuts, citrus, wooden furniture, coconut oil and other items into SA, free of import surcharge.

"While the Maputo rail and road links are sometimes subject to security action, a lot of trade is flowing through Swaziland," says TI spokesman Theo van der Merwe.

Meanwhile, SA's Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) recently visited Maputo to assist in establishing training centers and trading facilities for formal and informal businessmen.

"The official attitude to business development has improved considerably," says SBDC GM James Scott.

This week's visit by National Party leader F W de Klerk to Maputo, followed by the week-long Frelimo congress, could provide further pointers to the growing business links between SA and Mozambique.

#### \* Key Projects

34000762 Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES (Business)  
in English 16 Jul 89 p 3

[Article by Udo Rypstra]

[Text] Millions of rands could be invested in Mozambique after July 24. The Frelimo congress is expected to relax its marxist attitudes and ratify several joint projects with SA [South Africa] Government and business.

A key project is the reconstruction and retarring of the 120km road between Komatipoort and Maputo. SA will probably provide R25-million for the work.

The German-South African Chamber of Industry says the road is in poor condition. Trucks from SA use the route through Swaziland to the Namaacha border post.

The SA-Mozambique Commission for Economic Affairs was established in February under the chairmanship of former Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Kobus Meiring and Argila Mazula, Mozambique's Minister of Labor.

Six sub-committees were formed, one dealing with transport and road infrastructure. It is estimated that rebuilding of the road will take about two years.

SA is said to have approved R25-million in export credits for restoration and additions to the Polana Hotel in Maputo. It is said that Mozambique will return 50 percent of the ownership of the nationalized hotel to the Hoffman family of Johannesburg. The Hoffmans have a large stake in Karos Hotels, which was recently listed on the JSE. Karos is expected to take over management of the Polana.

Stan Hoffman, joint managing director of Karos, has made several visits to Maputo to discuss ownership of the hotel with Jacinto Velose, Minister of Co-operation, and Augusto Sumbarane, director for foreign investments.

#### Beachfront

Restoration of the hotel is expected to take 18 months and conference facilities will be added. The hotel will remain open during construction.

The SA Government is spending R16-million on a beachfront village for its trade mission staff in Maputo. Murray & Roberts subsidiary Ribco has been building the enclave since February.

The village will house families who would otherwise have to pay up to R8,000 a month for a three bedroom house, or R800 a night in a hotel.

The 19 dwellings, a small school, cafeteria and club room are being prefabricated in Durban.

The SA Black Taxi Association (Sabta) is poised to set up a R6-million operation to help the country's ailing transport system.

Premier International, Anglo American, Sappi and Metro Cash & Carry plan to expand into Mozambique. Anglo American is interested in the Pande gas fields off the coast halfway between Maputo and Beira. If the gas deal comes off, Anglo would become the biggest single investor in Mozambique. The project could cost more than R200-million.

Sappi is looking at a forestry venture south of Maputo.

#### \* Extent of RSA Business

34000762 Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English  
Jul 89 pp 51, 52, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64-65

[Text] Mozambique conjures up wildly disparate images in the minds of South Africans. On the one hand, it is of Portuguese, prawns and piri-iri; dazzling beaches, coral reefs and blue lagoons; vinho verde and Laurentina; whispering palms, balmy evenings and rip-roaring nightspots.

On the other, it represents a radical Marxist-Leninist regime; Russians and Cubans in profusion; ANC [African National Congress] offices on South Africa's doorstep; SADF [South African Defense Force] air and ground strikes; widespread fighting between Frelimo and

Renamo; crushing poverty; thousands dying, millions displaced; refugees pouring out of a country plunging into anarchy.

Both images are out of date. The communist ogre is following the colonial dictatorship into history, and a new Mozambique is struggling to emerge. If it succeeds, it will have achieved one of the most acrobatic socio-political somersaults in Africa's Contorted history; from zealous socialism to free enterprise.

The remarkable thing is that the Mozambicans are depending heavily on South African money, management and skills—particularly from the private sector. According to Mozambican officials and South African entrepreneurs already operating there, Mozambique offers a golden opportunity for making a profit and promoting peace in southern Africa at the same time.

This idea will raise many eyebrows. How can Mozambique turn around and swim against the stream it had previously chosen—the Third World, the non-aligned movement, the Eastern bloc, and the very body it helped to create to disentangle black states from apartheid South Africa, the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)? A country firmly convinced that South Africa foments its internal strife?

Nowadays, Marx and Lenin are seldom mentioned in the Maputo media. Most of those hysterical wall slogans have gone. The twitchy troops and policemen who used to patrol the streets with frightening hardware are out of sight. During a five-day visit, the only soldiers I saw were on guard duty outside barracks and the presidential residence. The thumping ideological rhetoric has died down, giving way to sober appeals for unity, production and resistance to Renamo. There is no overt hostility to South Africans—only sweetness and light; an eagerness to help, inform, invite.

It's a stunning turnabout indeed. What happened was that, five years ago, imminent mass starvation, national bankruptcy and spreading bloodshed brought Mozambique face to face with harsh reality.

The wholesale exodus at independence of the Portuguese—who had extracted much, put back little and taught hardly anything—had left the country bare of management. What infrastructure remained outside the towns and cities was shattered by the mindless violence of Renamo. Drought, rising oil prices, a massive plunge in exports, a decline of about 75 percent in traffic through Maputo harbour and much more in Beira, and the total death of the lucrative tourist industry nearly sank the country. It wasn't quite on the rocks, but it was scrapping the barnacles. Frelimo's old friends in the East who gave it guns and encouragement for so many years could do little to help. In 1983 an alarmed Fourth Frelimo Party Congress confronted reality and ordered its government to take drastic corrective action. The government hastily eased many of the economic restrictions associated with the socialist package, reversing a 9

percent drop in GDP [gross domestic product] in 1985, the darkest year, to a 1.5 percent rise in 1986.

This pragmatism made the West more responsive to Mozambique's appeals. A trickle of aid grew into a stream, from America, Britain, Italy, and other sources, in the form of cash or expertise (to such an extent that one cynic said the national symbol should be a pair of cupped hands). But with it also came hard-headed advice and conditional help from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

The real turning point came in 1987 when Mozambique launched an Economic Rehabilitation Programme [ERP] for 1987-90 that stands socialist dogma on its head. An honest admission that Mozambique cannot cope on its own, the ERP opens the doors wide—but not unconditionally—to foreign investors, allowing them to make money while helping the nation to drag itself up by its bootstraps.

The ERP is aimed at giving the moribund economy the kiss of life by getting local industry going again, reversing the drop in production, boosting incomes and consumption, repairing domestic finances, and improving the balance of payments (current account deficit this year: about US \$1bn). It specifically targets the development of agriculture—the foundation of the economy—and agriculture-based industry, import substitution, the stimulation of marine and mineral exports, training of manpower, and the full utilization of railroad and harbour facilities as urgent priorities.

To this end, government controls have been relaxed a great deal more to allow internal market forces free play, thereby energetically luring foreign investment and letting incomes relate to performance and production. The local currency, the metical, has also been drastically devalued—from 40 to the dollar down to 200 in January 1987, to 400 that June, 450 in January last year, 580 last June and 715 now, or about 274 to the rand.

The effects of these measures are severely limited by the fact that, in this country of 800,000 km<sup>2</sup> and 12-15m people, control of any kind, and therefore its applicability, is effective only in and around urban centers such as Maputo, Beira, Nacala, Pemba, Nampula, Chimoio and Tete. Most of the territory outside them is a battle-zone entered only at risk.

But economic revival has to start somewhere and the logical places are the urban centers, already the focus of the large service and small manufacturing industries abandoned by the Portuguese.

There are already healthy signs of improvement, feeble perhaps in South African terms but dramatic in Mozambique. A few years ago shops in Maputo rarely had stocks, food shortages were critical, long queues formed for what little was available, the informal markets in the shanty towns teeming with fugitives from the bush were



empty, and black marketeering was rife. The city was dangerously depressed and there was widespread disaffection.

Today Maputo's littered and broken streets are full of traffic. Consumer goods are appearing in shops, albeit in small quantities and variety. Customers jam restaurants like the downtown Continental cafe and the Zambis, which, like all buildings, badly need a coat of paint. But now the picture is reversed: there are more black faces than white. Cafes sometimes run out of bread, but seldom of the local draught beer. Informal township markets are booming, well supplied by the Green Belt—farms on the edges of the city run with foreign aid, supporting 80,000 people. Food and other production has risen.

Despite their decrepitude, hotels are thriving—almost entirely on foreigners, because the state permits them to accept only foreign currency. This device is aimed both at reaping foreign exchange and stopping black marketeering in money. Basic services such as lights, water and telephones function adequately. Some buses run and the taxi business is picking up. An Italian company has been contracted to repair the city's badly potholed streets. The changes are all small at this stage, all precariously dependent on foreign aid and investment, and largely confined to the main centers; but they are working. The economy grew by 3.6 percent in 1987 and was projected to improve by another 4.2 percent last year.

What has this meant for South Africans? Not much yet, according to Dr Jose Julai Mazive, deputy director of the Office for Foreign Investment Promotion. Many South Africans are coming to look, he says, but their investment so far is small beside the large sums coming from British, Italian and American entrepreneurs.

Those already involved say Mozambique is an opportunity it would be foolish to ignore.

"South Africans are still far too suspicious of Mozambique," says Carlo Esposti, the Falstaffian resident director of the Anglo American Corporation who also wears the hats of the local MD of De Beers and of Britain's Metal Box PLC, local director of Standard Bank, representative for Rockwell International, and owner of his own transport company.

"South Africa is the natural partner of this country," he says, waving an arm at the empty Maputo Bay and estuary where once 20 or more ships would have been queuing for berths in the harbour. South African traffic through it has dropped to between a quarter and a half of its old levels.

"I am very optimistic that trade will increase," says Americo Magaia, president of the Mozambique Chamber of Commerce, who recently led a mission to extol his country's potential to fellow chambers all over South Africa.

"There was a decline in recent years caused by political misunderstandings. But trade and economic relations must exist. People are keen to use Mozambique's routes and facilities. Since my return we have faced an invasion of South African business people. The South African Foreign Trade Organization organized two visits of 15 people who spent a week talking to their counterparts, seeing factories and meeting government. The Afrikaanse Sakekamer wants to bring a top group, and so does Assocom."

Rob Garmany, dynamic regional director of the Safren-owned Manica Holdings, the biggest freight and trade enterprise in southern Africa, says: "Mozambique is a tremendous area for investment and opportunity if this is based on local resources and existing skills."

"There has been a dramatic change in the approachability of the Mozambican authorities. South African investors should be setting aside some capital now in order to get a foot in the door. They have the huge advantage of experience in Africa and with Africans. The government is actually wooing South Africans. It is the logical source of capital and the biggest potential market for Mozambique," he adds.

"Even before the Nkomati Accord the government started talking to South Africans about rehabilitating our hotels", says Zacarias Sumbana, the young director of tourist planning, who is eager to see the tourists return.

"We saw the future and we were prepared to invest in it," says Ed Wilson, GM of Premier International Mozambique and MD of the embryo Premier Mozambique Ltd, both offshoots of South Africa's Premier Milling.

"We do not generate the return on investment here that we do in South Africa, but we are positive. We are now registering a local company with local participants to expand into mainly production operations." But he adds: "South African companies coming here must not try to make a fast buck; it will jeopardize relationships."

Mozambican attitudes towards South Africa began to improve before President Samora Machel's death—which was a major setback, says David Laubscher, South African trade representative, whose role is collectively that of ambassador. But relations have improved considerably since presidents Botha and Joaquim Chissano met last year at Songo, next to the Cahora Bassa dam, and South African businessmen are playing a major role in improving them further.

"It is really in the last year that Mozambique has opened up, sending people to South Africa and more frequently receiving South African officials here."

Describing the ERP as a "very big step towards free enterprise", Laubscher says the country offers many prospects for investors willing to join forces with the state or local businessmen and to train local people in management and operational skills.

It is not yet possible to calculate the total of South African private capital invested, and most of its owners are coy about their figures. Certainly it falls far behind the more than US \$70m from other countries and the nearly US \$80m for projects still being considered.

But one useful barometer of South African interest is the little Metavia airline based in Nelspruit. It began flying charters into Mozambique in 1983, linked up with the Maputo-based company TTA, and in May 1985 began scheduled flights. Now, it and TTA stage at least two flights daily, for a return fare of R240.

By January this year, says MD Peter Farquhar, they had carried 21,000 passengers and 634,000 kg of cargo in their little five- and seven-seater planes, including lobster brought out for export. Now Metavia is starting a new air service specifically for the 120,000 migrant workers who legally work in South Africa.

For these people, travelling home, laden with goods bought in South Africa and their pockets full of money, is hazardous. Both road and rail traffic to Maputo from the Komatipoort/Ressano Garcia border post have been shot up and robbed by the MNR [Mozambique National Resistance]. Those returning to homes between Maputo and Inhambane to the north face even greater risk.

So Metavia is flying them in Dakotas to Maputo and points north to Inhambane for fares of between R100 and R400 one way, with the return trip free if and when they want to go back to the mines. "It's a humanitarian thing which we really enjoy doing," says Farquhar.

Migrant workers were also the first motivation for Premier Milling's entry. Premier was approached five years ago after the Nkomati Accord because the miners were being ripped off by organizations that took money from them to deliver supplies to their families back home—but never did.

"So we created a scheme whereby a migrant's family could get goods from any of five warehouses south of the Save River," says Rui Costa, director of Premier International Mozambique. Since then Premier has moved in 1,000 tons of goods a month and keeps prices stable. How important this is can be gauged from the fact that the migrant workers are Mozambique's biggest export, bringing back R300—400m a year in pay and deferred pay.

The service has done much to generate respect for South African companies and erase the stigma left by the revelation of former deputy foreign minister Louis Nel's clandestine visit to the MNR in Gorongosa.

From that start Premier expanded into managing a local mill to make poultry, pig and cattle feed from imported maize. By agreement with the state-owned company Avicola it has also taken over the running of ten poultry farms and abattoirs around Maputo. This has served as a

strong incentive to other producers, and Maputo is now well served with meat and eggs at prices more stable than those in South Africa.

So successful has Premier been that it plans to expand into other agricultural produce for export—but not to South Africa until it drops its 60 percent surcharge.

"Access to the authorities here is first class," says Costa. "Our work has been based on facts, not bluffing and trying to oversell. We have not even started in Mozambique; there are so many things to do. It is important to inject capital and know-how, and South African know-how is great for these conditions.

"Here," he adds, "there are 360 degrees of opportunities, and by being here it is possible to implement them."

His views are echoed by Rob Garmany of Manica—a company far advanced on the Manica Trading of old, formed in 1892. The new Manica is a merger of 16 companies that were active in Mozambique before independence. It handles about 80 percent of all transit cargoes; has more than 300,000 m<sup>2</sup> of bonded warehousing in Maputo; is the only franchised IATA agent in the country; has joined the national airline LAM to start an Avis car-hire service; is setting up a center for visiting businessmen complete with office, secretarial and communications facilities; is moving into timber and furniture; has a US \$500,000 computer-assembly plant; has bought two prawn trawlers and a long-line fishing boat; will commission an ice factory for the Beira fishermen; is taking over management of companies making detergents, polishes, toothpastes and insecticides; is looking at operating the ammonia terminal at Matola port in Maputo's estuary; and has spent US \$1m on a 1,100-ton landing craft to serve Mozambique's remoter ports, particularly with international food aid.

This is a formidable list of ventures, most in conjunction with the state, and supplemented with a US \$250,000 investment in a commercial training center and loans to the government of more than US \$6m for port rehabilitation—several times higher than South Africa's loans to the territory.

Manica is the classic example of seizing the opportunities Mozambique offers. It has not only become the biggest viable company in Mozambique; it also handles more than 60 percent of all cargo in the whole SADCC region and it employs more than 3,500 people in 40 offices, offering 36 services.

The Anglo American Corporation is making typically meticulous studies of prospects in the country before taking final decisions, according to Carlo Esposti. One excellent reason for its caution is that many of these prospects are in territory soaked in anarchy. On principle, Anglo refuses to go the route of Lonrho and several other organizations by hiring private armies. Lonrho has its own force protecting farming projects in the south and in the Beira corridor. SAS-trained men supplied by Defence Systems Ltd. Owned by Britain's Rockwood

PLC, are training Mozambicans to protect a variety of other enterprises. The trainers' pay is said to be 5,000 a month, plus about the same in housing and other family benefits.

Anglo is looking at reopening the cashew nut factory at Xai Xai which made it the cashew king before independence, at a cost of US \$8-10m. Other possibilities for it are the Pande gas fields 800 km north of Maputo as a source of ammonia, farming on highly fertile land within a 40km radius of Maputo at a cost of perhaps US \$12 million, and mining gold and other minerals in a concession it has applied for in central Mozambique.

The Anglo subsidiary Mondi is examining potential timber plantation land in the Maputo region with pulping in mind. Its opposition, Sappi, already has a grant of 50,000 ha for timber along the Swaziland border.

There is no indication yet that Anglo stablemate De Beers might move in, although the Russians claim to have found two promising kimberlite sites—which they cannot mine because of the security problem.

These are the big boys whose commitment will inject massive doses of capital into Mozambique's economy. There are scores of lesser but no less needed South African entrepreneurs already in or thinking of coming in, say Mozambican officials—too many to list in detail. These are some:

I&J are interested in expanding fishing operations and improving port facilities for all local boats. Sapeko are looking at tea-growing prospects in the Beira corridor. Langeberg are considering canning foods, and another firm is thinking of opening a canning factory at Moamba, west of Maputo. The construction companies Murray and Roberts, Grinaker, and the Anglo American's LTA might tender for the rebuilding of the road between Maputo and the Transvaal border.

The Protea and Karos hotel groups, and also Sheraton, are showing interest in Maputo's hotels. Only one, the Cardoso, is privately owned. All the others—the Polana, Tivoli, Turismo, Girassol, and a number of smaller ones—are being run by the state, which will be happy to take on suitable partners. A Pretoria firm, ESPI, has proposed a feasibility study on opening the Four Seasons hotel on the Costa do Sol, which was never completed. TIM, a French shipping company, will help refurbish popular Inhaca island, but a South African engineering firm is keen on redeveloping the equally renowned Ponta do Ouro near the Natal border. Hotels and beautiful islands and beaches all along the coast are up for grabs by the right kind of investors. Santa Carolina and Bazaruto already have Zimbabwean-financed resorts, renowned for their Caribbean-like beaches and good game-fishing.

ICL may reopen its Maputo office, which was closed some years ago. TMS Engineering has long been busy upgrading Maputo port's coal-loading facilities. The SA Sugar Association is testing possibilities.

One little company begun in Maputo by a South African and a Mozambican, both experienced in electronics, is very successfully producing radio, hi-fi and allied equipment. They have reputedly won an overseas order for US \$8m for electric guitar heads.

There are many bureaucratic and procedural hassles associated with entering the Mozambican field, say those who have done it, but the incentives are strong. There is tax exemption for two to 10 years on income, profits and dividends depending on factors such as labor intensity, area, added value of products, use of local resources, personnel training and effect on the balance of payments. State guarantees for the transfer abroad of exportable profit, re-exportable capital and repayments of principal and interest. Customs exemption for raw material imports. The list is long.

And as a further attraction, one with wide appeal, the government is planning to create Export Processing Zones [EPZ] in Maputo, Beira and elsewhere—something South Africa should have done decades ago at plum sites like East London.

Foreign companies will be able to set up plants in these areas to manufacture anything they want for export from Mozambique, using local labor and preferably local raw materials, provided they meet government requirements including a value added of at least 25 percent. The Maputo EPZ will be coordinated by the private sector under legislation currently being processed. Already, five South African companies and one from Taiwan have said they want to use it.

The potential political profits from the kind of realism and co-operation Mozambique's new policy makes possible are incalculably high for the whole southern African region—if South Africans make use of it.

They can prove, once and for all, that the crisp crackle of money carries much further than the rattle of sabres.

#### \* RSA Trade Mission Enclave

34000762 Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL  
in English 14 Jul 89 p 71

[Text] A self-contained, R16m, beachfront village for SA [South Africa] trade mission staff in the Mozambican capital, Maputo, is being built by a Murray & Roberts (M & R) company, Ribco.

The rationale for the development is two-fold. Firstly, it will improve security for SA personnel now scattered in dwellings around Maputo. Secondly, it will cut exorbitant accommodation costs for SA's mission members.

While up-to-date SA-Mozambican trade figures aren't available, the country is believed to be of growing importance to SA as a trading partner. In 1987, Mozambique's imports were worth US \$625m, of which SA's slice was probably worth around 20 percent.



According to architect Gilbert Colyn of Colyn & Meiring, the project is being carried out for the Department of Public Works and Land Affairs. It involves 19 dwellings of varying sizes for different categories of staff, a small school for very young children, recreational facilities, a cafeteria and club room, a squash court, swimming pool and a security system.

Although the complex will be linked to municipal services, a feature of the contract is the provision of standby power and an emergency storage reservoir for water. Colyn says the intention is to maintain supplies during the frequent supply disruptions.

He says mission staff are staying in various parts of the city at "tremendous cost. The monthly rental for an ordinary, small, three-bedroomed house is anything up to R8,000 a month, and hotel accommodation costs about R800 a night."

While Colyn was not prepared to comment on the value of the negotiated contract, he points out there is "virtually nothing" in Maputo. All goods and materials have to be brought in from SA.

"It is very difficult. One cannot buy a pocket of cement or a bag of nails, although the situation is a lot better than when the trade mission building itself, which was completed a year ago, was built."

He says the structures, like the mission offices completed last year, are prefabricated in Durban and shipped up the coast for assembly in Maputo. This keeps down the most expensive single cost element, housing artisans in Maputo.

Work on the 13-month project began in February, following a delay while the Department of Foreign Affairs negotiated with the local authority for a suitable site.

#### **\* Canadian Group Makes Donation to Congress**

*34420125c Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
12 Jun 89 p 3*

[Text] Last Friday in Maputo, the private Canadian organization CUSO-SUCO [Canadian University Service Overseas] made a \$1,000 donation in support of the Fifth Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] Party Congress. Judith Head, coordinator of the organization in Mozambique, presented the donation to Jose Luis Cabaco, assistant secretary for foreign relations, of the Central Committee.

The contribution was presented during a ceremony marking the 10th anniversary of the opening of the CUSO-SUCO offices in our country.

On that occasion, Judith Head noted that cooperation between her organization and Frelimo dates from 1973. She explained that throughout these 10 years CUSO-SUCO has recruited more than 100 cooperants to engage in various activities in our country.

She added that the organization currently administers about \$4 million in funding for various projects in progress.

Jose Luis Cabaco stressed that the organization has "a long history of friendship and solidarity with Frelimo" and mentioned the work that has been conducted at various levels, both in Mozambique and in Canada, to mobilize public opinion in Canada regarding the present situation in southern Africa.

Taking part in the ceremony were cooperants recruited by CUSO-SUCO to serve in this country. Roger Bull, Canadian ambassador accredited in Mozambique, with residence in Harare, also attended. The photograph [not reproduced] shows Jose Luis Cabaco accepting the check from Judith Head.

#### **\* Chissano Addresses University Students**

*34420125d Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
28 Jun 89 pp 3-4*

["Text" of address by President Joaquim Chissano, delivered at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo on 27 June 1989; first paragraph is NOTICIAS introduction]

[Text] President Joaquim Chissano met yesterday morning with students, faculty and workers at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. The meeting, which took place at the university campus gymnasium-sports complex, marked the end of the visit which the chief of state initiated last Saturday to some departments of the university. On that occasion, President Chissano analyzed the many problems existing in the sector and drew important guidelines for their solution. Because of its importance and timeliness, we are printing the full text of yesterday's address by the president of the Republic.

It seems to me that our conversation really began yesterday, because today I saw that excerpts from the conversation that I had with some professors of the faculties of Engineering and Sciences had been published in the newspaper. There I explained the manner or type of work which we are conducting: to pay a working visit to the Eduardo Mondlane University to become more familiar with this sector of activity in our country, to learn about this sector from the inside.

I am in Maputo, but I never had this opportunity, this privilege of visiting the Eduardo Mondlane University, at least in the present manner. I had already had an opportunity to come here to speak with the workers, students and faculty, but within the context of the work of the Party.

So I have begun to learn about the problems of the university. But before this visit, one of my first acts was to have a talk with the dean of the university, whom I asked for a report on just what the university is. He gave me an almost exhaustive report. It is interesting that,

even then, he voiced to me all the problems that became public knowledge in May, when the students decided to make an outcry about them. In other words, even then we had already begun to talk about solutions to some problems at the Eduardo Mondlane University. The other meeting with students, at the Red Star pavilion, was not an occasion to discuss problems. We are focusing on some of these problems as a way to encourage the students, the professors, the university administration itself, the government, the youth, the women—in short, the fathers, mothers, and students—to think about solutions that could be within our reach.

We thought this would be a starting point, a basis for reflection. In other words, although we are paying this visit here this morning for the first time, it is not the first time that we have been in contact with the university.

We have always been necessarily cautious whenever we took up university matters, precisely because we knew we did not have enough inside information to formulate directives or opinions that would lead to a solution to the problems.

At this point, however, some problems have begun to be solved. And the solution to the university's problems at our level is a more or less overall solution, for which we must reflect on the resources and the forms.

We would say that we are thinking almost in the same way that we think about the enormous problems that exist in our Armed Forces, within the police, within the Defense and Security forces, to cite only a few. Why do we mention these? Because the process has been launched here, as well.

We call this the process of reorganization of the Armed Forces, reorganization of the police. Some people think that reorganization consists in the replacement of one officer by another. Sometimes they say that the reorganization has halted because no more officers have been replaced. They think this is what is meant by reorganization. For other people, reorganization meant the purchase of new uniforms. And then they said that reorganization had stopped because construction of the police barracks stopped.

But for us, reorganization means the creation of conditions that will permit continuing development, that will permit harmonious work, that will allow us to move from a situation in which conditions are miserable into one in which conditions may be considered poor, but no longer miserable, and from there to good conditions and, later, to excellent working conditions.

The important thing is to have a base from which to take off and move forward. To this end, we have to think about our resources. We have to think about what to do when these resources are inadequate. We have to know how to mete them out so as to move forward with security. Yesterday I said: We have to think about what is the ideal. And we can determine to achieve this ideal, but we must have a realistic starting point and we must

do everything we can to see that this starting point is well defined and that, in taking the first step, we can take that step with the assurance of going forward.

This is how we thought about the university in the first days. Then we needed to undertake a reorganization of our university. A reorganization similar to the other cases that I mentioned, which must include a correct conception of what we would like to be, to conceive of our university in a correct manner. What do we want our university to be? Do we want it to be an island in the society; do we want it to be an autonomous, independent, self-controlled structure where the students come to buy services? Do we want our university to be an institution which provides a free education? Do we want our university to be selective? What is our university?

My questions are not exhaustive. The conception of what a university is in our country requires an intellectual effort from everyone, particularly the faculty, the university administration, the government, the unions, the women, and the young people, as well. Why do I say "as well" and not put the young people on the same level as the others? Because the young people have many ideas, but they have never been to a university before they came to the university. They have aspirations that may be just and proper, but they are aspirations that have not been tested by time, by living; perhaps they have not had the necessary and sufficient experience. But I say that these aspirations must be heard because, when they are on the right path, they are aspirations that must be heeded, considered and satisfied insofar as possible, in good time.

By combining these intellectual efforts, we can define and thus conceive of what our university should be. I do not know if this has been completely thought through. In the Armed Forces, the matter is under debate: the concept of what the Armed Forces are and what they should be.

This is fundamental, so that we may move forward later. This is what must concern us, so that later we may move to the second question: what to do to achieve this objective, to accomplish this option. But we cannot stop with asking these questions. We must move forward even as we are thinking.

In the 1950's, we black Mozambican youths who went to secondary schools—there was no university—were already talking about the future of the country. We already had hopes of seeing greater participation by the Mozambican and we were talking then about the black Mozambican. We had these hopes for greater participation and some of us were already thinking about national independence.

At the end of the 1950's, we knew older people, whom we called old at that time—and today they would not accept it if I called them old, since they were perhaps my age. They told us: Maybe wait until we have 50 black doctors,

50 black engineers, 50 veterinarians, 50 lawyers, 50 architects, 50 officers. Then we will be ready to fight for our independence.

We saw their point, but we were not convinced; we were not really convinced, although we could see clearly what the old people's problem was. We did not wait until we had 50, 50, 50.

We have said that we are going to set out and, at the same time, think about how to reach the goal, which is to consolidate our independence, now that we have been independent for 14 years. I don't know if we have already reached the number 50, 50, 50. Maybe in some fields, yes, we already have 50, maybe in some fields.

What we are observing is that, when we want to build a road, it is still foreigners who must give us a conception of what a road is. We go to a foreigner to tell us whether or not we can build that road, for various reasons, but also because we are still not sure of our ability to make a decision on this matter.

When we want a food security program, [we turn to] a foreigner; when we want a health program [we turn to] the foreigner. Well, it is not just here in Mozambique; we can even say we are lucky because we here participate as much as [the people in] other countries that have been independent for 20 or 30 years and still do the same thing: They commission feasibility studies. Well, to get back to our point. We were talking about conceptions.

The ones who ought to be conceiving the ideas are those people who have come up from nothing, who educated themselves and who now know what a university is and who can compare one university to another, who can study the matter. Then, working together with all the people, they can give direction to this conception.

We are saying: Well, we do not have them all yet. Yesterday it was a foreigner who could tell us what a school of engineering should be, a foreigner who could tell us what a school of architecture is, a foreigner who could tell us what a university is. We could have a Mozambican dean, a Mozambican director of faculty, but we had to go to a foreigner for the conception.

So we have not reached this point and before we have this Mozambican, before we have this group of people who are able to form a concept, we cannot demand a ready-made concept. Someone will have to do it. Obviously, in the beginning, it will be flawed. It will not be expert, so someone will have to correct what is not perfect, to perfect it. And this someone will have to be produced here, not forgetting what I said before. Here, but not in isolation from the society.

Well, the dean here spoke of tasks that are being carried out and that will certainly lead to an improvement even in the material conditions at the university. He spoke optimistically and I believe he is right to be optimistic, because I went to visit the faculties. I saw what is there.

I saw the problems that exist, and I felt that the instructors are anxious to see conditions continuously improving, so they can educate their students better.

But I also perceived that there are no easy solutions. One example I saw yesterday was in the Faculty of Sciences, in the Physics Department. They showed me some books and we did some calculations. These books have a kind of index to tell us purely and simply what books and magazines are available in the world, from which we can learn about a particular subject. And we did some calculations. Just to buy these books for the needs of all the faculties, we saw that we would have to spend \$180,000 per year. Not to buy the magazines themselves, which is what we actually need, to refer to and to learn. We took an accounting: \$180,000. And later for the magazines—and then for more books.

So I understood that the solution will not be easy. We immediately thought: We must have a library, maybe the size of this pavilion, to contain everything for general reference or common to all the faculties, so that each faculty could have its own specialized library. I began thinking: What has priority? To build a library the size of this pavilion or to build a well-equipped university cafeteria of this size? I started to think—these visits really make one think—and I am still thinking.

In the Physics Department, the director told me: "These machines could do something." Something? So they are not "mazinhas" but are really for the course. "Mr President, we really have a long way to go." Maybe the World Bank will help us: There is a World Bank program to outfit this physics laboratory. I went to see the mechanics lab and they told me: "We are looking for the money to replace this machinery. There is a program to rehabilitate these machines because they are obsolete." There is a program. I began to think what kind of campaign I should conduct when I leave here to go abroad. (Laughter and applause)

In the Faculty of Agronomy, they showed me a herbarium with a collection of fabulous plants collected in the 30's, in the 20's, in 1930 and 1940 and such, but they are beginning to worry about their state of preservation and said they were going to build some kind of herbarium there. I don't know if this construction will be precarious, a temporary stopgap. What is the priority?

That year when we talked with the dean, he was almost weeping because he did not know where to house the students, because they were beginning to arrive, and we said: "Listen, put some of them in that house as a temporary solution, in the house that belonged to the Political Commission, and then we will think about how to solve the problem."

Students cannot come in from the provinces. When we thought about it, it was necessary to recruit foreign teachers. Where would we put the foreign teachers? I said: "I'm certainly not going to put them in my old house in Mafalala. (Laughter and applause)



Not only because it had already been nationalized and had tenants living there, but because a foreign teacher would certainly not be able to sleep in that room which drips ice water in the middle of the night. But I lived there. It was from there that I left to take my entrance examination for the university and I passed. But it certainly is no place for a foreign professor. What to do?

When I go abroad, what kind of pitch will I make? For construction of student housing or for construction of housing for the foreign professors? These are problems. Which has priority? I have confined myself to the priorities. I mean, there is a battle going on in my head and in the heads of the administrators with regard to setting priorities, just for the Eduardo Mondlane University.

But I could be referring to the battle that is also going on in our heads regarding the need to establish a priority between primary and university education. There could be a battle in my head to establish priorities between university and secondary schooling. I don't know if I should start by determining salary increases for primary school teachers or for secondary school teachers or for Mozambican university instructors.

Yesterday they told me: "We have problems, Mr President, recruiting Mozambican instructors because institutions and companies out there are paying better wages."

But we have also heard it said that the secondary school teacher—I don't know the terminology, but there is an slang expression for this—they say that the secondary school teacher often asks the student to go ask his father for I don't know what, to bring to school the next day. "On Monday could you bring in such-and-such?" "Teacher, where do I get it?" "Tell your daddy to give it to you." Those who bring it in get a passing grade; those who don't, flunk.

Why is this? The secondary school teacher is poorly paid. Maybe these things do not go on in primary schools, but we know that the teacher has big problems, too. If the secondary school teacher is not dedicated, is not trained, is not motivated, we will have poor students entering the university and they will flunk the first year. What happens to the scholarship grant when a student repeats the first year? How many contos is that per year? It is currently 260 contos a year; with the failure, it is 520 contos, but we have to increase the student's grant. Where will we take it from? Shall we take the 260 from the failing student or should we deny university admission to the student who we know at the outset is going to fail because he is not well prepared, so that maybe we could increase the salary of that secondary school teacher, to encourage him to be a better teacher? These are choices, these are priorities to set, because we must decide where to look for the money for each of the examples I have given. Well, I will go on. There are forms of organization, there are aspects that demand that we organize our lives. I have talked here about

choices, about priorities, but I could talk about setting standards. If the standards are not yet solidly established, how can we go forward?

Turning to the Armed Forces as an example, there were many laws that were lacking, many regulations that were lacking, and it is not easy to rewrite these regulations. Sometimes it requires several months of study, set up against experience, to regulate procedures. You must have heard tell of logistical problems in the Armed Forces and of problems of organization. Sometimes they are not problems of shortages or of needs, but rather of the lack of regulation, regulation which would permit effective control.

We need to regulate, but then we need to control and, for this control to be effective, it is necessary that the standard itself, the regulation itself permits this control and allows us to detect deviations immediately and to take steps to correct them. So when we speak of reorganization, we are talking about many things that must be done, but it also implies finding the practical means, practical ways to add to our resources, because it is not enough to know what the priorities are. We must know how to distribute the resources, how to seek and find the resources, so as to conduct our program in accordance with the resources and the priorities.

What will we do this year, what will we do next year, what will we do today, and what will we do tomorrow?

I made note here of a point that I had not meant to bring up at this moment when I am about to pose some questions, to provoke a debate. A debate in the university is somewhat difficult, isn't it? We are going to debate, but so I won't forget, since the debate could lead me into other discussions, I want to say the following: When we listened to the students' demands in May, I made note of a point. I did not mention it to anyone, but I marked it and observed it. It will be of service in the future.

The students were protesting. Certain support for the student protest began to take shape. But how did this support take shape? It was in the form of new demands from other groups of individuals; I believe there were even instructors, but the instructors were not protesting in the sense of helping the students find solutions to their problems. They were protesting to present their own problems, demanding solutions for their problems at the same time that they were demanding a solution to all the problems. And I think this wave could be continuing. This is the phenomenon: this so-called solidarity is not solidarity to solve your problems, the nation's problems. It is solidarity with you to solve their own problem.

On the day when their problem is solved, you will simply be a bore, a person who does not know what suffering is. You can protest in vain, because they will already have solved their problem.

Today we have student protests and I say this today to see if 10 years from now, some of you are going to remember this.

I am making this point for this reason, so that you don't forget, so that 10 years from now when you hear students protesting and you are the finance minister (laughter)—you are studying economics for this—you will know to take up for the student's demands and deal with their problems promptly. (Applause)

I will say more. When that time comes, you will have many helping hands, because by then you will have good accountants, good economists in every department of the university, trained by the Eduardo Mondlane University. You will have good managers in the university dorms, in the locker room, in the laundry. You will have good mechanics, good engineers in the TPM's [expansion unknown]. You will have good managers there who will not let the truck fleet, the transport fleet, the buses break down. By then you will have all these.

But remember that on 27 June 1987 [as published] someone said: "When you are working as a union leader, remember to show solidarity with the students. Don't go around saying: 'But these students want to earn the same wage as a mid-level factory worker? No, don't give them more money before you give the workers a raise, because we are the ones who are producing!'" Remember this, when that time comes.

I have made the point here that the leaders of tomorrow will be from the university. They come out of the university. They are students first, then they are leaders. This was my point. Where did the minister get his education? He studied at the Eduardo Mondlane University and today he is minister of education. (Lengthy applause)

I don't know if he had a scholarship or not, or if he was a student who worked and earned money—I don't know how much—to come to study, but today he is minister of education. He studied at the Eduardo Mondlane University. But, oh, this minister does not take an interest in student affairs. This minister does not understand about our suffering at the university. And he is minister of education! And who is this? Where did he study? He is director of a faculty here. And he is not solving their problems? But he studied at the Eduardo Mondlane University! I could seek out economists, I could look for individuals in finance.

What is this phenomenon? I know of a country. The president of this country was very smart. He met there in Europe with students from his country who were making a lot of noise because things were not going well in their country. This sector was not doing well, that sector was not doing well. They banged on the table and everything and the president was smart and he scheduled another meeting. He asked for proposals; they came up with lovely proposals. He returned to his country and conducted a cabinet overhaul. It involved students—students who were not returning to the country because

everything was going badly there. He remodeled his cabinet and appointed four of five of these students to various ministries. He said: "I am very happy because now we are going to have prosperity in our country. I really liked that meeting we had, so I decided that you should have this ministry, you should be in charge of that ministry" and so on and so on. "Take over!" After just 2 years, the president was already taking to the streets asking his people to allow the ministers to continue with their experiment. The third year it did not stand up. It was worse. The president was obliged to pull them out. Instead of progressing, the country was going downhill.

The ideal is what is possible. The possible is practical. This is possible, yes, but...now we have to put it in practice. It is not enough to say it is possible. This is the ideal, but you have to get there. How does one go about reaching the ideal?

Well, what I said was a challenge, a challenge to you to direct your attention to necessary matters. We can have a debate inasmuch as the students' demands have been reiterated here, but we are already receiving reports, the commissions are working. It appears that the buses have already begun to circulate. As for some of the buses, I don't know what we can do if they have broken springs. I don't know.

I happen to have some money, this money that I go around begging abroad, and I earmarked this money to buy some trucks for a military command in a certain province that I visited and found it had a transport shortage. No, not a shortage, no transport at all. And since the trucks I ordered were taking a long time coming, well, maybe I could propose to the city of Maputo that it buy two buses for the exclusive use of the Eduardo Mondlane University. Meanwhile, the trucks have arrived (laughter), the trucks have arrived and the Eduardo Mondlane University does not have buses and the military command of that province does not have trucks. It appears that I opted for the province, because I had already made a commitment and we are going to send the trucks to the province.

By this, I meant to say that the commissions are working in all kinds of ways. There are problems that can be solved immediately and there are longer-range solutions which the dean has announced here, such as the construction of new housing, with foreign assistance. I don't know how much internal effort will go into solving this problem. I don't know.

I don't know if the new housing will solve the whole problem. To date, I don't know of any country which has already solved its housing problem. This is a housing problem. A little while ago I was in the GDR and I heard tell that almost all the people had a place to live, but now they are conducting a housing rehabilitation program because, while almost everyone has housing, it is not always good housing—and this is in the GDR, one of the most advanced countries in Europe, at least among the socialist countries.

We have a housing problem, but we are going to build, with foreign assistance. I repeat, will it be a definitive solution? Or 5 years from now will we have another student strike protesting the lack of housing, or 5 years from now will we have a population of students who cannot come here to study? If that happens, it will not be any less serious 5 years from now than it is now. And if we don't come up with Mozambican solutions to our problems, the solutions that we come up with will always be stopgaps.

Now the other problems—let's look at them. The workers are here, the professors are here, the students are here, the directors are here. So we can listen to what they have to say, even at risk to the "inner man." I mean, you will be late for the lunch hour. But we can have a discussion; there is still time. Anyone who wishes to speak should raise his hand. The microphone is there.

(At this point, a university worker brought up the issue of the need to get the war over with, saying that the government must find a solution to the problem.)

If I may interrupt, your point is this: the war. Our government must study how to end the war.... Proposed Topics for the Fifth Congress. Fourth Topic: National Defense and Security Policy, directives for discussion of the topics. A synthesis of the discussions will enable the central organs of the Party to understand the sense and the will of the Party militants and of all the people as to what strategy and tactics to adopt for the development of the country. The study and discussion of the Proposed Topics for the Fifth Congress will make it possible not only to identify the problems confronting the country and their causes, but will also point toward the correct solution to the problems that have been identified, as well as the experiences which must be generalized.

Did they listen? These topics were presented to the public for study, to enable the people to indicate correct solutions for the situation identified. Today I think we have concluded the study of the topics and still we are hearing it said: "The government must study the problem." This is a solution? "The government must find a solution"? The Party said: "People, we have this problem which is called the defense and security of the country; how do you think we should solve it?" The answer: "It must be solved." We are here today to discuss problems, including the problems of the university. They are to be discussed because the Party gave the order of the day: "Let us discuss our problems."

We held the National Party Congress, we identified the problems, and we said: There are so many problems that we are going to compile a little book. We will offer it for public debate so that we can find the paths to a solution. The debate is not for the purpose of saying: We have problems; the government must solve them.

The topics include economic and technical-scientific development. These topics are relevant to the problems of the university: problems of technical-scientific development. This is what should be discussed and

approached in a positive way, to arrive at a solution. The solutions should be out there, to be debated, so that decisions may be reached by the Central Committee and in the Party congress. It was the Party that brought up these problems, but some people seize on the problems and begin to make demands.

The Party itself says: Here are these problems. The Party says: Bring in solutions so that we can perform a synthesis and make a formulation. The reply is that the government is slow in solving them; it must solve them faster, that's all. How are they presented and how—particularly this—how are they to be solved? Now, solve the problem of the war! We all want to solve the problem of the war. Can you use this forum to tell us how?

Or are you saying this because I appealed yesterday to those who commit terrorist acts to stop the terrorism? Is that it? Or is it because I talked about sending trucks to the Niassa Province Command, to improve its combat capability? Or is it because Angola is finally embarked on a peace process?

I say this to remind you that sometimes people are not very sensible. When the government or the Party begins to think about the solution to a problem, they leap up and want a perfect solution on the very day that the government or the Party makes them see that a problem exists, that there is a problem, that the government is seeking a solution and asks for their cooperation in solving it. Then they want an immediate solution.

Take the PRE [Economic Recovery Program], since we were talking about wages. What is the PRE? For some people, it is a matter of increasing the exchange rate. They do not see the increase in the exchange rate as one of the necessary conditions to carry out the PRE. They see the PRE only as this. For other people the PRE means the food shortages, the clothing shortage. But the PRE means the measures, all the measures, to eliminate these shortages.

It was said in November 1986 that the PRE would require sacrifices. It was said. Go back and read the speech that was given in the Executive Council—I think it was when I took office as president of the republic: "The PRE will require sacrifices." They applauded. They said: "We are all prepared to make sacrifices." The time has come for the sacrifices, and now they are demanding an end to the PRE, an end to economic recovery?

Sure, we could do away with this PRE if we had another PRE; in other words, if we had another program which would be better than this one. We ask here: What is this other program that would enable us to rebuild our economy? What is it? What is economic recovery? We also said that we would not be able to take an accounting of what we had accomplished with the PRE before 3 years had passed.

The 3 years are not up yet. I have not yet served 3 years as president. Yet [they say] the PRE is no longer any



good. We are no longer willing to bear the sacrifices. Look, everyone here is wearing shoes; everyone has shoes. It is the same out on the street: plastic shoes, rubber shoes, but they are wearing shoes. When we talked about sacrifices, not everyone had shoes, no. Even at that time when we were talking about the PRE. Some people have a shirt and on top of the shirt they are wearing a yellow or blue jacket and in the districts brightly colored clothes are already appearing. We are already making "Xiluva" now. But the 3 years are not up yet.

Sacrifices are still required and we never said that the sacrifice would be over with at the end of 3 years. We said that, at the end of 3 years, we would take an accounting to see what steps to follow and here we are. We are going to the Party congress. I am certain that when we get to the congress, they will say the same thing: "The government must study the problem." But the congress is for the purpose of drawing outlines, drawing up guidelines as to how the government should proceed.

(At this point, the same worker who had spoken earlier explained that he meant the Army should be better organized to win the war, and not hold talks with the armed bandits. A student then spoke, criticizing the amount of money which the government spends on trips abroad and on the importation of luxury cars. The speaker added that, in his opinion, there ought to be an investigation of the "common points" between the government and the armed bandits—namely, to ascertain if the latter do not also share a love of country and of the people. He also complained that there are individuals who are growing fat off the war; specifically, they go abroad seeking food for the people and later is it sold in the Praca dos Combatants. President Chissano replied.)

In the first place, regarding this search for points in common between us and the armed bandits: We are going to study this. But I think the speaker is not a very assiduous reader. A foreigner who is an assiduous reader could say that this has not only been studied already but continues to be studied. So the speaker is a little late with this advice.

We have had proposals from various individuals in the outside world, perhaps in the form of a question. They have asked: "Minister"—I was a minister at that time—"Minister, why not negotiate with the bandits?" (They used the name by which the group of armed bandits call themselves.) "Why not negotiate with the Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance]?" My reply was: "Negotiate what? Define what is to be negotiated. When we find out what we can negotiate about, maybe we can consider it. Negotiate with whom?"

When the so-called Renamo defines itself, its base of support inside Mozambique, the class which it represents, if it represents the Mozambican bourgeoisie, wherever it is, if it represents the peasant class, if it represents the Catholic or Muslim religion, if it represents any class or stratum, if it has a recognized social base, at that point

we will know with whom we are negotiating and what is being represented. So these were systematic questions. We want to know if it happens that we are fighting a group that we need not even have fought, if it happens that it is not even necessary to fight this group.

Please, all you journalists or diplomats or all of you who ask me the question, please help me: Negotiate what and with whom? Armed bandits who call themselves the Renamo, when we know its origins are connected with South Africa, with Kaulza de Arraiga, with Jorge Jardim, with the 7 September Movement?

In Lusaka, we were in the process of signing the Lusaka Accords—as they say in Portuguese, the ink was not even dry on the signatures—when what came to be the Renamo seized Radio Mocambique in Maputo, on 7 September 1974.

I have begun badly because I should have asked some of you here to tell me when the armed banditry began. Tell me when the banditry began, because I have often heard that it began in 1980, after Zimbabwe became independent.

Armed banditry in this form began on 7 September 1974. They took over Radio Mocambique. The ink was not even dry on the Lusaka Accords. What were they against? I do not believe they were against the purchase of limousines, they were not protesting malnutrition, they were not protesting the lack of buses for the students.

What were they against? And who was leading them? Who was Jorge Jardim, who was Orlando Cristina, then secretary general of the so-called Renamo? Who was he? So we ask: What were they demanding then, at that time? What did Orlando Cristina have to protest? Orlando Cristina, who went to Dar es Salaam, sent by the PIDE [International Police for Defense of the State] to disrupt the organization of the Mozambican Liberation Front in 1963, 1964, 1965, this same Orlando Cristina who was secretary general of the so-called Renamo, which began as "Free Mozambique," a branch of the so-called "Free Africa," and then became the "Resistance"—what was it resisting? Because at that time we were talking of independence and they were resisting it.

Certainly this was not one of the common points. We wanted independence and they did not want independence. They resisted independence.

Then we found a paper of theirs which told us that Renamo wanted an unconditional alliance with the West. Certainly, for a nonaligned country like ours, the word "alliance" with the West merits some analysis and attention.

But, above all, the word "unconditional": I don't think this could ever be a common point between us. When I say "us," I dare say between "us Mozambican people" and the so-called Renamo. I don't know of any country

that has an "unconditional alliance" with another country or group of countries.

We ask: Would these be common points between our Mozambican Government and the Renamo or between us Mozambican people and the Renamo?

[We went] to London to negotiate the rebuilding of a sugar plant costing \$30 million, more or less. The factories were destroyed.

It is not \$180,000 and it is not the ticket or the cost of hotel accommodations for the minister of industry and energy or the governor of the Bank, who went to negotiate the rebuilding of the Marromeu factory and the Luabo factory.

The president of the People's Republic of Mozambique made a trip in the Illyushin—so big, so much luxury, so much fuel! There was no other plane. Even though he wanted to buy a smaller plane, he could not do it at that time because the conditions were not there to buy the smaller plane and they were there to buy the other plane. But he made the trip, he did not consider the plane, he was only counting on winning the solidarity, the understanding of the people. He came back and announced that he had received \$350,000 for a specific defense program. But there, where they gave us the money, there was a dance. There was wine, as well. Is this tourism on a grand scale?

Unfortunately, there was no opportunity for tourist trips in that country. As I recall, we worked very hard, except for those days when there was a party. We came home and announced that we had gotten \$350,000.

When I was minister of foreign affairs, I also had a good experience. I used to travel and there were some ministers who were jealous. I did the favor of taking some of them along.

All I know is that they never asked me again. One of them was the dean here. I sent the dean to take my place at a meeting of the United Nations. How beautiful it is there! When he returned, he said: "Comrade Chissano, it is better that you go, because these things are very complicated. I would rather stay here at home, because all that is a very complex business."

True, if I were out to win elections, I could talk in demagogic language here and win applause from everybody, win their votes. I would only have to say that, from now on, ministers would get around on bicycles. I would only have to say that the president of the republic would start going around in a "Lada," and I would win applause, applause, and more applause.

And we would travel by bicycle, maybe we would drive "Ladas"; I don't know if anyone has demanded that we go on foot. And remember what I am saying. Some of you here will leave the university 2 years from now. You will be directors. I was also a minister and I had directors

and other ministers have directors. It seems to me that their demand is the same one that some professors are making.

There are professors who get around very well on bicycles in their native territory. There are directors here, there are professors here who are demanding transportation and are even striking for transportation.

We went for many years, a great many years, without importing automobiles—many years, too many years, and there was an outcry for transportation. It was in the factory, it was the plant director, it was the administrator.

This year, for the first time, we managed to import cars for the administrators, for the province governments, and there are not enough cars to do the work. They are inadequate.

For the first time, we managed to do this. And soon we were hearing: "Let's stop importing cars." This is the year in which the importation really began. Directors or not, they requested cars. "I have a family. How can I get around?"

We tried various things. We said: "No. So you directors can travel, we are going to make some cars available for you to lease. Anyone who wants to go to Matola on a Saturday or Sunday may rent a car."

We did this for a while, but we saw that it was almost impossible for some directors; for others, no. We took another tack and said: "Look we are going to put a car in the home of each minister, for household use," but we came to see how much gasoline was being used up—you don't want to know. The gas pump was at their disposal. The tanks were filled because they needed to get around, and the cars lasted maybe 1 or 2 years.

We told the directors: "Now we are going to make an allotment. We cannot make an allotment for everyone at once, because we would have to import 10 times as many cars as we are importing now. But we are going to move slowly until the moment comes when, to buy a car, you go to the market and order one."

We will get there, but meanwhile we have some possibilities. Maybe we will get to the university. We had to come up with a solution for the doctors. We said: Look, if this man is going to have a car, he is going to care for his car and he is going to pay the additional cost in medicals. He is not going to oblige the state to use up more foreign exchange to purchase another car a year from now, because he is going to prize that car. He is going to maintain it the way he should.

We are conducting this experiment. We are going to conduct this experiment. Some directors have had free water and light, but the bills were incredible. Now we are telling them to pay their water and light bills and see if they can handle the money themselves. Money for water and light, money for gasoline, money for automobile repairs, etc.

These are ways in which we are experimenting, but the point here is that this is the first year in which we have tried very conscientiously to respond to the demands that date back for several years, and this very year here comes someone saying: "Stop. Enough is enough."

The donkey, the little boy and his grandfather. Do you know the story? They said: "You are really crazy, you let the donkey walk and you are both walking?" The grandson gets on the donkey and farther along they meet someone. "But you are really crazy. The old man has to walk while the young boy rides?" They switch around. The old man mounts the donkey. "Oh, old man, aren't you ashamed, making a child walk?" So both of them get on the donkey and people say: "Two people riding one poor donkey. They are really heartless."

This is what we have here. In the end, they carried the donkey on their shoulders. It is true! They carried the donkey on their shoulders! "But what is this? You are carrying the donkey on your shoulders?"

We are not going to carry the donkey on our shoulders and we must warn all of you here and everyone else to be careful what you say when you size up any situation.

You must study it before you say what is happening. We are very concerned about the diversion of goods donated to us by the international community for emergency aid or to handle an emergency situation.

We are concerned about the irregularities in our government apparatus and we want the public to help us. There is no point in coming here and saying that these individuals are enriching themselves, these individuals who go to America to ask for help and then get rich off the emergency donations, these individuals who are making money off the war. It is not helpful.

We have the police, we have the security service, we have the Permanent Commission of the Popular Assembly, we have the Political Bureau, we have the Presidency of the Republic. If you don't want to confuse us, go to these structures and say: So and so did this, this and that.

Make accusations; take responsibility for your words. If you think something is going on, there is nothing that prohibits you from saying: "Look, we think that something is not right in such and such an agency." But when you are sure enough to say with some vehemence that a minister went on a pleasure junket, you must really tell us.

This minister may well have gone off on a tourist junket. Then let us know; not in a way that creates confusion, that does not really provide a basis for investigation. There is no need for demagoguery. We should talk about it. The Party also says: Come and speak up. The structures say: Come and speak out. They are prepared to listen because we want to correct the errors. It cannot be rumors. It cannot be in the language of agitation. None of this. We must be serious. We must make serious accusations.

Maybe we are talking about certain prerogatives which are granted to the directors so they can have a moment to relax, here or abroad. If you think this is wrong, then say so in the right way. "The director should not take vacation trips either here or abroad because, after all, our people do not all get to travel."

For this reason, if I help make it possible for him and his family to travel half-fare to Nampula for a vacation, or even to Paris or the Soviet Union, then say: "No. We think the director should stay here and take a rest here."

I only say, when your time comes, don't forget what you said today, 27 June 1989.

When you say that food is being sold in the *Praca dos Combatants* by officials who go to America to request aid and then come back and sell it, help us to catch them. Don't agitate just to stir people up against some unidentified hypothetical official.

I am not saying that no officials are deviant. No. There could be one or another official, but if he is to be detected and caught, there must be another way of addressing the problem.

We have to know precisely who it is and, insofar as possible, you must give us a lead—I am not saying proof—but a lead. Where was the lead here, in the way you spoke?

Limousines—I don't know what type of limousines you are talking about, but have you made a study? Have you spoken to the structures? Are you familiar with the program? Or have you seen limousines go past and then talked about it? What's that? You are a student; you must study! Mao Tse-Tung used to say: "Those who have not looked into a matter have no right to speak." But we give you the floor because we have freedom to express our concerns and, in this case, they are concerns of a general nature.

But when we allow our concerns to be taken for ultimate certainties, the truth of truths, eternal verities, the perfection of perfections, we can create doubts and confusion.

So here, if you have not studied the matter, make an inquiry. Say you have a concern. Voice your concern, but make it known that, since you have not studied the matter, you can't really draw any conclusions.

So, let us proceed, dear students, to find out who is selling goods in the *Praca dos Combatants*, who gives them the things to sell, and be advised that there are commissions for this. Now we only ask you to help us. If we catch them, very good, but we want to solve our problems peacefully. Otherwise, we will not succeed in solving the problems.

The dean has just announced the construction of new housing. It seems that the dean had to go abroad to find the money for the libraries, to find the \$180,000 and more. He had to travel and these trips that he made did



not come to \$180,000. He had to travel because he has to travel, particularly because we still depend so strongly on other countries. We still have to travel.

So when we took an accounting and said it was going to be a little difficult, we also counted on this money from the trips and we know that this money from the trips was enough to solve this problem; we were not sending anyone abroad. In fact, this is what we did: we latched on to the money and that was the end of it. The problem was solved. No one traveled. It was not necessary. The doctors and technicians of various kinds who are said not to travel—I don't know if this is true.

Our present minister of health, who is not here, became minister of health when he returned from England, where he went to take a postgraduate course. I don't know how many others are abroad, but at least in every faculty that I visited, they told me they had Mozambicans abroad studying for a master's degree or doctorate, or on an internship so they could come back as instructors in the faculty.

In various companies, we find that they go and complete professional internships in various locations, so I don't know if this maximum is absolutely accurate. Well, but when we sent doctors and all these people abroad for their training, then when they came back here and told me they didn't have the money to buy reagents, I didn't know how to answer them.

We had to say, well, there are no reagents because the governor of the Bank was not going to rescale the debt with such and such a country and now that country does not want to give us credit so we can acquire the reagent. We have to consider all this.

I thought someone was going to show up here to present one or two points that I wanted to discuss. The first one is the study grants. I do not have a solution because there is a commission which is meeting here to settle the question of the study grants.

I would like to know who among the students is the son of a nurse? Stand up, children of nurses. Do you know how much your father earns? And your mother? What does your mother do? Do you know how much she earns? Twenty thousand and something, no? Which of you is the child of a primary school teacher? Who is the son of a peasant? No one? Raise your hand if you are the son of a peasant. If your parent is a factory worker, raise your hand.

When I heard talk about scholarships, I really began to think hard and the question was to see what would be the ideal study grant and also what size of grant would be possible today. Then I considered the variables. In a case where we paid—the government paid—for everything for the student, what should the scholarship be? When I say everything I am referring to the entire cost of the education, including the entrance fees, lodging, food, transportation—we did not mention text books because there are none—but if we pay for all of this, how much

would it be? How much would it cost? So we would ascertain the cost of educating a student. Then I said, no, I am not going to make the calculation—it is a little tough—because I know more or less how much an education costs in England, in the United States. I know how much an education costs in other countries which are in a position to offer a free education. I know how the student lives.

So I preferred to turn to something else, to study how our people live. I asked how much a primary school teacher earns. I wanted to know what the minimum wage is, what the average wage is. There are a few people who make a reasonable wage—I say reasonable because some people are not paid according to their work; they earn less than their work is worth and even less if we consider the sacrifices that they accept.

But I said I wanted to know the minimum and average wage and I found that a primary school teacher earns an average 49,000 meticals; the minimum is 30,000 meticals.

The minimum wage for a nurse is 34,000 meticals; the average is 51,000 meticals. The minimum wage for a medical technician is 57,000 meticals; the average is 60,000 meticals. For an agricultural technician, the minimum is 41 meticals, the average is 56,000 meticals. For a stenographer, the minimum is 26,000 meticals; the average is 29,000 meticals. For a civil servant, the minimum is 22,000 meticals, the average is 22,800 meticals. An officer candidate in the Armed Forces, who is thus already a noncommissioned officer, earns 40,000 meticals. A second lieutenant earns 49,000 meticals. A station master earns 36,000 meticals—as the administrator of the station. Factory workers: At Texlom, for example, a worker earns a minimum of 22,500 meticals; at Maquimag, the minimum is 24,500 meticals. They average between 36,000 and 37,000 meticals. An administrative secretary, male or female, earns 38,000 meticals. These are figures that I collected and that I want to give to the commission that is considering the study grants for students who are children of factory workers, peasants, teachers, nurses, policemen....

In talking about study grants, they should think a little about these figures and think whether they are talking about individuals who have two, three, four, five, or seven children for whom they have to provide transportation, they have to buy clothes, food, pay the rent, the telephone and light bills, buy soap, etc...these are the people I am talking about. I am not talking about a nurse who has only himself to support. Many of these people have nephews or grandchildren in their keeping; some of them are widows or widowers.

So, if you think about how much money a person needs to live on, you may say, well, after all, I am worse off than anyone. When we talk about improvements, we must know how to set limits. What is the limit, then? This was one of the points.

The second point was focused on here: the idea of creating a student council. Until we have a definition, I have nothing against it and I don't believe the Party or the government leadership has anything against the creation of a student council. Thinking a little bit in the abstract, we might have something to say after we see the proposal describing what the student council is and what its functions would be. If the functions of the student council are to create those conditions that I found here in 1974 in the Beira Lyceum, which is where things began, even in the colonial era, if it is a student council which is going to demand that exams be abolished or that evaluations be eliminated or is going to challenge the evaluation, above all, if that student council consists of second- or first-year students, when students in their final year could propose better methods of evaluation for the students who are coming up—perhaps this, yes—but a student council that is going to be there to rule on their own grades, a student who is going to turn up and say: "Professor, I passed": No, we are not going to accept such a council. This is not acceptable.

I admit that a grade might be wrong or too low, but I would never allow the grade to be determined by the very student who is being examined or evaluated. It would be the same as going to court and saying: "Oh, your honor..." Now there could be an appeal to higher bodies, such as a court, regarding a grade—it is always this way.

This is why, in the game of soccer, there is a red card, a red card for the referee, who is the arbiter. The player cannot judge himself. Now, if the referee has made a bad call, we have the soccer federation, etc. If the rules of soccer are not good, they can even be changed; please play the game according to the rules in effect. The ball is not held in the hands unless it is stated that, in soccer, the ball can be caught with your hands. Only the goal keeper can hold the ball. If it happens that some day they say you can hit the ball with your hand, no problem. It may be that they will say that some day. But these are the rules of the game today—whether they are good or bad is another matter. Today, the professor is the judge.

During our visit, we discussed this point in two faculties. The point was presented here as it came up. There are professors who contested it; there were students who contested it, but the answer is no. The evaluations will be conducted this way; that is a rule of the game. Now those who are going to leave might leave good ideas to add to the discussion, but it will be for the students who are coming up, who are going to encounter new rules of the game.

So the student council needs to be defined and, based on this definition, we will judge the merits of this student council. We are not going to say at the outset that it is good or bad. We have to know what it is, so let the committee continue to work on this, and let the students who have all the ideas present them to the committee, so we can see what the student council will be.

This is connected with another matter that was not focused on here. It is whether the university students are sufficiently organized to contribute effectively to the solution of their problems. The point of organization. Yesterday I attempted to talk about organization in the Faculty of Engineering. Are the students sufficiently organized? Will it be a committee that was created sporadically [as published], spontaneously, a reflex action of an organization of the students? Will the organization of the students be for the purpose of protesting? I ask: Are they sufficiently organized? The Party supports and even offers as much guidance as possible for the creation of various organizations, to organize the Mozambican society so that all the Mozambicans can have a say in the various processes of economic, social and cultural development of the country. There is an organization based on gender and one based on age. We have the Organization of Mozambican Youth [OJM] and most of our students are young people.

If the best young people are not in the OJM to solve the problems of youth, how can the OJM solve the problems of young people?

They say the OJM is led by illiterates! How can you be elected to the leadership of the OJM if you are not a member? As long as the OJM is "theirs" and not our OJM, how will the problems of youth be solved? "Their" OJM? Who are "they"? Are they foreigners?

The OJM says it is the youth of Mozambique. The OJM needs your advanced thinking, but you deny this to the OJM. You refuse to fashion this OJM into a capable organization and behind the door you call it "their" OJM. How can this be?

Some say: "This OJM is good for nothing. It is better to be an association of students." Well, a national union of students could be formed in no time.

But in no time at all we could have students entering the university at 18 years of age and even at 17 years. These are 4-year courses and when they are 21 they will be leaving here and they will not be students any longer; they will be workers—and they will still be young. So there would be some young people who could not be members of this youth organization, since they would have to be students, and other young people who would have to be the youth (...)

It will not be a National Union of Students of the Eduardo Mondlane University. Maybe it will include secondary school students. This would not prevent these students from being members of the Mozambican Youth, because the problems of youth are not limited to student problems.

Even during the period when a student is at the university, his problems are not simply those connected with his education. He has many problems in his social life which are within the general framework of the problems of youth. So there are two paths. Either the students are members of the OJM as individuals and, at the same

time, they are members of a student union, also individually, or the National Union of Students is a member organization of the OJM.

This is a topic for discussion by the young people. In the Soviet Union, the students are members of the youth organization, but at the same time they are members of the organization of students. These are the young people who show up at the World Federation of Youth; they are the same ones who show up at the International Union of Students.

We now have young people who went to Pyongyang and I believe that includes university students. They are still students. Tomorrow there will be a festival of students. The OJM would know whom to send. Then it would be very clear that here we have secondary students, intermediate students and superior students. I didn't put that very well: secondary school students, high school students, and university students.

You may think that "superior" students are the superior ones, so let us say "university students." These students would go to the international festival of students and they would still be young people. They would still be in the OJM, but there they would discuss specific problems of students and not of young people in general.

Young people are members of the Soccer Federation; young people are union members; young people are teachers. Young people are Catholics and Muslims. But Muslim youths there discuss specific problems of religion, since they are young people of that religion. These are not the general problems of youth.

So I think that the problem is not simply a matter of being members of the OJM and not members of a national student union or of being members of a student organization and not members of the OJM.

When you hear talk about a national union, it is because this story of a national union is nothing new. We had an organization here that was called the National Union of Mozambican Students. I was president of that organization. Sergio Vieira was a member of that organization. The minister of foreign affairs was vice president of that organization.

Here in Maputo there was the Nucleus of Secondary Students of Mozambique, which spread to the whole country. They were young people. This has existed. It is not a new thing.

When did the breakup come about? There was a breakup back in 1965, after the formation of the Front. Incidentally, during the prior years, 1960 and 1961, the National Union of Mozambican Students fought to be a unit of the liberation movement, for the creation of a front, and it imposed, as a condition, of adherence to the liberation movement, the creation of a single movement.

So the students of that period—there were few of them—were a kind of other liberation movement whose aim was the creation of a solid front, without any pretensions of

leading this organization, but to form a front that would unite the Mozambican people, as the best means of struggle against the Portuguese colonialism. This was in the 1960's and, in 1963, when the front had already been formed, we said: "Our goal has been achieved; now we are going to support the Mozambique Liberation Front."

The enemies of the revolution began to maneuver and the "apoliticals" began to appear and it was then that the breakup began. At that time, the National Union of Students was the most progressive group of young people because it had young people in the front. And we others stopped going to the university in favor of this youth.

We created scholarships, we contacted half the world and people were educated. We saw the national interests of the Mozambican youth, but we were the National Union of Mozambican Students. Because we were more advanced in terms of experience and organization, we took the lead and created the Mozambican Youth. This is how the OJM was born. It was born of the struggle and it continues.

So this is a point that I wanted to mention, because organization is very important if we are to solve the problems in our life, so as to avoid anarchy, so we can be certain that we are thinking correctly and are properly taking our problems to the appropriate structures. The same thing happens with the Party. "The Party does not do anything." "The Party does not say anything." "The Party does not want anything." But when your time comes to voice your opinion as a member of the Party, you will not be able to, because you are not a member. You are not a member because you do not want to be, because you do not care for the strict discipline of the Party.

The Party has statutes and a program and the statutes contain duties. Since you do not want to comply with these duties, you are not a member.

Nonetheless, you think you have better ideas and you don't want to make these ideas available to the Party so it can lead the country better. And here I am talking about young people, not-so young people, students and nonstudents. There are workers here. I don't know what would happen if I asked who is a member of the OMM [Organization of Mozambican Women]. There are so few of them. Is this why you call it "their" OMM? Who is a member of the OJM? You call it "their" OJM. Who is a member of the OTM [Organization of Mozambican Workers]? You speak of "their" OTM. How are you going to solve the problems, to see the problems in an overall way?

We are always going to complain about our stomach; we are going to have the story of the stomach, the heart, and the brain. Each says it is the one who is suffering, so if the other doesn't care, so be it. "I am not going to do anything more"—that would be the stomach. And the heart says: "I will stop working and pronto, fend for yourself." And the brain says: "I am not working any more. Fend for yourself." The doctors say: "You can still survive with



catheters and injections and the brain will continue to work." But this does not seem like the life we want. We don't want to die, we want to live.

Because we are not organized to coordinate everything we do. When we talk about improving our living conditions, we must speak in a very objective way, taking the various aspects into account. Have you imagined the stomach, the heart and the brain fighting and none of them working, because one thinks that the other only eats and does not work, because the heart is always beating but the stomach rests between meals? If they fight this way, we are going to die.

There are associations of engineers, artists, painters, musicians. Why not an association of students? There is already an association of teachers. Do you want to create an association of university professors? Well, discuss whether this is the best form of organization. But let us be organized and this way we can avoid chaos in our thinking and we will see things more clearly. Then the Party and government leadership will have a very great source here, because the university is for study. They would see that, yes, here they are organized to conduct a study. They would avoid speculation and rumors and rely on appropriate studies and mature discussion to find solutions to problems.

The Party must include university workers, university professors and even university students. I don't know if I have made myself understood, if my critique has been much too lengthy. We came to talk and to have ideas and I hope that our next meeting will be more lively. We will even have solved many problems because we will be better organized and will have more strength to go forward.

The Struggle Continues!

Independence or Death! We Will Win!

Long Live Mozambican Youth!

The Revolution Will Win!

Socialism Will Triumph!

I am sure this last is not a point we have in common with the armed bandits. Of this I am certain, absolutely certain. But this does not prevent us from finding a solution to the problem of the war, because we know that the construction of socialism is a gradual process. Today, on one of those trips we make abroad, we are going to ask for money to give to capitalists here, to the private sector, for the development of our country. We know what we are doing, because the main point is economic and social development; this is the main point. If this is what they want, let them come.

Socialism Will Triumph!

### \* First Group of Students Leaves for Cuba

34420127d Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
14 Jul 89 p 3

[Text] The first group of 723 students scheduled to continue their technical-scientific education in the Republic of Cuba this year will leave Maputo today. This is the 11th contingent of students to travel to that Latin American country to pursue their studies within the framework of the agreement on bilateral cooperation in the field of education between the governments of Mozambique and Cuba. Meanwhile, 200 Mozambicans will be returning to the country shortly. Of this group, 150 have graduated in various basic and middle-level specialties, while the other 50 are returning to their native land for their annual vacation.

Our reporters visited the Foreign Students' Reception and Preparation Center (CFM [Mozambique Railroad] South Inn) yesterday afternoon to obtain further details about the Mozambican students' trip, and not only that. There we talked with students, teachers, and officials involved in this project.

The director of that center, Ernesto Mabjaia, told us that the students will travel on five airplane flights between now and 28 August, although the majority are scheduled in July.

Mabjaia said that the group of graduates and those returning to the country for the vacation period are expected to arrive at the Maputo airport on the 16th of this month.

When we asked about the criteria for the selection of students to go to Cuba, the director of the Students' Reception and Preparation Center said that this group includes representatives from all parts of Mozambique.

Concerning the qualifications required for continuing education abroad, in Cuba in this specific case, Ernesto Mabjaia noted that as happened on earlier occasions, those now making the trip were chosen from among the best students at the secondary schools in our country.

### The Desire To Study

As we saw there, the students go to the center to familiarize themselves with certain aspects of the new life they will pursue together at the Mozambican schools in Cuba, as well as to learn to work together. For example, among the other planned activities yesterday afternoon was the showing of a film about Cuba.

Just before the film was shown, we approached two students, namely Torres Italiano Tereque, 16, who was a student at the Songo Secondary School in the province of Tete, and Fatima Eurico, 14, who completed the sixth form at the Chiure Secondary School in the province of Cabo Delgado.

The first to speak was Tereque. He told of the happiness he felt at being able to go abroad to study, and he said: "I

will do everything possible to return to Mozambique as an automobile mechanic, because this is the profession of which I have always dreamed.

"I have always liked to see a vehicle operating with a good engine. When I return from Cuba, I want to be able to repair cars," he added.

Fatima Eurico, in turn, said she would like to study medicine, because she has often seen people die in her province because there was no one to provide medical aid.

"At first, I thought that being a nurse was everything. But now that I have the opportunity to go abroad just to study, I think I can go farther. And so I want to study to be a doctor," Fatima said.

According to the information obtained by NOTICIAS, 48 of the total number of students who will pursue their studies in Cuba are girls, while the others are boys. They range in age from 12 to 16, and the academic level they have completed is the sixth form.

In view of the fact that some of the courses in which the Mozambicans will enroll last more than 5 years, it is estimated that the first graduates in this present group will not begin to return to Mozambique until the middle of the 1990s.

The Mozambican students who have gone to that Latin American country have received scientific-technical training in various sectors of activity, such as agronomy, economics, industrial planning, and fishing.

Figures provided at the time the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Mozambican schools in Cuba was celebrated in 1987 indicate that up until that year, a total of 6,591 students had studied at those establishments, and 4,610 had graduated after completing the [illegible] level.

#### \* Chissano Receives Evangelical Delegation

34420127c Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
27 Jun 89 p 1

[Text] The Mozambican chief of state granted an audience yesterday in his office to a delegation representing the Evangelical Apostolic Action Community (CEVAA) and headed by its president, Pastor Jacques Terme. The eight-member delegation was accompanied by Pastor Amos Baltazar Zitha, president of the Synod Council of the Presbyterian Church of Mozambique, which invited this group of religious leaders to visit our country.

During the audience, the chief of state exchanged impressions with the visiting delegation, speaking of the effort the people of Mozambique are making to overcome their current difficulties. He also expressed his satisfaction with the moral and material support the people of Mozambique have received from this religious community.

The CEVAA is an organization which brings together religious groups from many countries, nine of them in Africa. A delegation made up of its leaders pays an annual visit to the countries which have member churches. The visit to Mozambique was organized by the Presbyterian Church of Mozambique. The photograph we are reproducing [not shown] shows President Chissano during the interview with the CEVAA delegation.

#### \* Bilene District Needs Food Assistance

34420127a Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
3 Jul 89 p 3

[Text] At least 4,000 tons of food will be needed this year for the more than 97,000 persons living under extremely difficult conditions in the district of Bilene, in the Province of Gaza. Samuel Malhaieie, the representative of the Emergency Commission in that part of the country, who gave us this information, said that this situation is the result of the incursions made by the armed bandits against vulnerable targets, as well as the increasing severity of the drought in that district.

Samuel Malhaieie explained that the emergency situation in Bilene became more acute beginning in 1987, when armed bandits attacked the Macuana, Messano, Praia do Bilene, and Macia administrative posts.

He explained that one of the disastrous consequences of the armed bandits' activities has been the massive flight of the people to other relatively safe places, which has made their already unsatisfactory geographic distribution even worse.

By way of example, he mentioned that the districts of Magude and Manhica, in the Province of Maputo, are among those to which the largest population groups have fled.

Again in connection with the consequences of the bandits' attacks in the district of Bilene, the Emergency Commission representative said that the capacity of the school network has been substantially reduced. As a result there are more than a thousand children who cannot be accommodated in the schools. He also noted the problems in connection with providing foodstuffs to the people, and he stressed that the terrible condition of the access routes is making transportation to the interior difficult.

He admitted that the Department for the Prevention and Struggle Against Natural Disasters (DPCCN) has already begun distributing land to the peasants, and seeds as well. Our interlocutor emphasized that what needs to be done now is to distribute working tools such as hoes, rakes, and axes.

Our interlocutor stressed that the products distributed have been mainly corn and beans.

The DPCCN representative in Bilene told us that the land distribution program is providing priority coverage

for the Praia do Bilene administrative post, over an area in excess of 600 hectares. This activity has benefited more than 300 families.

On the other hand, the areas of Messano, the Macuana administrative post, Praia do Bilene, and Chissano have been seriously affected by the emergency.

## Zambia

### \* Prices Up 60 Percent After Devaluation

34000629c Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA  
in English 3 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] Prices of most goods have shot up by wide margins following the 60 percent devaluation of the Kwacha and scrapping of price controls.

Most bars in Lusaka were selling Mosi beer at K10 and K12 at the weekend from the previous controlled price of K4.

The price of local spirits has gone up from K100 to K150 on the black market while Kwench and Tarino soft drinks were at K4 at market stands from K2.

Bread was fetching K10 and K12 at the city-centre market while it was still selling at the pre-decontrol price of K7 at Supa Baking's bread centre.

School exercise books went up with the small size selling at K6, big size K14 and hard cover ones at K45.

Most of the traders attributed the rise in prices to the decontrol measures announced by President Kaunda on Friday night.

In Kitwe vendors increased the price of bread from K6.50 to K15 while grocery shops raised the price of Coca-Cola from K3.25 to K5 in reaction to the decontrol of prices.

But it could not be established whether Supa Loaf or Copperbelt Bottling Company had "adjusted" prices for the items.

Vendors including those selling bread outside UBZ flats in Parklands increased the price of the commodity to K15 a loaf.

In the city-centre the price of Coca-Cola in take-away outlets and grocery shops was being retailed at K5 a bottle.

There was no change in both local and inter-town fares although pirate operators were reportedly ripping huge profits at night by demanding exorbitant booking charges.

Sources within the United Transport and Taxis Association of Zambia indicated that fares would go up immediately the price of fuel was increased.

And Zambia will welcome assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to help implement the ongoing economic restructuring programme.

Finance and Planning Minister Cde Gibson Chigaga said in Lusaka yesterday the two institutions would be briefed on the latest economic measures Government has taken.

The recent IMF fact-finding team which toured Zambia acknowledged that the measures taken so far were correct.

They further found Government was correct when it reported it had drastically cut expenditure, the budget deficit and registered a 6.7 percent economic growth rate, the highest recorded in 18 years.

Asked whether the IMF appraisal formed the basis for renewed cooperation, he said Zambia was willing to accept assistance from international lending institutions.

With the devaluation of the Kwacha, illegal currency dealing is thriving with currency dealers pegging their exchange rates differently.

The British pound is now fetching between K120 and K150 at Katondo street while the United States dollar fetches as much as K70.

### \* 50 Percent Wage Increase 'Inadequate'

34000629b Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA  
in English 5 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) has described as inadequate the 50 percent salary and wage increases awarded to public service workers to cushion off the impact of the decontrol of prices and the devaluation of the Kwacha.

Assistant general-secretary Cde Chitalu Sampa said in Kitwe yesterday Government should not restrict the margin because the 50 percent rise would "swiftly" be swallowed up by the free-pricing system.

"We are not happy with the salary increments at all because we have always preferred collective bargaining, particularly with the devaluation."

Scrapping price controls on all commodities except mealie meal last weekend, President Kaunda announced 50 percent salary increases for the low income group in the public sector group in the public sector and 30 percent for those in high income bracket.

Private and parastatal firms were expected to follow a similar pattern bearing in mind the ability to pay. Trade unions were still free to negotiate.

Cde Sampa said the 50 percent was not only inadequate because of the past experience with the decontrol measure but some companies were capable of paying more than the margin.



The ceiling had set the clock back because a few months ago trade unions, the Prices and Incomes Commission and employers had agreed to iron out their differences on principles of collective bargaining.

Decontrol as had shown before hurt people most because traders and manufacturers were given a free hand to peg prices a situation which could be "quite dangerous".

He recalled that when in 1987 Zambia abandoned the IMF restructuring programme the organisation was called a lot of names.

"What people should know is that the IMF cannot lend money for nothing. They have to give it out with conditions."

### \* \$83 Million EEC Aid to Copper Industry

34000628b Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA  
in English 5 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] The European Community (EC) has pumped in about \$83 million to strengthen Zambia's copper industry.

Visiting EC vice-president Mr Manuel Marin in charge of development affairs said in Lusaka yesterday Zambia was one of the nine countries in the Southern African region that had benefited from the recent economic programme.

The community has embarked on financing important Frontline states projects to reduce their dependence on South Africa.

Mr Marin said at a Press briefing at the EC offices that the Zambian Government was happy with the donor's aid in the copper industry.

More evaluations would be made to see how best the industry could be improved especially in its export drive efforts.

It was within the SADCC context that the EC was also financing a couple of studies to ensure projects were properly conducted.

Mr Marin met Foreign Affairs Minister Cde Luke Mwananshiku and will also hold talks with President Kaunda today on the situation in Southern Africa.

### \* Copper Production Declines Steeply in 1988

34000627c London AFRICA ANALYSIS  
in English 23 Jun 89 p 8

[Text] Lusaka. Zambia's copper output is going into a steep decline. When the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines [ZCCM] board reveals next month the production figures for the 12 months to 31 March, these will be down to around 425,000 tonnes—about 10 percent down on the previous year.

The coming figures will destroy hopes that Zambia's copper output had stabilised at around 470,000 tonnes a year. This had been maintained for three years, after a fall of more than 10 percent between 1985 and 1986.

In the quarterly reports since March last year, ZCCM chief executive Francis Kaunda has spoken repeatedly of 'continued operational problems' and 'low availability of equipment'. In the nine months to 31 December 1988 the production level was down to 304,900 tonnes, as against 355,800 tonnes for the previous corresponding period.

The contrast with 20 years ago is stark. Then Zambia was the world's biggest producer, with an output of 747,000 in 1969 (notwithstanding the difficulties created by sanctions against the illegal regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia). Other copper-mining countries—notably Chile—have now far out-stripped Zambia.

The government now finds itself in an economic vicious circle: the decline of copper (still the source of 90 percent of export earnings) reduces revenue available for re-equipping the mines. Without new equipment, output falls yet faster.

This news comes at the very time the world price of copper is surging ahead in the face of extremely low stocks and threatened disruption of supplies from North America, Papua New Guinea and Zaire. Zambia's own problems are also obviously a contributory factor in this rise in prices which this week saw Grade A copper trading (on 90-day delivery) at £1707.50 on the London market. Spot sales this week moved up to a high of £1744.50.

But the problem of Zambia may be insoluble, because the Copperbelt ore-bodies—first identified in the 1920s—are becoming worked out. Orebodies not yet exploited are of too low a grade (and Zambia's geographical position too remote) to warrant the massive funds they would demand to be opened up. Zambia does not have the money, and private investors are unlikely to provide it.

The impact of aid from the World Bank and other donors has only helped to slow the decline. But 'winding down' the Copperbelt during the 1990s will be a delicate political operation, given its central role as an urban employer.

### \* Japanese Aid Tied to Wise Use of Resources

34000627a Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA  
in English 7 Jul 89 p 2

[Text] Zambia must use efficiently her aid resources if she has to receive more assistance from Japan, the ambassador Mr Toshio Saiki said in Lusaka yesterday.

The ambassador who was signing a \$12.5 million aid grant for the construction of two junior secondary

schools with Foreign Affairs Minister Cde Luke Mwananshiku added that while Japan was trying to step up aid, the resources should be applied well.

Cde Mwananshiku thanked Japan for the grant that had come when the nation was facing "enormous economic problems".

Most pupils failed to proceed with their education because of limited places in schools especially in rural areas.

There was need to build more schools to ease congestion in the institutions of learning. The sites for the schools have already been chosen.

Four years ago Japan constructed a secondary school in Maheba refugee settlement in the North-Western Province on a grant aid programme and there are plans to build another school.

"For the government to convince tax-payers, this increase is only possible if the resources for aid are used efficiently," Mr Saiki said.

He called on developing nations to implement projects as promptly as possible.

The construction of the two schools in rural areas should be speeded up, the ambassador said and added:

"I hope the Zambian Government will appreciate these circumstances and see to it that this project materialises in good time."

Japan was happy to contribute to the development of Zambia to further the friendly links between the two nations.

The schools project was among the important objectives of the Fourth National Development Plan to increase educational facilities.

#### **\* Job Plan in Jeopardy for Lack of Investment**

34000630a Lusaka SUNDAY TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 2 Jul 89 p 7

[Text] The government's intention to create 400,000 jobs during the Fourth National Development Plan may not materialise because current investment has not been streamlined into the productive sector.

ZCTU [Zambia Congress of Trade Unions] deputy director for research Cde Ages Mukupa said the economy was still out-ward looking in spare-parts, raw materials and skilled manpower. For the latter, Zambia was losing its own local manpower because of lack of incentives.

"These are the contradictions that go against the development plan. Given our industrial base, there is need to create employment but at the same time incentives are not there to entice and retain skilled labour force", he said.

There was need to reduce dependence on expatriate labour, for the country was continuously turning out graduates from the university and colleges who were capable given the chance and incentives to work.

Cde Mukupa said investment in social services must be reduced. "More should be diverted into agriculture, industry and various other productive sections which will form a base and a spring board."

Commenting on the labour force, sackings and redundancies since 1985, Cde Mukupa said these had had an adverse effect on the economy.

"There is need to reduce redundancies, considering the effect they had on ZCCM [Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines] and the civil service, when the IMF and World Bank dictated to them to render 3,000 and 5,000 workers redundant respectively," he said.

Meanwhile Cde Mukupa has said the large pool of the unemployed in Zambia is threatening the jobs of those in employment because managements can sack and employ at will.

"Job security has been undermined because of the poor economic performance which has not absorbed many people into gainful employment," he said.

Employees are living and working in fear of losing their jobs. They cannot talk back to their employers over an issue and work culture in many organisations had become a "cat and mouse game".

Cde Mukupa said there was a proliferation of a dubious employment activity going on. Many people were being employed on casual basis because this had its advantage.

Those taken on as casual workers could be dismissed at will and they were not entitled to benefits.

"Once one is employed as a casual worker and he stays on for about six months, he is dismissed because an employer knows that at that time he can either demand to be fully employed or be entitled to benefits," said Cde Mukupa.

He urged employers to stop this unfair trend of using people because it did not help in reducing the army of the jobless. This aside, it only promoted industrial strife and discontent in industry.

Great strides have to be made to create employment. At present only 2.7 million people constitute the labour force and every measure had to be taken to retain them.

#### **\* Kaunda Praises 6.7 Percent Economic Growth**

34000630b Lusaka SUNDAY TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 2 Jul 89 p 1

[Article by Kelly Chubili and Matildah Mwenda]

[Excerpt] The export of non-traditional goods is earning Zambia \$120 million every year. President Kaunda

announced yesterday at the Zambia International Trade Fair in Ndola which marked its 25th year.

More would be earned if the export base was increased through diversification and adoption of a more aggressive marketing strategy because entry into foreign markets was difficult but not impossible, he assured the crowd.

Cde Kaunda called on the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the export and import bank and export promotion board to encourage manufacturers and businessmen as the poor performance of these institutions in the past had frustrated progress.

The President was speaking when he officially opened the trade fair whose theme was "export promotion".

Cde Kaunda revealed that a review of the performance of the interim national development plan launched in 1987 showed the economy had grown by 6.7 percent, the highest growth the economy had registered in the past 18 years.

This was against the 2.2 percent recorded in 1987 and 0.7 percent in 1986. The growth was mainly contributed by the impressive performance of major sectors of agriculture and the manufacturing industry.

Cde Kaunda gave the catalogue as follows: agriculture 21 percent being the highest and followed by the manufacturing 15 percent, then financial institutions and insurance, 11.2 percent, while hotels, bars and restaurants had 8.4 percent.

But while the growth was impressive in these sectors, mining output fell by ten percent and further losses were recorded in the construction, transport and communication sectors.

There was need to be more outward seeking. Tourism for instance would quickly and substantially contribute to restructuring the economy and lessen dependence on the mines as a major foreign exchange earner.

Cde Kaunda was happy because the manufacturing industry had taken the heed of the call to embark on the export of non-traditional goods, though industries had witnessed a sharp decline in capacity utilisation as some were operating as low as 15 percent.

Inflation escalated by 70 percent, unemployment went up, political pressure mounted and the last straw was the riots of December 1986. [passage omitted]

#### **\* Country To Pay 10 Percent of Foreign Debt**

34000628a Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English  
29 Jun 89 p 1

[Excerpt] Rome, Wednesday—Party Secretary-General Cde Grey Zulu has promised foreign creditors that Zambia is not running away from her international debts, but is working on long term measures to repay loans.

While urgent loans such as those for oil and other technological areas needed to rebuild economy will continue to be paid off at the earliest convenience, settling for most debts will be shelved until the financial position improves.

He told Mr Mario Pedini, president of Assafrica, an association of Italian businessmen with special interests in African development, when he called on him that it will be pointless for Zambia to spend all her income on repaying loans and start begging again.

Only 10 percent of total foreign debt will be settled, while efforts are made to strengthen economy.

Cde Zulu assured foreign investors the Government will support and protect them if they invest in Zambia.

Zambia, unlike other countries does not seize private businesses at random or without cause.

Most Zambian industries are operating below 50 percent capacity resulting in severe economic problems.

"We want to boost industries to production levels of up to 75 and 100 percent levels," he said.

But to achieve this Zambia should have more foreign investment.

The Government on its part will continue to provide peace and security. [passage omitted]

#### **\* ANC Would Drop Struggle After Concessions**

34000628c Lusaka *ZAMBIA DAILY MAIL* in English  
1 Jul 89 p 4

[Text] The meeting between the white South African delegation and the African National Congress [ANC] of South Africa is not the first one the ANC has had with white South Africans in the last two years. But it comes at a time the white South Africans appears to have been sufficiently jolted to reexamine their consciences over apartheid and oppression of the black majority.

The meeting with the top ANC leadership is significant because it takes place at a time when the racist regime is shaken and may be trying to find ways of responding to international condemnation of apartheid by changing its appearance and so hoodwink the world into considering the demands of the blacks as overtaken by promises of reform of apartheid.

The composition of the delegation clearly reflects a new wind of change in South Africa, a wind of change which must be kept blowing by a unification of forces opposed to apartheid.

The meetings with the ANC, which are strongly condemned by the regime, reflect the emergence of a new consciousness in South Africa—a white consciousness alongside black consciousness which has gripped the country.



It may be that South Africa is entering another decade of consciousness—white consciousness. The people to kindle this new wave for the attainment of peace and true democracy are the enlightened ones, such as those who form the delegation now in Lusaka for a meeting with the ANC.

To achieve this objective the whites should have a clear understanding of the ANC and what it stands for. On the other hand the blacks, under the leadership of the ANC, ought to be convinced that there are whites who want to abandon apartheid and work for peace and democracy.

The kind of situation which forms a strong base for achieving peace in South Africa was stated by leader of the 115-member South African delegation, Mr Michael Olivier when he said if South Africans had to be part of a peaceful future they should unite and understand each other.

The challenge for those who realise that apartheid is incompatible with peace is to understand the aspirations of the blacks and why they have taken to violence to fight for their rights. In this way they will be able to remove the basis for the armed struggle which the ANC wages and the violence which has gripped the country.

ANC president Comrade Oliver Tambo allayed some of the fears which whites may have when he said that the blacks were peace-loving but had been forced to take up arms because the regime had failed to reason with them.

He even promised that the ANC would drop its armed struggle if the regime created conditions for blacks to organise freely by unbanning political organisations, releasing political leaders and removing the brutal police forces from the African townships.

Once these [portion illegible] have been met the regime would have free leaders with whom to discuss the future of the country. We do not see why the blacks could use violence under such conditions.

It is for the enlightened whites, probably the majority but still silent, to take advantage of the growing desire [portion illegible] many do not know what kind of change, to demand that the ANC's simple conditions be met.

Unless those who recognise the folly of apartheid take up the leadership now and lead others on a new "after trek" towards a peaceful South Africa, the country could be hijacked into chaos by those who want to perpetuate apartheid.

#### **\* State, Private-Sectors Workers' Pay Raises**

34000629a Lusaka ZAMBIA DAILY MAIL in English  
6 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] Salary increases of 30 and 50 percent announced by President Kaunda last Friday are compulsory for all workers in government, parastatals and private sector

and are not open to negotiations, Finance Minister Gibson Chigaga said yesterday.

Explaining the increases, Cde Chigaga said only salary awards of above the 30 and 50 percent brackets were open to negotiations and employers able to pay more could do so after negotiating with union representatives.

The minister said the government had worked out a table for those in the low and high income brackets and employers should get copies from the Finance Ministry.

He said following the announcement by the President some companies thought they could negotiate their salaries on anything less than 30 and 50 percent for high and low income brackets, respectively, which he said was a misinterpretation.

"Everybody benefits from the salary increases. Those companies wishing to negotiate for more on the basis of their ability to pay can do so, but when they affect those increases it has to be with effect from July 1, this year," he said.

Cde Chigaga also said that companies should not base their low and high income bracket levels on the K20,500 annual income announced by the President as this applies to mealie meal coupons only. Those getting above this figure are not entitled to coupons.

He told companies to contact his ministry to compare with the scales the Government would use for determining low and high income brackets.

"Those that wish to negotiate for something more than 30 and 50 percent can do so provided they do so according to the Government regulations," he said.

The increases have been necessitated by the decontrol of prices and devaluation of the Kwacha by 60 percent.

He explained that by removing subsidies, on commodities Government hopes to stimulate the growth of manufacturing industries.

"We controlled so much on the industries and as a result we ended up paying so much in order to keep them running," he said.

Cde Chigaga gave an example of the United Bus Company of Zambia (UBZ), where the Government was forced to take over loans for both local and international lending institutions worth over K200 million and guaranteed another K112 million for the company to buy buses and other equipment.

He said many other industries ate into Government coffers in a similar manner.

**\* Imports Up 42 Percent, Exports Up 25 Percent**

34000632d Lusaka SUNDAY TIMES OF ZAMBIA  
in English 9 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] The growth of imports substantially outstripped that of exports in the period 1987-88 the central bank has reported.

The Bank of Zambia statistics just released showed the total imports in that period increased from K6,627.5 million to K6,898.1 million.

This represented an increase of up to 42 percent while exports grew by only 25 percent. Zambia exported goods worth over K8,058.6 million in 1987 which increased to K9,786.2 million last year.

The country's magnitude in imports constituted in 1987 in crude oil, which amounted to K812.5 million. This, however, fell last year to K660.6 million because of the slump in oil prices.

But the major imports were in the undefined category which stood at K6,080.4 million in 1988.

Lower import figures were recorded in fertilisers, wheat and maize. Import figures of maize fell from K40.5 million in 1987 to K28.4 million in 1988.

The mining industry lead in the export market with copper, amounting to K6,854.9 million in 1987, which rose to K8,339.6 million the following year in 1988.

Cobalt followed at K466.4 million in 1987, and increased to K598.2 in 1988. Non-traditional exports came third on K397.1 million which further rose to K431.2 million.

Meanwhile about \$75,000 was earned by 63 major Zambian exporters of non-traditional exports last year, a rise of almost \$17,000 from 1987, director of the export board of Zambia (EBZ) Cde Jameson Muchaili has said.

The figures for 1987 and 1988 are as follows:

Primary and agricultural commodities doubled from \$4,830 to \$8,840 in 1988.

Fresh fruits and vegetable exports doubled from \$2,127 to \$4,252. Mining and engineering equipment rose from \$18,724 to \$22,687.

Giving a comparison 1987 and 1988 export data, Cde Muchaili said there had been a rapid improvement in all sectors.

This was a healthy sign and a commitment exhibited by producers to increase non-traditional exports in line with Party and Government aspirations.

**\* Looting Due to High Prices Under Control**

34000632c Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA  
in English 10 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] The Government said yesterday it had contained disturbances by youths on the Copperbelt in protest against rising costs of essential commodities following last week's decision to decontrol prices.

Secretary of State for Defence and Security Cde Alex Shapi said in Lusaka reports from the Copperbelt indicated the situation was under control and this was concurred by the area Central Committee Member Cde Rankin Sikasula who urged residents to refrain from violence.

Cde Shapi declined to give further details on the disturbances which erupted on Saturday when youths in Kitwe, Ndola and Luanshya looted markets and stoned vehicles.

The situation in Lusaka was calm yesterday, provincial commanding officer Cde Zunga Siakalima said. No reports of looting had been reported.

But Cde Siakalima disclosed that Lusaka had been hit by a spate of aggravated robberies, car thefts and murder at the weekend.

Three vehicles including a bus belonging to Hotel Inter-Continental were stolen on Friday night but the bus was later recovered at a farm in Lusaka west.

A man found tampering with the bus was shot and later died at the intensive care unit at the UTH.

A man was murdered on Friday by unknown gunmen in Katima Mulilo road.

Three more vehicles were stolen on Sunday night in cases of aggravated robbery.

On the Copperbelt Cde Sikasula appealed to residents to keep calm and observe the rule of law.

Cde Sikasula made the appeal in Ndola when he confirmed disturbances in Mufulira where youths armed with stones and sticks damaged shops and stoned motorists before armed police moved in to control the situation.

He condemned the disturbances.

He regretted the incidences particularly in Kitwe where a Mercedes Benz was burnt on Saturday saying people should know that no legitimate Government could tolerate acts of lawlessness.

He urged residents to report all "trouble makers" to appropriate authorities adding that vigilantes and Party militants should cooperate with security forces in their task to restore law and order.

Cde Sikasula said no lives had been lost.

Speaking in Mufulira, Zambia National Council of Commerce and Industry general secretary Cde Kangwa Nsuluka appealed to the police to provide adequate security to protect business houses and property.

In Kitwe, goods worth thousands of Kwacha were looted from Ndeke ZCBC shop at the weekend by a mob of youths.

A TIMES team was told by workers that the looters gained entry into the shop through the backdoor and took away tablets of soap and tinned beef.

In the industrial area, the looters mostly from nearby Mindolo mine township raided Zambia Ceramics Stores where undisclosed amounts of wares were snatched.

Elsewhere in the town the situation remained calm as armed riot policemen patrolled strategic positions.

But the transport situation remained chaotic as most taxis and minibus operators kept away their vehicles for fear of being attacked.

At Wusakile and Chamboli townships riot police have continued to guard State shops.

Some filling stations in Ndola have increased the price of lubricating oil by almost 200 percent with immediate effect.

A snap survey conducted revealed that BP Zambia filling stations were selling a half litre tin of lubricating oil at K42 from K16.

A five-litre can of the same oil is fetching K352 from K147.

Mobil, Caltex and Agip establishments were still selling a half-litre tin of engine oil at the old price of K23.

Meanwhile, the Ambassador Funeral Parlour in Lusaka has hiked its service charges from K1,500 to K2,250.

A list of new prices released shows storage of the body will now cost K100 a day from K50.

The K2,250 service charge covers washing of the body and provision of the hearse.

Coffins have gone up from K2,000 to K2,500 while wreaths have shot up to K100 from K50.

And Chifundo Construction has increased prices of bricks. A brick which used to cost K7.50 will now fetch K13.

State shops in Lusaka were yesterday busy fixing new prices for all items.

The decontrol of prices announced by the Government recently has forced industries and retailers to charge more for the goods and in some cases by wide margins raising complaints from the public.

The Minister of Commerce and Industry Cde Otema Musuka at the weekend expressed concern over the trend of price increases.

He summoned parastatal managers to discuss the issue of wild price increases.

#### **\* Interest Rates Increased; 19 to 29 Percent**

34000632b Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA  
in English 11 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] The Bank of Zambia has raised interest rates from 19 to 29 percent with immediate effect, a circular released in Lusaka indicated yesterday.

The bank's circular says the maximum lending rate for commercial bank has also been upped from 25 percent to 35 percent.

The rate of interest on loans to peasant and small-scale farmers for agricultural purposes charged by commercial banks will not exceed 33 percent.

The other changes announced by the central bank following the devaluation of the Kwacha include treasury bills whose rates have been increased from 18.5 to 28.5 percent while savings bank rates have gone up from 13 to 23 percent.

Last week President Kaunda announced the devaluation of the Kwacha pegging it at K16 for one United States dollar.

In February 1987 the central bank slashed the official interest rates from 30 to 20 percent which the then Prime Minister Cde Kebby Musokotwane who has now been posted into the foreign service said were inhibiting vital sectors like agriculture and small-scale industries from borrowing for the development.

The Commercial Farmers Bureau has in the past warned that high bank rates would discourage investments in agriculture unless they were matched by a similar rise in producer prices.

Meanwhile, Southern Province Central Committee Member Cde Felix Luputa has charged that businessmen had deliberately misconstrued the good intentions of the decontrol of prices announced by the President on 30 June.

Cde Luputa said the decontrol was aimed at boosting production and not to enrich businessmen through exorbitant prices which could not be justified.

Addressing the business community in Livingstone's Victoria hall yesterday, Cde Luputa warned traders in the province to learn from what had happened in other parts of Zambia.

He warned the traders that if they charged unaffordable prices, consumers would not remain passive and might



react in which case even the normal profit margin they were entitled to would not be realised because property would be destroyed.

Traders guilty of overpricing should know that the Party and its Government had the powers to take action and would not sit idly and watch the situation worsen.

Cde Luputa condemned the committee which decided on the recent prices for essential commodities because they were outrageous.

He cited an example of salt whose prices had more than doubled up.

The meeting started on a low note, with the target audience, retailers, trickling in at the last minute.

Earlier, Cde Luputa said the retailers were the ones guilty of overpricing.

A TIP 115 survey on prices in the district showed most of the commodities had shot up by more than 60 percent.

Most shops remained shut for most parts of the morning.

#### **\* Foreign Debt in 1988 Amounted to \$6 Billion**

34000632a Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA*  
in English 19 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] Zambia's foreign debt soared to \$6 billion by the end of last year partly on account of interest and the country's non payment of the 10 percent of foreign exchange earnings towards debt servicing, Parliament heard yesterday.

Minister of State for Finance and Planning Cde Rabibison Chongo said when answering questions by Luena MP Mr Chrispin Sibetta that as at 31 December the debt stood at \$6,190,717,000.

In 1985, principal was \$61,134,000 and interest \$34,289,000 totalling \$95,425,000.

In 1986, principal was \$64,572,000 and interest \$30,264,000 totalling \$94,836,000.

In 1987, principal was \$22,710,000 and interest \$16,379,000 totalling \$39,089,000.

Where net inflows had been higher payments exceeded the 10 percent ceiling though these were to institutions like African Development Bank.

Debts owing to the IMF and the World Bank were not reduced.

The Bank of Zambia did not apply any special rates of exchange in trying to dismantle the national debt through use of non-traditional exporters retentions as at 31 December 1988.

By 31 May this year monies owing to the IMF in principal reached \$935,724,000 and interest

\$182,503,000 totalling \$1,118,227,000 and to the World Bank principal \$363,345,000 and interest \$79,309,000 totalling \$462,645,000.

Cde Chongo said Zambia remained a member of the IMF and as such the IMF found the Fourth National Development Plan and the interim national development plan and new economic recovery programme good for talks.

This ruled out the need for entering into negotiations for fresh structured adjustment programmes.

The devaluation was done to challenge the non mining sector to make efforts to boost foreign exchange earnings to sustain the economy.

If the measures were not taken, Zambians would have faced much greater difficulties.

On charges by Banguclu MP [Member of Parliament] Mr Joseph Kasongo that similar measures were in 1985 adopted but led to "enormous" suffering, Cde Chongo said at that time the foreign exchange auction was being followed and the Kwacha fell below expected levels.

Finance Minister Cde Gibson Chigaga on a further question by Nkana MP Mr Noel Mvula said the budget deficit had dropped from 34.6 percent in 1986 to 11.5 percent with the help of a system of controlling Government expenditure.

### **Zimbabwe**

#### **\* More Mineral Exports Now Through Mozambique**

34000729b Harare *THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE*  
in English 14 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] The volume of Zimbabwe minerals being exported via Mozambican ports is now slightly more than that being routed through South Africa, the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) general manager, Mr Njodzi Machirori, said this week.

He told the *GAZETTE* that MMCZ is continually endeavouring to increase use of the Beira and Maputo ports, the only present limitation being the dredging exercise taking place at Beira, to allow larger vessels to call at the port. He expressed the hope that more continental vessels would call at the port.

Mr Machirori said the Mozambican ports were coping adequately with Zimbabwe's export cargo, and the volume through Mozambican ports had increased by about 5 percent over the last 12 months.

He added: "If the Chicualacuala line were operational that would naturally help quite a lot, because we would not have to go through the South African system. Most of the minerals from areas such as the Midlands could then be railed direct to Maputo, an even shorter route than the current route through Beitbridge-Ressano Garcia-Maputo.

"If this route is operational, it would simplify the system for us because we are currently paying three rail rates—NRZ [National Railways of Zimbabwe], Sats [South African Transport Services], and CFM [Mozambique Railroad] (Mozambique)—but through Chicualacuala we would only pay the Zimbabwe and Mozambique rates."

The MMCZ general manager complimented the Mozambique Railways for their "cooperation", saying that the CFM this month agreed to a stay in any rate increases for its services. Meanwhile, Sats, which normally raises its rates in April, recently raised its rates twice, in December and in April, a move Mr Machirori says has put a bigger burden on the MMCZ's pricing formulas.

The shortage of locomotive power has also created some problems in the transportation of mineral exports, but, with assistance from the Ministry of Mines, these consignments have been given priority status by the NRZ because of the complications that could arise in international markets.

As previously forecast, mineral exports—excluding gold—will, for the year ended July 30, exceed the \$1 billion mark for the first time. This has been due to the upswing in mineral prices on the international markets—particularly for ferro-alloys—and also because of the depreciation of the Zimdollar. Last year, non-gold mineral sales reached \$814 million.

Mr Machirori confirmed that the MMCZ has been involved in barter transactions, which last year constituted nearly 2 percent of total sales, but said that these were on the decrease. "We are actually reducing barter trade transactions; we can sell most of our minerals anyway, and so it is only asbestos which has been involved in such transactions.

Asked whether the anti-asbestos lobby was having any significant effect on Zimbabwe's asbestos sales, Mr Machirori said most people were now more educated on the use of asbestos, and were beginning to appreciate that it was only dangerous in dust form.

In any case, he claimed, some of the products being recommended to substitute the use of asbestos had more harmful properties than asbestos itself.

#### \* Paper Comments on Land Distribution Delay

34000729 Bulawayo *THE CHRONICLE* in English  
4 Jul 89 p 4

[Text] Addressing the annual congress of the Zimbabwe National Farmers' Union four years after independence, the then Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Cde Eddison Zvobgo lamented:

"Although the abhorrent policies of previous regimes regarding land ownership have been reversed, the factual reality of the situation has not changed much and land is still in white hands."

Cde Zvobgo was, of course, not airing his personal sentiments only but also those of the masses who were getting restive about the slow pace at which land was being acquired from whites for redistribution. Nobody thought that the situation would remain that way for much longer. As it has turned out, though, that was all wishful thinking.

Today, five years later and nearly 10 years into independence, the land issue appears far from having been resolved.

Only this past weekend, repeating a call that he has made many times before already, Senior Minister Joshua Nkomo again expressed dismay at the fact that the black majority are still largely dispossessed of land as white commercial farmers, who number only about 4,000 odd in a population of more than eight million, own half of the country's land.

We find this state of affairs a most unamusing paradox whose perpetuation is totally unacceptable as it is a negation of the very quest for land which spawned the Chimurenga which resulted in political independence in 1980.

It is a state of affairs which is not only morally wrong but one which is economically unjustifiable and downright ruinous ecologically.

Millions of peasants are having to accept a condition where they are crammed together on very small tracts of land, formerly called tribal trust lands, which have become bleached and sandy through overuse and not, as the colonialists would have the world believe, poor land husbandry.

All the yawning gullies, the deforestation, denudation and siltation were a direct result of this overcrowdedness.

Cognisance must be taken of the fact that when black Zimbabweans clamor for land they are not trying to acquire it merely for the sake of prestige—so that they have something to boast about: they use it, and productively too.

Before independence, black Zimbabweans' sales of crops to the Agricultural marketing Authority were negligible because nobody would loan them money for inputs. And yet by 1985 their contribution to the national granaries was already about 50 percent, thanks to a more sympathetic ear to their requests for input loans from the new authorities.

It was the black farmer's performance which was responsible for some pleasantly surprising favorable comments from the World Resources Institute in 1987 which said that the most dramatic transformation in African agriculture had "occurred among Zimbabwe black farmers since independence".

In the face of this, one wonders, whether the Government is being too gentlemanly continuing to honor the obnoxious land provisions in the Lancaster document.

### \* Railway Workers End Week-Long Strike

34000734c Harare THE HERALD in English  
21 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] National Railways of Zimbabwe artisans and enginemen returned to work yesterday, ending their week-long strike which had seriously affected goods train services throughout the country.

An NRZ [National Railways of Zimbabwe] spokesman last night confirmed that the strike had ended, that strikers in Bulawayo had returned to work and those in other centres were expected to report for duty soon.

Yesterday morning, the 2,000 artisans at Raylton mechanical workshops opted to return to work in response to appeals by the Minister of Transport, Cde Simbarashe Mbenegwi, for the strikers to resume their duties while their grievances were being looked into.

The artisans have also decided to select a committee to meet the NRZ management for discussions on their demands for an extra 20 percent pay rise on top of the Government stipulated 5 to 16 percent increment.

Meanwhile, the 200 enginemen who had also joined the strike for more pay and better conditions of service, held a meeting yesterday and elected to return to work.

The enginemen—who have chosen a four-man committee to liaise with the NRZ management—have set a deadline of two weeks to August 3 for the parastatal to give them "concrete answers" to their list of grievances and the issue of an extra 15 percent allowance.

The Minister of Transport assured the strikers and other NRZ employees on Wednesday that the Government and the NRZ board were working on a new wage and salary package for all railway employees.

### \* By-Election Reveals Voter Apathy, Pessimism

34000734b Bulawayo SUNDAY NEWS  
in English 9 Jul 89 p 6

[Text] As was expected, ZANU(PF) [Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front] has romped home the winner of the Dzivaresekwa by-election held last week to fill the Parliamentary seat left vacant by the late Cde Maurice Nyagumbo. The manner in which this victory was attained, however, was not impressive and it poses some serious questions which the ruling party would do well to address itself to.

Out of 64,000 registered voters only 16.9 percent turned out to cast their ballots. Of these, 3,125 or one-third, voted for the candidate of the newly-formed Zimbabwe Unity Movement [ZUM]. This was a remarkable achievement for a party barely two months old and which had such a low-key election campaign.

There must be a reason for the high degree of voter apathy witnessed in Dzivaresekwa, and it must be identified and matters put right before the onset of the 1990 general elections. One theory is that ZANU(PF) supporters resented having a candidate being imposed on them. If this is true and the same thing is done in next year's elections then this could spell big trouble for the party.

There are also some discredited politicians whom it would be folly to expect the people to show enthusiasm in voting for, although they will probably scrap through because the majority of the people are being the ruling party. If ZUM is allowed to become a stronger force, such candidates could embarrass the party by losing, far-fetched though the idea may appear at present.

The question of updating the voters' roll and clarifying the identification required before one can vote must be urgently addressed, in order to avoid the turning away of so many people as happened at Dzivaresekwa.

We have stated before that we oppose the formation of ZUM as it only serves to create discord at a time when the nation should be concentrating on the noble task of forging national unity. We hope that ZANU(PF) will not, through errors of omission or commission, further alienate itself from the people and allow ZUM to become an even bigger threat.

As President Mugabe said, the party must make haste and reorganise itself so that the pessimism that seems to prevail is not exploited to the opposition's advantage.

### \* Land Redistribution Debate Continues

#### \* Nkomo Address to Farmers

34000734a Bulawayo SUNDAY NEWS  
in English 9 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] Bulawayo—The Senior Minister in the President's Office, Cde Joshua Nkomo, on Friday night urged white commercial farmers in the country to negotiate with the Government before 1990 the release of some some farms for resettlement of landless people.

Cde Nkomo told about 500 farmers at the annual general meeting of the Matabeleland branch of the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU) here that more than 110,000 families in Zimbabwe needed to be resettled, and lamented that these people were often described as "squatters in their own country."

"I don't think we are being unreasonable if we say you commercial farmers who own the best and the bulk part of Zimbabwe's land because of history, should share part of it with the indigenous displaced and landless blacks who are the majority," he said.

"Only 4,400 white commercial farmers own the best land in the country but what of the 10 million blacks in



the communal areas and other displaced people? Can we say then that we are free if we don't have the land which we fought to get?"

The Zimbabwe Government, he said, had abided by the 1979 Lancaster House constitutional agreement for almost 10 years now thinking that the few who owned the bulk of the land, during the course of that period, sell part of it to the State for re-distribution to the landless.

"None of us want to seize the land that was served to you by the discriminatory legislation before Zimbabwe's independence and also which you acquired because of the history of this country, but we want to devise, together with you, a system to share that land and not your farms," Cde Nkomo told the farmers.

Most of the land for resettlement could be found from idle farms in commercial areas, he said. "What I am saying is not Government policy but reality which is prevailing in the country and which we should solve now or we will head for disaster."

However, the CFU Matabeleland branch president, Mr Max Rosenfels, told Cde Nkomo that the spirit of confidence among farmers in the province was being affected by "rumblings on land ownership."

"Whatever action is taken, caution should be exercised to maintain or to increase productivity," he said.

Mr Rosenfels said that since independence in 1980, nearly four million hectares of large-scale commercial farm land had been acquired by the State on a willing-seller willing-buyer basis for resettlement.

"In Matabeleland, the Government has purchased 900,000 hectares of land of which only 386,000 hectares has been partially used. Much of this land has been mismanaged," he said.

The CFU national president, Mr John Brown, told the farmers that he had held meetings, met with several ministers, including Cde Nkomo, on the land issue.

He said his organisation wanted to ensure that agricultural land was used in a sustainably productive manner.—ZIANA.

#### \* Tekere Comment

34000734a Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE  
in English 21 Jul 89 p 19

[Text] ZUM [Zimbabwe Unity Movement] chairman, Mr Edgar Tekere, has urged the Senior Minister in the President's Office, Dr Joshua Nkomo, to talk first to top government officials and those in Cabinet to "reverse and decrease from land grabbing" before accusing commercial farmers of not cooperating on land distribution.

Senior Minister Nkomo has been in the news recently expressing concern that not many commercial farmers were willing to sell land to government for resettlement.

Mr Tekere told Parliament on Tuesday that "too many farms are already owned by too few chiefs (top government officials). He (Dr Nkomo) should start in Cabinet, at party leadership meetings, to begin with reversing the trend that was set in motion in 1980, before he goes to the commercial farmers."

Mr Tekere said that if he was a commercial farmer, he would have retorted long ago that Dr Nkomo was going to the wrong place in the first place.

He told Dr Nkomo "to go back to your colleagues and tell them about this collection of land among too few."

"Comrade Nkomo has not seemed to lay his remarks at the appropriate target. Probably that is why he has been a little lonely in talking about land hunger among our people and in equal land distribution," said Mr Tekere.

#### \* New Price Control Regulations Issued

34000733e Harare THE HERALD in English  
22 Jul 89 p 1

[Excerpt] New price control regulations, freeing all but the most essential or strategic goods from the need for prior Government approval before increases are announced, were gazetted yesterday.

The Control of Goods (Price Control) Regulations 1989 replace the much-amended regulations first issued in 1954 and signal a formal end to the price freeze, announced in 1987 and effectively raised more than a year ago.

Although the regulations are part of the implementation of the policy of opening up the economy and liberalising trade, the Government retains regulatory powers.

Besides keeping tight control on the prices of the most basic foods where Cabinet approval is needed for increases, ministerial approval will still be needed for price rises of strategic goods such as steel and packaging.

Many other common goods, from shirts through batteries and cement to toothpaste, have fixed maximum percentage mark-ups for both wholesale and retail prices.

However, prior Government or ministerial approval is not needed for price increases on the long list of goods so long as the maximum percentage mark-ups, which only exceed 30 percent in two cases and are often as low as 10 percent, are adhered to.

Where there have been substantial increases in costs since the effective lifting of the freeze in May last year, these can be adjusted by a mark-up of a maximum of 5 percent on the increased cost component only, which will be added to the price charged at the beginning of this year to get the new selling price. This adjustment can only be made once during the next 12 months.

Importers of commodities not otherwise regulated have been given a maximum mark-up of 50 percent. If the

mark-up was lower on January 1 this year, then that lower mark-up must be used.

Buyers will now be able to recover any excess mark-up from the seller if the regulations are breached.

The Minister of Trade and Commerce, Cde Oliver Munyaradzi, in a statement last night said the new regulations were a result of the Government's resolve to rationalise the price control system. [passage omitted]

#### \* Castrol Company Centralizes Regional Sales

34000733d Harare THE HERALD-BUSINESS  
HERALD in English 20 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] Castrol Zimbabwe stands to boost its export earnings by more than 400 percent to \$2.5 million this year following the decision by its British head office to centralise regional sales in Zimbabwe.

Until now, Zambia and Malawi were supplied from South Africa while Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, southern Zaire, Zanzibar and Madagascar received Castrol lubes from Britain.

Now responsibility for supplying specialist industrial, mining and automotive lubricants to these countries has been given to Castrol Zimbabwe—with spectacular results in foreign exchange earnings.

Castrol exported products worth \$650,000 last year and in the first six months of this year, the million dollar figure was reached.

#### \* Harare-Chitungwiza Light Rail Under Study

34000733c Harare THE HERALD in English  
19 Jul 89 p 4

[Excerpts] A Canadian private investment banker and financier has succeeded in persuading Zimbabwe merchant and commercial banks to finance the building of a light rail link between Harare and Chitungwiza.

Mr Robert Stewart, whose great-grandfather was involved in financing the Canadian Pacific Railway and the railway from Cape Town to Harare, moved from Switzerland with his wife to live in Harare about 11 weeks ago to try to make the dream of a rail link a reality.

Chitungwiza has a population of about 500,000 and the thousands of commuters travel daily to the city mainly by bus and emergency taxi. [passage omitted]

The securing of finance removes one of the biggest obstacles to the realisation of at least part of the Government's plan for a rail link between the capital and Chitungwiza and an urban rail system that would link high-density suburbs with the city centre.

The plan Mr Stewart wants the Government to accept would reduce drastically the cost of the system, which had been estimated at more than \$1 billion. The plan,

produced by Mott Macdonald, of Britain, and Electrowatt of Switzerland, in the initial phase, covers only a link between Chitungwiza and Harare but would cost only about \$150 million. [passage omitted]

Local banks have agreed to jointly provide the entire \$150 million required for the project. A consortium of Swiss banks has agreed to provide 30 million Swiss francs to buy materials needing foreign exchange.—ZIANA.

#### \* Joint Bicycle Project With Chinese Company

34000733b Harare THE HERALD in English  
13 Jul 89 p 4

[Excerpts] The Ministry of Industry and Technology has approved plans to make bicycles locally through a joint venture between a Zimbabwean and a Chinese company.

Although the project had been expected to be fully operational by the end of 1987, the ministry had not, until recently, given a go ahead.

The joint venture is to involve Norton Cycles and the Metallurgical Construction Company of China and they would work together to meet the demand for bicycles in the country, at affordable prices.

The managing director of Norton Cycles, Mr Indravadan Hasjibhai Patel, on Tuesday told THE HERALD that the ministry had now approved the project and construction of the factory would start at the beginning of next year. [passage omitted]

He said the project would cost \$2.5 million in construction and another \$4.5 million for machinery. The company would employ 310 people and 12 engineers would be coming from China. [passage omitted]

#### \* Decade of Foreign Exchange Problem Reviewed

34000733a Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE  
in English 21 Jul 89 p 28

[Text] The outlook for 1989 shows that the economy is still experiencing severe external imbalances; despite a 19 percent growth in exports last year, there was a large increase in net invisible payments from \$506m in 1987 to \$691m in 1988, and a \$50m net capital outflow, a senior Reserve Bank official said in Nyanga last week.

Mr S Malaba, head of the economics division, told delegates to the 22nd Institute of Bankers of Zimbabwe's Winter Banking School, that the economy had progressively become a net capital exporter, as repayment of foreign loans were now larger than the amount of forex coming from new borrowings or foreign investment.

The economy had experienced inadequate levels of direct foreign investment, an overall reduction in capital inflows from commercial and official development sources over the past few years, and the effects of the country's commitment to fully service its external debt.

This development, combined with inadequate growth in exports—partly due to the economy's heavy reliance on primary exports which had often been subject to general fluctuations in international commodity prices—had resulted in a critical forex shortage for imports and a financing gap with adverse implications on the level of economic activity and unemployment levels, he said.

The balance-of-payment position was experiencing severe imbalance, because of the large export dependence on the agricultural and mining sectors, relatively increased outflows on the invisible account (interests, pensions and dividend remittances) external debt obligations and net capital outflows.

The invisible account, reflecting the landlocked nature of the Zimbabwean economy, experienced large net service payments, mainly in respect of freight payments for imports, he said.

Because of the Lancaster House settlement agreement, remittances of pensions to former residents had assumed significant proportions.

Mr Malaba said the overall balance-of-payments position in 1980 had worsened from a deficit of \$39m in 1979 to \$80m. This was due to a rapid growth in exports of 27 percent and an even larger increase in merchandise imports of 45 percent.

The reduction in the trade surplus, which was accompanied by increases in service payments, resulted in the current account deficit rising from \$74m in 1979 to \$156m in 1980.

The overall balance-of-payments deficit in 1980 worsened by \$140m, despite an 8 percent increase in the value of exports. This increase was, however, only due to the steep rise in the value of tobacco exports, following the establishment of new markets in the post-Independence period and the favourable prices received for the 1980 crop.

Mr Malaba said the growth of the current account deficit in 1981 was also due to developments in both the non-factor services account, which saw an increase in net service and income payments.

He said the increase in net service payments, from \$187m in 1980 to \$280m in 1981, and another sharp rise in net income payments from \$14m in 1980 to \$80m in 1981, largely accounted for the subsequent increase in the invisible deficit from \$225m in 1980 to \$382m a year later.

"This worsening situation in net service and income payments, which followed, respectively, the increase in shipment payments on imports and the increase in interest payments on external obligations, was reflected in the current account position deteriorating from a deficit of \$156m in 1980 to \$440m in 1981."

Net capital inflows were only \$143m in 1981, and it became necessary to resort to increasingly short-term borrowing, totalling \$220m in 1981, and a reduction of import allocations. The pressure on the balance-of-payments became more severe in 1982, when the current account deficit worsened by \$93m to a record of \$553m.

The official said the performance of exports was also exacerbated by the effect of the real appreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar. Since April 1980, the real effective exchange rate of the dollar had appreciated by about 25 percent against currencies of this country's major trading partners.

#### Capital Inflows

He said the highest capital inflows in 1982, which helped finance the large current account deficit, helped reduce the overall balance-of-payments deficit from \$220m in 1981 to \$124m in 1982, thereby reducing the utilisation of short-term standby borrowings by the Reserve Bank to \$110m.

The situation remained under pressure in 1983 during which the deficit went up to \$158m, and was financed by borrowings from the IMF of \$163m and short-term standby borrowings of \$126m. Outflows on the invisibles balance rose to \$541m.

Mr Malaba said the balance-of-payments position improved from a \$158m deficit in 1983 to a surplus of \$165m in 1984, in 1985 a surplus of \$204m and in 1986 fell to a surplus of \$73m, despite a 22 percent growth in exports, boosted by gold sales of \$413m.

#### Drought

However, the position worsened again in 1987 following the drought and, consequently, the terms of trade deteriorated by 7 percent, while export volumes increased by only 1 percent.

Mr Malaba said the debt service ratio had risen from 30 percent of exports of goods and non-factor services in 1986, to peak at nearly 35 percent in 1987, before declining to 27 percent last year.

"Current estimates, assuming no new loan commitments, are that the debt service ratio will decline to about 26 percent in 1989 and by 1992, will be in single digit numbers," he said.

According to Mr Malaba, the timely honouring of the economy's external obligations has continued in the face of adverse conditions. "This achievement, although maintaining the country's credit worthiness in the international capital markets, has been at considerable cost to the economy."

Mr Malaba said to overcome the external imbalance facing the economy, while at the same time being fully



cognisant of the imperative need to adjust and restructure the economy, government was in the process of finalising a macro-economic framework paper.

"The paper, while addressing the problem of the untenable external position, will also specifically focus on the

other macro-policy areas which include the budget deficit, price and incomes policy, money and capital markets and investment.

"Thus, a number of studies which are part and parcel of the framework paper, have been completed or are being finalised," said Mr Malaba.

## Ghana

### \* Japan Signs Agreements on Three Grants

34000732e Accra GHANAIAN TIMES  
in English 22 Jun 89 p 3

[Article by James Addy]

[Text] Ghana and Japan yesterday exchanged notes in respect of three grants totalling about 10 million dollars in Accra.

Dr Obed Asamoah, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, signed for Ghana whilst Mr Shigemi Ando, the Japanese Ambassador signed on behalf of his government.

The first grant of 5.6 million dollars is to be used to purchase equipment, materials and vehicles to support electrification projects at Bekwai and Tokuse-Senya in the Ashanti Region.

The second grant of 3.8 million dollars will be used for the construction of lay-by jetty, fish handling shed and other facilities aimed at alleviating congestion under the Tema Fishing Harbour Rehabilitation Project.

The third grant of 300,000 dollars, cultural grant to the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board will be used to purchase equipment for documenting and preserving material relating to the country's heritage.

Speaking during the signing ceremony, Dr Asamoah said the grants were a further manifestation of the interest and confidence the Japanese Government had in the PNDC [Provisional National Defense Council] and gave the assurance that the grants and equipment would be fully utilized.

### \* Iran Proposes Health, Education, Dam Projects

34000732d Accra GHANAIAN TIMES  
in English 26 Jul 89 p 5

[Excerpt] Iran is to embark on a number of construction projects in Ghana under an agreement soon to be signed.

A team of officials of the Iran construction company Jihad-e-Szandegi has been in the country since the beginning of the year to handle the projects which are in the areas of health, education and small dam irrigation schemes.

This came to light when an 11-man Iranian delegation led by Rasoul Lahijanlian, Deputy Minister of Jihad-e-Szandegi, called on Mr Huudu Yahaya, Secretary for Mobilization and Social Welfare in Accra on Monday.

The delegation is on an eight-day visit to see progress of preliminary arrangements on the projects to be embarked upon.

Mr Yahaya said though the Government was still studying the draft proposal, Construction Jihad had

acquired 1,000 hectares of land in the Northern Region while another plot of land had been acquired for the proposed school.

He said the Government was interested in the projects, and mentioned the construction of storage facilities, vocational training and projects aimed at rural development as other areas that the Jihad could look at.

He said lack of storage facilities had compelled developing countries to buy the very goods they sold to develop countries at higher price. [passage omitted]

### \* U.K. Agreements Provide Development Grants

34000732c Accra GHANAIAN TIMES  
in English 30 Jun 89 p 3

[Text] Ghana and Britain yesterday signed two agreements in Accra.

Mr. K. B. Amissah-Arthur, Deputy Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning and Mrs Lynda Chalker, Minister for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, signed for Ghana and Britain respectively.

Under the first agreement, Britain is to grant Ghana 20 million pounds sterling to support the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in fulfilment of a pledge she made at the 1989 Donors Conference in Paris.

Fifth percent of the amount is tied to the UK market while the remaining 50 percent is untied, by which arrangement Ghana can purchase goods and services from nine countries including Finland, France, America, Norway, Germany, Japan and Sweden.

This brings British support aid to Ghana since 1983 to 92.5 million pounds sterling.

The second agreement seeks to establish a Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) office in Ghana in a bid to step up economic activity.

It would commit 69,000 pounds to textile production and a half-a-million pounds to the generation of electricity in conjunction with the Volta River Authority (VRA) among other projects.

The CDC has already committed over 15 million pounds sterling to the VRA and the Twifo Oil Palm Plantation and a further 11 million pounds has been approved for poultry, electricity and gold mining.

In a speech, Mrs Chalker said the grant was in recognition of the tremendous efforts that the government was making towards economic recovery.

Mr Amissah-Arthur expressed gratitude for the new liberal conditions offered under the grant and acknowledge Britain's contribution towards the development of Ghana.

### \* Demonstrators Protest Lawyers' Lecture Series

34000732b Accra *PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC*  
in English 28 Jun 89 p 1

[Excerpt] Many people in Accra yesterday held a peaceful demonstration against the decision of the Ghana Bar Association to hold a series of lectures in memory of the three High Court judges that were murdered in 1982.

The judges were Justice (Mrs) Cecilia Koranteng Addow, Justice Poku Sarkodee and Justice Adjepong.

The lectures, the first of which was supposed to have started yesterday at the Christ the King Parish Hall, were called off because of the demonstration.

The demonstrators were of the view that the lectures were not only unnecessary but were meant to allow the association to make negative pronouncements against the government.

The demonstrators carrying placards with various inscriptions maintained that the lectures are only a ploy for some of the lawyers who do not support the government to achieve their own political ends.

Some of the inscriptions on the placards read, "we know the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]'s connection with these memorial lectures," "reactionary lawyers are lawless, arrogant and wasteful," "shame to the judiciary, fancy Heward Mills case," "high legal fees not the rule of law," "Justice Taylor, Justice of Supreme Court or sabotage," "we shall resist every effort to derail the revolution," "stop this provocation" and "PNDC [Provisional National Defense Council] shake up the judiciary."

The demonstrators started off from the Drama Studio near Ambassador Hotel and went to the British Council premises to demonstrate and thence to the Christ the King Parish Hall where the lectures were to have been held.

They expressed their indignation at the British Council for hosting such lectures which give people the opportunity to make derogatory remarks meant to derail the revolutionary process. [passage omitted]

### \* Nigerians To Conduct Seismic Survey for Oil

34000732a Accra *GHANAIAN TIMES*  
in English 23 Jun 89 p 1

[Article by Gayheart Edem Mensah]

[Excerpt] Ghana and Nigeria yesterday signed a Geophysical Services Agreement in Accra.

Mr Tsatsu Tsikata, acting Chief Executive of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), signed for Ghana while Mr J. B. Buluro, Managing Director of the Integrated Data Services Limited (IDSL) of Nigeria, signed for his country.

Under the agreement IDSL of Nigeria, a subsidiary of the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation, will conduct a seismic survey at the onshore area of the Tano Basin in Ghana.

The survey is to ensure the acquisition of seismic information from the Tano Basin and to help identify areas for the drilling of hydro-carbons (petroleum).

The acquisition of the seismic data is a prelude to exploratory drilling activities to be undertaken by the GNPC in the Tano Basin as part of the corporation's programme designed to define the structures needed to trap hydro-carbons.

In a pre-signing address, Mr Tsikata noted that the Tano Basin had had an indication of a high potential for oil production for a long time now.

What had been lacking, he said, was a concentrated and cumulative work geared towards tapping that resource.

Mr Tsikata said with the inception of the seismic survey, a consistent and systematic path for future drilling activities in the area would be paved.

The agreement, he said, was an important element in cooperation between Ghana and Nigeria.

"It is joining the two countries in a very important area of economic and technological development" which would improve Ghana's chances in the area of crude oil production, he said. [passage omitted]

### \* PRC To Build National Theater in Accra

34000730d Accra *PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC*  
in English 6 Jul 89 p 9

[Article by Siisi Quainoo]

[Excerpt] Ghana and the People's Republic of China yesterday signed a formal agreement for the construction of a 15 million-dollar (C4.05 billion) National Theatre in Accra.

Under the agreement, the cost of the theatre will be met by the Chinese Government.

Dr Mohammed Ben Abdallah, Chairman of the National Commission on Culture signed for Ghana, while Mr Zhou Haitao, Economic Counsellor at the Chinese Embassy signed for his country.

Work on the theatre which has a capacity of 1,504, auditorium, orchestral pit, rehearsal and exhibition rooms, begins in October this year. It also has an outdoor theatre capable of accommodating 1,000 people and a square fountain. [passage omitted]



**\* Only Half of Fish Requirements Produced**

34000730b Accra GHANAIAN TIMES in English  
12 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] For the past decade, Ghana has been producing only about half of its annual fish requirements, a Senior Official of the Fisheries Department has said.

Mr F. M. K. Denyo, Deputy Director of the Department, told the GNA in Accra yesterday that Ghana's annual landings during the period were between 350,000 and 380,000 tonnes, far lower than the annual requirement of 600,000 tonnes.

Last year for example, the total marine catch was 302,931.7 tonnes, 27,087.4 tonnes lower than that of 1987.

Mr Denyo said inland fishing brought in about 65,000 tonnes.

Catches from the Volta Lake had been static, ranging between 40,000 and 45,000 tonnes.

He said when the lake was created in 1964, it was estimated that it would yield about 60,000 tonnes of fish annually, but that figure was attained only in 1969.

"It looks as if we have reached the maximum, or our marine resources have been fully exploited," the fisheries official said, adding that increases in marine fleet might not increase landings.

Mr Denyo said the state of affairs had compelled Government to negotiate for fishing rights in other countries and to intensify aquaculture development to raise the catch from the present one percent to 10 percent within a few years.

Under the aquaculture programme, regional and district offices of the Fisheries Department would provide technical advice to district assemblies, organizations and individuals wishing to invest in fish ponds, Mr Denyo said.

Operations of the Regional and District Offices of the Department had been decentralized to enable them to draw up their own fishery development programmes.

According to Mr Denyo, as at 1987, about 177 hectares of fish ponds had been developed by individuals, providing about 312 tonnes of fish.

Although aquaculture development had been on the increase, people were not achieving good results because of bad management.

**Mali**

**\* French Aid for Restructuring Development Bank**

34190343 Bamako L'ESSOR in French 22 Jun 89 p 3

[Text] A loan agreement between the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation and the government of the

Republic of Mali was signed on Tuesday in Koulouba by Dr N'Golo Traore, minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation, and Michel Perrin, ambassador of France to Mali.

The purpose of this agreement, in the amount of 8 billion CFA francs, is to partially finance the restructuring of the Development Bank of Mali that will officially open on 1 July 1989 with the appropriation of its capital (set at 3 billion CFA francs) and a managing partner, the Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank.

This sectorial-adjustment-combined loan is part of the special aid program of the French republic to countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Part of this loan, 77 percent, is in the form of a gift. The interest rate on the remainder is 0.68 percent over 30 years, with a 10-year grace period.

For Michel Perrin, ambassador of France to Mali, this agreement expands the cooperation between Mali and France. It implements an adjustment loan, coordinated with the World Bank, as part of the special aid program to the poorest and more deeply in debt countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. He noted that everything was ready for the new Development Bank of Mali to which he wished good luck.

Dr N'Golo Traore, minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation, rejoiced over the excellence of the cooperation between France and Mali.

The minister stated that the French aid would cover sectors like agriculture, industry, mining and finances, and is part of the economic and social development policy defined by the party and the government.

He recalled that this agreement was the outcome of the personal steps taken by General Moussa Traore, secretary general of the party and president of the republic, to re-establish the BDM [Development Bank of Mali]. The agreement had been obtained during the chief of state's official visit to France between 3 and 9 April 1989.

**Niger**

**\* Internal Problems; 2d Republic Discussed**

34000766b London AFRICAN PREVIEW  
in English Aug 89 p 5

[Text] Niger will celebrate the 29th anniversary of independence from France engaged in laying the foundations for a return to civilian rule, the first civilian rule, called the "First Republic," collapsed when the late Hamani Diori was overthrown by General Seyni Kountche in a coup d'etat in April 1974. President Kountche ruled the country under a military regime until he died in November 1987. His successor President General Ali Saibou has, since taking over, been working towards a return to a new civilian government, the Second Republic.

Expected to direct efforts towards national recovery and development is the National Movement for a Society of Development (MNSD), which was formally inaugurated in May this year. The MNSD will be the only legal political party in the country. As the composition of the inaugural conference indicated, it intends to bring together in one political movement all classes, interests and tendencies in the country. The slogan of the party is "Consultation, Dialogue, and Participation," and one of its key objectives is "the consolidation of national unity." The party will be involved in all aspects of national life. It will initiate policy, elect members of the higher Council of National Orientation (CSON)—the most powerful organ of the party—and, on the proposal of the CSN, the president of the party who will be the sole presidential candidate in national presidential elections.

There will be a National Assembly which will pass legislation. The president and all deputies to the National Assembly will be elected by universal suffrage, but the list of candidates will be approved by the CSN. In addition to these bodies there will be the National Council of Development (CND) which can consider all social, economic and cultural legislation and may be consulted by the president, the president of the National Assembly, and the Supreme Military Council (CMS). The CMS is only one indication that the military will continue to play an important role in the new civilian regime: about one-third of the National Executive Bureau are military men.

If all goes according to plan the second republic will formally come into existence by the end of the year. In September the citizens of Niger will be asked to pronounce on the new constitution, elect their deputies and then, on 10 December, elect the sole presidential candidate: General Ali Saibou himself. Under the constitution the president is elected for a seven-year term and is eligible for re-election only once.

On the face of it, the official programme as sketched above, will run its course, but there is a rising underlying tribal tension in the country which may create difficulties for a transitional programme. When in November 1987 President Kountche died in hospital the power was transferred to his cousin Lt-Col Saibou, Chief of Staff of the armed forces. Ali Saibou belongs to the Kountche family in whom effective power in Niger is concentrated. And yet the presidential family are a minor aristocracy from the chieftancy of Fandou in the department of Filingue. Their tribe is Djerma, a mere 9 percent of the total population. The Hausa, who constitute over 56 percent of the population have been excluded from power because of their alleged links with their fellow tribesmen in Nigeria. The conflict between the Djerma and the Hausa is likely to increase under this new transitional arrangement which does not appear to take into account the imbalance in power sharing.

This transition will divert attention away from the effect of implementing a traditional IMF structural adjustment

programme. Niger has a population of only 7.25 million people giving it a low density of 5.2 persons per square kilometre. With a GDP [gross domestic product] of about £2.3bn and a GNP [gross national product] per capita of £320 Niger is one of Africa's poorest countries. Its main cash crop is onions although it also produces groundnuts and exports some beef. Its main food crops are sorghum and millet. Because of exceptionally good rains in 1988 it produced an abundance of these staple foods last season so that it will not need any food aid in 1989, as it had to do during the years of drought that persisted for nearly twenty years.

But apart from satisfactory food production the economy of Niger has not been doing well. The price of uranium, on which Niger depends for about 70 percent of export earnings, has fallen. In 1987 the country imported more than it exported and had a deficit of 40bn FCFA. It has a total foreign debt of £1.5bn (1987) on which it spent about 22 percent of its exports, which totalled 128bn FCFA in 1988, to service. For 1989 it plans to have a deficit budget—an estimated expenditure of 84.7bn FCFA and a projected revenue of 78bn FCFA, deficit of 6.7bn FCFA or about £22.33m.

## Nigeria

### \* Abuse of Decree 2 Seen as 'Scourge of People'

34000759a Ikeja *NEWSWATCH* in English  
31 Jul 89 pp 17-21

[Article by Etim Anim with Ely Obasi, John Ebri, Kolawole Ilori, Abdulrazaq Magaji, Akpa Edem, Janet Mba and Olanrewaju Olemoh.]

[Text] The decree has all but lost its full title. No one now seems to bother about its year of enactment. It is simply called Decree 2. Between 1984 and now, the powers wielded under its provisions have become so pervasive that its crisp name has assumed an identity of its own. Today, the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree, enacted in 1984 and amended in 1985, has taken on the shape of a monster before which the ordinary Nigerian trembles. It stomps the land like a colossus and even the courts and the constitution quake in its wake.

For that matter, everybody else, except the chief of general staff, CGS, the inspector-general of police, I-G, and the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria who signed the decree, is a potential victim of Decree 2. As Tunji Abayomi, president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of Nigeria, ATLN, puts it: "Decree 2 appears to be a law that protects the government at the expense of the nation because, except for the government, everyone of us is endangered."

The original decree, enacted by the government of Muhammadu Buhari, a major-general ousted as head of state August 1985, is a mere 448 words long, signed into law 8 February 1984, and backdated to 31 December 1983, the day Buhari and Co. seized power. But section

4 of the decree leaves nobody in doubt about its awesomeness: "No suit or other legal proceedings shall lie against any person for anything done or intended to be done in pursuance of this decree." In those 24 words, the authors of the decree at once ousted the jurisdiction of the courts and rendered irrelevant the most handy legal instrument for compelling the state to produce a detained person, the writ of habeas corpus.

The decree goes further to suspend chapter IV of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, specifically stating that "any question whether any provision thereof (i.e. of chapter IV) has been or is being or would be contravened by anything done or proposed to be done in the pursuance of this decree shall not be inquired into by any court of law and accordingly sections 219 and 259 of that constitution shall not apply in relation to any such question."

Chapter IV of the constitution sets out the fundamental human rights provisions; section 219 deals with "jurisdiction of the courts" while section 259 deals with "references of the question of law." In short, if ever there were any doubts as to the nature of a decree as the ultimate law in a military dictatorship, the provisions of Decree 2 have, without any equivocation, removed such doubts.

The Ibrahim Babangida administration adopted the Buhari decree, but amended it by Decree No. 12 of 1985 to vest the power of detention previously exercised by the chief of staff, Supreme Headquarters, in either the chief of general staff or the inspector-general of police. The government explained at the time that by vesting the authority in two persons, the arbitrariness associated with Tunde Idiagbon, erstwhile chief of staff, Supreme Headquarters, would be curbed. But surprisingly, that amendment of 23 May increased from three to six months the initial period for which a person might be held.

An expansion of the surprise by ATL's Abayomi cited earlier is that the fate of detainees has been placed in the hands of three people. Since the decree does not also define what is an infringement of state security, the power to determine who has committed such a breach rests with the CGS and I-G. So is the power to determine what constitutes a breach. The consequence is a reinforcement of the sweeping powers of the decree. Says Abayomi: "The law invests judicial powers on three men. It is an unjust law because the same people who accuse you also determine the enormity of guilt according to their dictates and it does not even make a provision for fair hearing for you as you would have been entitled to in a normal court of law."

Two senior journalists, Mohammed Haruna, former managing director of NEW NIGERIAN, and Felix Adenaike, editor-in-chief of THE TRIBUNE group, put it differently. Both see the decree as empowering the military to be prosecutor, judge and jury all at the same time. A Lagos lawyer, Abiodun Akinyemi, presses the

point by saying that it is only the CGS and the I-G "who can tell us what constitutes state security and breach of same" because the decree empowers them to detain a person when either is satisfied that the person is engaged in acts prejudicial to state security.

The lack of a definition by the decree of what constitutes an offence may mystify the decree and enhance its awesomeness but it does have its backlash. This was demonstrated, for instance, by the detention of Mohammed Bashir, a businessman said to be of questionable integrity. Whereas the government says Bashir is being detained as a security risk, Bashir, through an affidavit filed by lawyers, says he is being put where he cannot talk because of a disagreement over a business deal between him and Augustus Aikhomu, a vice-admiral and chief of general staff. It is the CGS's word against Bashir's. In the minds of a public which, as Mohammed Haruna argues, "is always inclined to believe the worst of those in power," the sympathy lies with Bashir.

The ambiguity of what constitutes an offence is also reflected in the disparate backgrounds of those who have been detained under the decree. The hoopla whipped up by the fate of the decree's latest known victim, Gani Fawehinmi, a Lagos lawyer, is merely a function of the status of the detainee. Fawehinmi has only gone to join other less known persons, ranging from newspaper reporters, students, businessmen and even foreigners. According to the Civil Liberties Organisation, CLO, a human rights watchdog group based on Lagos, it is impossible to determine the number of persons who have been detained under the decree since the inception of the Babangida administration. But the group's secretary, Clement Nwankwo, says there are currently in Lagos prisons alone 67 persons held under the decree (see box).

The wave of detentions, the fact that nobody says what crime a detainee has committed, the fact that courts cannot inquire into the causes of detention, the fact that the places of detention are not always known, the fact that no one knows how long a detained person may be held—in short, the stringent exercise of the powers conferred by the decree has engendered so much alarm that the CLO has had to go to court to seek certain declarations on the scope and extent of the decree.

The CLO contends that Decree 2 specifies that only those engaged in acts prejudicial to state security and economic adversity of the nation could be held under the decree's provisions which, it argues, are not applicable to many of the present detainees. The organisation, therefore, wants the court to pronounce on: whether it is open to a judge of the superior court in Nigeria to examine the reasons for the detention of persons under Decree 2 of 1984 as amended; ascertain if the conditions prescribed by the decree have been fulfilled; if the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, what is the proper order for the judge to make in the event that it be shown



that a person has been detained contrary to the conditions prescribed by the enabling decree; and such further or other incidental question or questions as the court of appeal may find necessary or determine in the circumstances.

In seeking a judicial pronouncement on the scope and extent of the decree, the CLO is pleading the jurisprudential position, articulated by Olatunji Braithwaite, that "it is elementary that if there is any conflict between the constitution of a country and any other law, the supremacy of the constitution is the law. The constitution prevails where there are inconsistencies between it and any other law, be it statutory or common law."

The CLO's action represents the collective concern of the people on the uses and abuses of Decree 2. Says Tai Solarin, the old teacher of Ikenne, himself a victim of the decree: "The decree is intended to crush the soul of any man apprehended under it. The decree is very primitive and any government that has respect for the people should have nothing to do with it."

Those who have gone to court have always come face to face with one simple declaration by the judge: the court has no jurisdiction. The fact that lawyers still go to court on behalf of detainees is but a mark of desperation, a dogged effort to keep their fate in the public mind lest they be forgotten. Olu Onagoruwa, a constitutional lawyer, believes in that strategy. He advised victims and their families not to fold their arms in despair but to continue to fight to ensure that Decree 2 is "destroyed by the judiciary, otherwise the decree will destroy the Nigerian society."

The present state of affairs is more perplexing because President Babangida came to power waving a human rights agenda, a dispensation that won his government immediate acclaim and support. Babangida's posture was the more impressive because, before he struck, the nation had been reeling under the iron fists of Buhari and Idiagbon. Their major weapon was Decree 2, backed by Decree 4, a.k.a. Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) Decree 1984.

According to Amnesty International, AI, the London-based human rights organisation, "over 500 former politicians and traders were detained in 1984, while another 150 were detained for suspected acts prejudicial to state security or having contributed to the economic depression of the nation." Within 24 hours of coming to power, Babangida abrogated Decree 4 which had, for 18 months, muzzled the press and sent two journalists to jail. Then the president offered state pardon to Ndaka Irabor and Tunde Thompson, the two journalists convicted under Decree 4. In short order, he flung open the doors of Nigerian Security Organisation, NSO, detention centres, released 87 detainees and set up a panel to study the cases of others.

The public responded with ovation and promptly conferred the title of a humanist government on the

Babangida administration. Some people called it a military government with a human face. Wrote THE GUARDIAN 10 September 1985: "The government's open declaration of emphasis on human rights, followed by the immediate release of some 87 detainees, has given a tremendous push to optimism, to the belief that the new government will be just and humane and that the necessary redress to the evils perpetrated by the Buhari regime will be swiftly accomplished."

Today, however, a huge question mark is hanging over the human rights claim of the administration. For instance, in professional journalism circles, the question is being asked whether the press is faring better now than it did under Decree 4. It is being argued that, under that decree, what constituted an offence were listed and the penalties on conviction stipulated. The state was compelled to take offenders to court and the procedure for doing that set out. In spite of the fact that the decree appeared tailor-made to send journalists to jail, there was, at least, a fighting chance. Not so under Decree 2. "I believe that Decree 2 inhibits the exercise by every Nigerian of the guaranteed freedom of expression through the press," says Adebayo Adejare, a resident of Lagos. Adds Akinyemi: "You find a journalist just writing an article which they (government) don't like. He is just picked up and detained."

The decree's provision that the appropriate authority should review a detainee's case after the initial six months is not even being complied with. For instance, a journalist with the WEEKLY METROPOLITAN newspaper, Tony Ukpog, has been in detention for more than 195 days. Femi Aborishade, editor of the LABOUR MILITANT, has not fared much better; he has been incarcerated for five months.

Ahmed Joda, a retired federal permanent secretary, offers a possible explanation for such long-term detentions. Joda told NEWSWATCH that the problem frequently lies with the day-to-day operators of the decree like policemen and SSS field agents. The CGS or the I-G may not even know who has been picked up in their names. It is a measure of the extent to which the decree can be abused. The police, for instance, has always had the proclivity to treat with levity the requirement that no suspect should be held for more than 24 hours without charge. But this proclivity appears to have been escalated by the existence of Decree 2. These days, no one is quite sure when or if a person is being detained under Decree 2. Suddenly, the country has all but returned to the harrowing days of 1984 and early 1985. "An atmosphere of fear," as Wole Soyinka pondered last year, "is replacing what once was openness."

What turned an administration that founded its legitimacy on human rights into what the Nigerian Bar Association, NBA, has labelled as a repressive regime? Does the regime, in fact, need Decree 2? Every government, be it military or civilian, has as its primary duty the maintenance of the security of the state. That is protecting the state against internal upheaval and

external threat. As the president said in his Id-El-Kabir message: "The government will not compromise the peace and stability of the country." No responsible government can. The citizens, in fact, feel more secure when they perceive that a government is capable of guaranteeing the security of the state by offering protection to life and property, by keeping down tension and by being in a position to ward off external threat.

The logic of the government is that to maintain that security, Decree 2 is an imperative. The president has argued that the decree is necessary to "ensure security of life" in what he sees as "an era characterised by crimes of violence at a rate unprecedented in our country's recent history... The government has a duty to face squarely the realities of the country's situation. To do otherwise is to bury our heads in the sand like the proverbial ostrich."

The president's position raises the question of what constitutes crimes against the state or a breach of the security of the state. Bola Ajibola, minister of justice and attorney-general, would not comment on the decree. But a spokesman of the I-G, Albert Afegbai, a commissioner of police, told NEWSWATCH that the police is not in a position to determine the criteria used in detaining people under Decree 2. "I am sure you know the responsibilities lie with the CGS," he said. Afegbai did offer the opinion, though, that anybody detained under the decree must be so detained because he or she is a security risk. He added: "If you do anything which is merely criminal, the police will just investigate and charge you to court. That is simple."

The police commissioner drew attention to a generally neglected point, rather ominous, which throws more light on what falls within the ambit of risk to national security. Said he: "For your information, all arms of the security forces have access to the use of Decree 2: customs, immigration, army air force, navy and the police."

But Akinola Aguda, jurist and National Merit Award winner, thinks that the security of the state has to do with the stability of the state system, and threat to the state system consists of acts which would normally amount to treason. "If people plot to overthrow a government or plot to raise an army to come and fight the country, that is treason," he said. That is an act prejudicial to the security of the state. Aguda emphasises that the law says it is by "overt acts," not merely by words, can the law hold a person liable of working against the security of the state. That position is supported by most legal practitioners.

They, however, argue vehemently that a law like Decree 2 has no place in the statute books of this country because there is a plethora of laws under our penal and criminal codes to deal with a wide array of crimes, even crimes against the state. Or laws to deal with torts like libel or sedition for which journalists may usually be called to answer. But Police Commissioner Afegbai insists that "there is a thin line between the law of

criminality and what passes for security risks. That is why, if we investigate a case and find that it borders on security, not crime per se, we turn such a person over to the SSS. Same applies to SSS."

The mood in the nation today points to an overwhelming desire to have Decree 2 scrapped. The Nigeria Union of Journalists, NUJ, the Nigerian Bar Association, the Association of Trial Lawyers of Nigeria, the Civil Liberties Organisation, as well as vocal individuals all want the decree abrogated. Said Adejare: "Let us demonstrate a practical adherence to the rule of law by revoking Decree 2 which not hangs like the Sword of Damocles over the head of every freedom-loving Nigerian." Haruna's articulation sums up the mood of those who wish the government well: "...Retaining the decree seems to me unwise because it detracts from its (the administration's) laudable human rights policy without necessarily checking its enemies in the long run and, perhaps, even in the short-term."

But a retired army brigadier disagrees. The one-star general who pleaded anonymity says "there's nothing happening in Nigeria which has not happened before... When a government passes a law, it is all encompassing, not just singling out one type of situation. It broadens the horizon of the law." He traces Decree No. 2 to J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, the first military head of state. Babangida agrees: "The decree has always been in existence. It was there 1975 through 1979. Such laws are in almost all countries of the world, including developed countries," he told NEWSWATCH December 1985.

History is on the side of the two men. The origin of such laws seems to lie in the desire to acquire special powers which protect operators from the civilities of democratic constitutions. For instance, in the early sixties, the federal government had to take emergency powers and introduce the Preventive Detention Act to deal with the Action Group crisis. It is the same logic that informs the use of decrees as laws. The logic is even more compelling for a military government which is not, either by definition or nature, a democratic government. All military rulers probably swear by Niccolo Machiavelli's little book, *THE PRINCE*, where the man says "to be feared gives more security than to be loved." Therefore, the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree is designed to confer military governments with the capability to protect themselves against counter-coups or insurrection.

Afegbai puts it this way, quoting Chike Ofodile, the attorney-general and commissioner for justice who drafted the decree: "For anybody to rule Nigeria successfully, such a person needs Decree 2." He argues that though this administration came in with a human rights posture, it will not be right if it folds its hands and let the nation crumble on its head. "There must be law and order in any society. Our's can't be an exception."

However, the history of military rule in Nigeria shows that the earlier military governments used detention of

persons decrees to keep in check specific persons who were believed, in the prevailing circumstances, to be capable of threatening the stability of the inchoate military government. Thus, Aguiyi-Ironsi's State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree 1966 or Decree No 3 of 1966, signed 8 February, was meant to authorise the detention of certain politicians of the First Republic listed by name in the decree itself. Because it did not have the blanket authority of today's Decree 2, a new decree had to be signed every time more persons were to be detained, leading to the promulgation of, at least, 16 such decrees under which about 54 persons were held. By the same token, revocation decrees had to be promulgated for the release of detainees. The Yakubu Gowon government adopted a similar pattern. Four state security (detention of persons) decrees are on the statute books of this country under which Gowon detained some 24 persons. In spite of the fact that Gowon ruled the country in the shadows of a civil war, the government did not enact one all-powerful decree.

The issue then seems to be the exercise of powers under the decree. As Babangida himself observed: "when we had the decree between 1975 and 1979, it was used only once in those four years. I think it was the arbitrary use of the decree by the last regime that brought about the real worries. It should not be used unless it is absolutely necessary—where the security of the state is being threatened."

It can be argued that it is the president's deep concern "for the security of the nation" that has produced a conflict with his human rights motivations. A study of the president's speeches reveal that they are replete with worries about security of life and security of the nation. People grant the government the right to be tough on law breakers and the duty to protect the integrity of the nation. All they seem to be saying is that if Decree 2 must be, it should be reserved for "acts, overt or covert, likely to lead to the overthrow of government." Normal transgressions against the state, Aguda says, should be dealt with under the laws which are already there.

Abrogating the decree, or restricting its use, will remove the climate of fear that has enveloped the land and created a 'they-against-us' syndrome between the people and the government. That climate of fear was forcefully brought home as NEWSWATCH worked to put this story together. Very few Nigerians were willing to offer opinions on Decree 2. Government officials hedged, while ordinary citizens declined outright.

Pronouncing on the offences of detainees will also help to bring down the tension that has been hanging tough since the riots of May. Aguda argues that "everybody is afraid. There is alarm within the populace as to how Decree 2 is being used and that alarm can be reduced or eliminated by bringing some of them (detainees) to trial in a very short while." He argues that the people will then know who has done what and those engaged in acts against the state are unlikely to have the sympathy of the ordinary folks.

Sam Ikoku, a veteran of detention centres, says there must be an attempt to make a case against a detainee: "The government, because of intelligence available to it, may know that I am planning something dangerous; the public doesn't know that. So the government says, 'Ikoku, we'll take you in.' The public says, 'why do you take this man in?' The only way the government can let itself off the hook is to charge me formally. If, in the process, they show that I was really up to something, the public will say, 'let him pay the penalty.' If the government doesn't do that, the public will feel they don't have any real evidence to produce in court."

The chief executive of a Lagos-based publication offered the view that if the federal government could go public immediately with a matter as grave as the Vatsa coup plot, he sees no logic in the hush-hush manner in which offences of Decree 2 detainees are handled. He will like to see a situation where individual offences are spelt out clearly and openly.

Soyinka once counselled that "the federal military government should rule by reason and dialogue rather than by tyranny." For "tyranny and oppression," as President Babangida once said, "is bad if you happen to be on the underside." Both the Nobel laureate and the president are on the same side on ruling by reason and dialogue. Said the president at Kuru in 1988: "Let Nigerians maintain the admirable posture of being vocal and assertive over matters affecting their liberties. The pursuit of liberty is altruistic, because a lofty heritage will then be passed on to posterity. Freedom goes hand in hand with a healthy well-developed public opinion." A Lagos lawyer puts it another way: "In view of our needs as a developing nation, frank and open discussion of matters of public interest ought to be encouraged."

The dread of Decree 2 can hardly promote such a culture. Instead, in the words of Haruna, "it can only cow many who would want to offer honest advice to the government, while it remains ineffective against government's real detractors."

#### \* Critics, Supporters Debate SAP Merits

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[Article by Soji Akinrinade with Dare Babarinsa, Etim Anim, Stephen Agwudagwu, Joseph Ode, Abiola Oloke, Godson Ukpevo, Janet Mba and Hycinth Elueme. First paragraph is introduction.]

[Text] "Alternatives, and particularly desirable alternatives only grow on imaginary trees."—Saul Bellow, 1944

President Ibrahim Babangida has a sympathiser in Saul Bellow and is probably an ardent supporter of and believer in the American's school of thought, at least as far as economic matters go. For three years, Babangida and the officials of his government have been drumming it into the ears of Nigerians that the economic path they have chosen, the Structural Adjustment Programme,



SAP, is the best in the circumstance and has no alternatives. The president re-emphasised this dogma last 5 June in Abuja, when he told his foremost constituents—the soldiers—that the "...Structural Adjustment Programme is the only alternative we have if we are to reduce Nigeria's total dependence on oil as its foreign exchange earner. It must also be understood that the task of correcting the accumulated errors of almost three decades cannot be achieved in one fell swoop. It calls for patience, perseverance and determination. This administration is committed to the programme because there is no viable alternative."

Samuel Aluko, a renowned professor of economics and member of NEWSWATCH Board of Economists, not only says that SAP is "really a financial mal-adjustment programme," but adds that people "blaspheme economics by saying there is no alternative to SAP, when economic science is the science of alternatives, the logic of choice. A policy contrivance that has no alternatives is not an economic contrivance. It is chimera, magic or mystery. There is alternative even to death, which is living. SAP is a kiss of death." Aluko also said that "unless the Babangida administration changes course from SAP, it will never revamp Nigeria's economy, no matter how hard it tries."

Aluko may be right. A report on the workability of the economic programme up to 1993, prepared by the Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU, of London, released last month, provides only very cold comfort. The prediction of the unit is that the economy would only "stumble forward" during the early 1990s, principally because of the ripples of the expected slow-down of the world economy in 1990. The slowdown would lead to further oil market price declines. Prices are expected to average \$14.5 per barrel in 1990 and 1991, slightly rising to \$15.5 per barrel in 1992 and \$17 per barrel in 1993. This will definitely compound the problems of foreign exchange receipts from the most important sector of the economy.

Not only this, prices of exportable agricultural commodities are also expected to keep falling during the period, further reducing receipts from non-oil sources. Purchasing power will fall further, notably for urban population, in the next three years, and inflation, which is not 45 percent, will remain high and only fall to about 20 percent between 1992 and 1993. Worse still, the average exchange rate of the naira, already a touchy issue among Nigerians, is expected to be 13.8 to the dollar in 1992 and N16 to the dollar in 1993. At the parallel market, it is expected to be N22 to the dollar in 1992.

Such poor economic indices make talks of alternatives to the government's programme more credible now than ever before. In fact, since the student riots, induced by the ravaging effects of SAP, late May and early June this year, the debate on what alternatives there are has dominated the national life. A conference on alternatives to the programme organised by a group of Nigerian radicals and fixed for 17 June was aborted by security

officials. The attempt led to the detention of Gani Fawehinmi, a Lagos lawyer, Tai Solarin, a leading social critic, and Michael Imoudu, who were at the venue of the conference, were also detained, but only briefly.

No matter, the crux of the clamour for alternatives, as some economists see it, is that the overall economic objectives that President Babangida has set for his administration, laudable as they are, are hardly achievable because they are being pursued with the wrong policy, SAP.

When Babangida took over power in August 1985, it was crystal clear that the economy was in such a mess that something had to be done fast. The president was also aware of the political cost of taking the International Monetary Fund, IMF, loan, hence he asked Nigerians to debate the issue. Following the rejection of the IMF loan, a 15-month economic emergency period was declared during which a stabilisation programme was introduced. The president and his men put a 30 percent levy on imports, imposed a 2 to 20 percent economy recovery levy on workers, removed 80 percent subsidy from petroleum and extended the wage freeze.

The stabilisation programme had little impact on the economy. The president admitted in July 1986 that the performance of the programme was mixed as it was adversely affected by reduced oil receipts and slow non-oil export promotion. Urban unemployment grew and the much needed credit lines to facilitate the importation of raw materials to keep the wheels of industry turning were not forthcoming. Nigerian creditors could not swallow its rejection of the IMF loan and as a result, the nation's credit rating dropped from about 55 percent in 1980 to about 24 percent by March 1986. All this resulted in Nigeria's inability to reschedule its huge external debt. The stage was set for tougher economic measures.

So, in July 1986, a structural adjustment programme, supervised by the officials of the World Bank and the IMF was introduced. As designed by government, SAP has focused on four major areas: finding the true value of the naira; overcoming public sector inefficiency through improved public expenditure programme and the speedy rationalisation of parastatals; relieving the debt burden through a comprehensive rescheduling of the nation's medium- and long-term debts; and encouraging a net inflow of foreign capital, while keeping a lid on foreign loans.

To achieve these goals, government, over the past three years, set up S(FEM) [Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market], now (IFEM), for the auctioning of the naira in order to find its true level; abolished import licensing system; liberalised trade and removed controls from the economy. It has also steadily tightened monetary and fiscal policies, deregulated interest rates and waged vigorous campaigns for non-oil exports. By 1988, it started its commercialisation and privatisation programme and

introduced debt equity swap to the nation's debt management. To further encourage import substitution and search locally for raw materials, government not only banned the importation of such items as maize, rice, wheat and malt, it also put in place, by early this year, a new industrial policy which took into account the needs of local industries.

On the positive side, government officials, including Babangida, Olu Falae, secretary to government, and Augustus Aikhomu, a vice-admiral and chief of general staff, have credited the adjustment programme for putting Nigeria on the road to economic self-reliance. Falae, for example, is always quick to point out that the agricultural sector has benefited immensely from the programme. He attributes this to the abolition of the commodity boards and the removal of controls in the sector.

According to Falae, by 1986, when government launched the structural adjustment programme, Nigeria was only exporting about 80,000 tonnes of cocoa, but the figure increased to about 240,000 tonnes by last year. Falae told a group of senior journalists at DAILY TIMES early this month that "what we've seen is farmers simply going back to the farms because of the better prices they are getting for their produce, and they have virtually doubled the production of cocoa." Of course, the ban on rice, maize and wheat is also touted as a success because it has enhanced local production of such crops. Added to this is what government sees as the tremendous improvement in the average rate of capacity utilisation. It was about 20 percent in 1986, but Falae says it has now increased to 50 percent. Then there is the successful rescheduling of a huge chunk of the nation's \$30 billion external debt by teams of officials led by both Chu Okongwu, minister of finance and economic development, and Abubakar Alhaji, minister of state for budget and planning.

However, it is the failure of the programme in so many areas that has made the search for alternative options very attractive. For example, three years after the devaluation of the naira started through its auctioning at the foreign exchange market, its true value has still not been found. The naira, which in 1986 sold at 1.2 to the dollar, by last week was 7.1 to the dollar. It has been devalued by up to 80 percent of its original value. By auctioning the Nigerian currency, cost of importing raw materials has increased for industries, a factor that has led to the ever-increasing factory-gate prices of finished products. The consumers bear the brunt. And as Falae himself has admitted, such increases tend to go right down the line. Even prices of food items have risen sharply in the past three years, more so in the first half of 1989. Chukwue-meka Odumegwu-Ojukwu put it well in 1987: "In the past, you needed a pocketful of naira to bring home a basketful of goods, now you seem to need a basketful of naira in order to bring back a pocketful of goods." The situation holds true, even more so today.

Other areas of failure include the high inflation rate that has been unleashed on the economy since the programme came into being. According to Central Bank figures, inflation rose to 45 percent during the first quarter of the year. Probably, one of the most controversial kernels of the programme is the removal of subsidy on the price of petrol. It was done in early 1986 and in 1987 when marginal subsidy removal led to riots in many Nigerian universities. In 1989, a two-tier pricing system was introduced, allowing old prices from commercial vehicles and nearly 50 percent increase for private vehicles. Rather than stabilise things, the increase led to general increases in prices of goods and services throughout the economy. Ironically, SAP has never definitively addressed the issue of wages of workers. Minimum wage remains at the rate of N125 a month.

Furthermore, many economists reason that SAP has not improved the balance of payments position substantially, while terms of trade have actually worsened, since more is paid for imported inputs than is received for exports. Also, the much touted inflow of foreign participation has not really materialised. Only multilateral and bilateral assistance have trickled in. Private investment is yet to come in. Within the country itself, the deregulation of the banking sector has led to high interest rates and generally high cost of capital, which most economists say surely stunts growth. There have been massive retrenchment within the economy.

The situation has been such that a group of 15 eminent personalities, led by Helmut Schmit, former chancellor of West Germany, and including Olusegun Obasanjo, former Nigerian leader; Pierre Elliott Trudeau, former Canadian prime minister; and Paul Volker, former chairman of the United States Reserve Bank, took a dim view of the structural adjustment programme. A report prepared by the group and released last month said: "...Their (IMF, World Bank) imposition and supervision of adjustment policies focused mainly on cuts in government expenditure and money growth, reduction in imports and devaluation of the recipient country's currency. But while these policies may have improved the balance of payments, they may have been formulated too narrowly to lead to growth, penalising, in some cases, the poorest segments of society and causing, in turn, social and political unrest."

It is, indeed, the social cost of SAP that appeared to have got most critics up in arms against the programme. Leftists, for example, regard SAP as a capitalist manifesto which cannot be given a human face and which is inherently anti-people. The "Ife Collective," a group of lecturers at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, writing in THE GUARDIAN 30 June, said: "For SAP to work, people's resistance to and struggle against hunger, unemployment, injustice (social and economic), abdication by government of its responsibility for the welfare of the citizenry, exploitation and the mortgage of the future of our children through the debt trap—all these must be prevented by the rulers at all costs." Of course, the

lecturers, Dapo Fasina, G.G. Darah, Idowu Awopetu, Toye Olorode, Kayode Adetugbo and Segun Osoba, are convinced that Babangida's economic programme cannot do this.

They have, therefore, proposed a socialist alternative, which they say will put "all economic power in the hands of the people who produce the wealth of the nation." Fasina told NEWSWATCH last week that the socialist alternative would be tagged the national economic reconstruction programme and will "socialise all major means of production." In order to deal with the issue of the value of the naira, the socialists will operate a two-tier market. One tier will be tied to such necessary products as food, clothing, etc., while the other will be tied to other transactions. The tier tied to food importation will be pegged at a specific rate which will be lower than the rate for the second tier. Said Fasina: "The advantage of this is that it is going to enable us to deal more with the food problem." Furthermore, the socialists are also proposing that Nigeria's production should be geared more towards internal market, rather than what they call "import substitution or production for export." The "Ifé Collective," for example, say that the internal market is big enough and that production should be geared towards it as "this is the only way to guarantee a self-reliant economy."

To do this, however, the group envisages a land reform which will provide land for people to produce agricultural goods. While government would help the producers with machinery, it will require that whatever is produced is sold at a certain price to the state. The middleman, the bane of the current system, would be eliminated. No big time farmers would be allowed.

The socialist alternative is also expected to focus on small-scale industry which it thinks is not properly addressed now. There would be no interference in the running of such businesses except that they would be expected to be geared towards the needs of the larger society. Privatisation would not be allowed but those parastatals which have the potential for profit making will be allowed to do so. Foreign trade would be controlled by the state and would be basically south-south rather north-south. Trade priority would, therefore, be with countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa "who share the same problems with us."

Full employment is another major plank of the socialist alternative. Said Fasina: "When we socialise the economy, take over foreign trade and replace import substitution with intensive production internally, we would be creating employment opportunities in this country." Multinationals would be allowed to exist in the system but at a price. They would be required to invest as much as 50 percent of their profits in a national development fund.

Eskor Toyo, a professor at the University of Calabar and a socialist, sees the road to self-reliance and possible total economic independence as depending on technological

advancement. He believes that the Ajaokuta steel projects, for example, should be completed. "Why don't we look for money even from the devil and finish the project?" he asks.

What some economists fear about the socialist alternative, however, is that it seems to be based on utopia and is not in touch with the reality of modern economics. Some government officials, too, see the Nigerian socialists as behind time. Developments in the traditional socialist states, they argue, indicate that those countries are now opening their societies more to the influence of capitalism because of the failure of their systems. Akin Oyebo, a lecturer of international law and jurisprudence at the University of Lagos, however, urges a thorough understanding of the Eastern nations before sweeping assertions are made. "In these countries, the basic issues have been solved, so they can afford now to tinker with the international capital market. They can afford to relax their controls. Nigeria is not Soviet union or China. It still needs to build the basis for its economy. It has to create infrastructure to launch this country towards industrial age," he said.

There are other alternatives. One is a modified form of the national economic reconstruction programme which the "Ifé Collective" want. The programme is proposed by Bade Onimode of the University of Ibadan who says that African economies need no adjustment but transformation and recovery. According to him, to adjust an economy is to return it to a position of a balance of equilibrium. However, since African economies are under-developed and are in a state of imbalance, they cannot be returned to a balance of equilibrium that they have never reached in the first place.

For the national reconstruction programme, NRP, to work, objectives would be set for 3, 5, 10 and 20 years and would be strictly adhered to. One of the first things that the programme would do is return the country to a regime of fixed exchange rate. This decision, according to Onimode, would be based on the economic theory that small countries in the world trade should operate a fixed exchange rate to minimise the shocks of the international trade. The naira, he said, would be pegged at 2.5 to the dollar, but reviewed periodically.

The NRP will advocate a system of managed trade rather than trade liberalisation as contained in SAP. Whereas a few products have been banned under SAP, a whole category of imports that can be produced in this country would be banned. "In addition to outright ban, there will also be a need to place a very clear limitation on the amount of imports that we can afford to pay for. You don't buy other people's goods when you have no money to pay for them." To promote the programme, the open policy of trade promotion that led to the export of Nigeria's staple food crops, before they were banned temporarily, would be changed to selective export promotion. What this means is that only those items that Nigeria can produce in surplus would be so promoted for exportation.



Said Onimode: "It is important to recognise that when people talk about export promotion, they assume that the market for those goods is always there. That is not true. First, there are trade restrictions against the export of primary products. Secondly, various substitutes, e.g. synthetic fibres, are now being produced to replace our primary export. And so, in those circumstances, you find that the export market for our primary products is shrinking." In such a situation of falling demand, increases in supply from developing world would only lead to an inescapable result: disastrous price fall.

Apart from advocating full employment through the redeployment of labour and the use of the informal sector, NRP will also put other measures in place. It will abolish expatriate quotas and deny even the ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] citizens work until every able-bodied Nigerian is able to get a job. It will also take small-scale enterprise more seriously by creating a separate bank for its operations. "If we do those things, it will not only be possible to limit the retrenchment of workers but to find alternative jobs for those millions of our citizens roaming the streets," said Onimode.

The economic policy would frown at the withdrawal of subsidy which Onimode thinks is misguided. His conviction is based on the fact that most of the countries recommending its withdrawal maintain subsidies in their economies. The United States, for example, maintains massive subsidy on agriculture. So does the European Economic Community, EEC, under the common agricultural policy, CAP. The issue, therefore, would be to look at the withdrawal of subsidy selectively, on the basis of the observed priorities of the country. In other words, it would be necessary to bring back the commodity boards.

Onimode sees the idea of privatisation as absurd since the indigenous private sector which is expected to benefit is very weak. In fact, he thinks that privatisation under SAP is an invitation to foreigners to take a greater control of the Nigerian economy. Besides, there are parastatals that are already profitable in which government does not need to divest its interest. "There is nothing in economic theory or in politics that says that government can't make profit." Onimode's policy has another grouse against privatisation. It notes that the Margaret Thatcher experience with privatisation in Britain has failed. "Britain today has the highest level of unemployment in Western Europe and the highest rates of inflation and interest. It has now recorded its worst balance of payments in its entire history—under Thatcher's privatisation," added Onimode. The alternative, therefore, is the rationalisation of public enterprises. They should be divided into two, those that are purely commercial and can compete and those, such as public utilities, that should not be run on the basis of profit, but on the basis of cost recovery.

The national recovery programme sees the SAP-induced high rate of interest as wrong because, in economic

theory, a situation of massive unemployment actually demands lower rate of interest to make it cheap for people to borrow money, invest and create employment opportunities. According to Onimode, the apostles of SAP claim that there is a need for positive rate of interest in order to increase savings and encourage capital inflow. "But the evidence is that this high rate of interest has not increased anything because savings depend mostly on the level of income and not on the rate of interest." Since the level of income is low, there is consequently no allowance for savings. Instead of capital inflow, what obtains is capital flight, mostly through non-oil exports.

And just as the socialists have proposed, Onimode's programme would also tackle the land issue through a reform of the present system. He believes that the problems can be solved only if Nigerians can have access to land anywhere in the country. The programme would also introduce a more effective taxation system to make sure that wealthy Nigerians who now pay next to nothing contribute more to the economy.

To Aluko, however, SAP appears to deal more with "manipulating the exchange rate value of the naira than in structurally transforming the Nigerian economy from essentially primary producing to an industrial one, from essentially exporting primary products to mostly local processing to increase value added and thus create more jobs." The professor bases his conclusion on the wrong policy of privatising the economy, "the avalanche of retrenchment, retirement and rationalisation of labour in all sectors of the economy, public and private," and the low naira exchange rate of imported input.

Said Aluko in a lecture he delivered at the Nigerian Institute of Management, NIM, Lagos, in December 1987: "It does not appear to me that we are engaged yet in the real structural adjustment, but only in the illusory search for the real exchange rate of the naira and in a sudden unrealistic and unplanned attempt to source local raw materials for diminishing industries."

Aluko's alternative:

(i) emphasise full and gainful employment of all human and material resources in Nigeria and stop retrenchment, retirement and rationalisation of productive labour;

(ii) control and regulate the activities of the operators in the Nigerian economy rather than leave them to market forces;

(iii) collectivise rather than privatise the economy and find the correct *modus operandi* for making public enterprises pay;

(iv) reduce cost of loanable funds to increase incentive to invest;

(v) curb the activities of foreign entrepreneurs, including foreign governments, the IMF, the World

Bank and their minions, in the operations of the Nigerian economy and have endogenous rather than exogenous control of the economy;

(vi) abolish FEM (IFEM) and operate a managed currency system through which true and realistic exchange rate of the naira can be determined and sustained (Aluko advocates the replacement of the naira with a new one, "Nigeriana." Two present naira should exchange for one new naira); and

(vii) stop all foreigners from operating in the export market and nationalise the external trade.

While Aluko sees the obsession with the value of the naira as the greatest disservice that has been done to the economy, Ashikiwe Adione-Egom, a radical economist and publisher of FINANCIAL POST, is an advocate of nationalised capitalism, to achieve what he terms the capitalist alternative to SAP. He believes that the problem with SAP is its internationalisation, which makes Nigeria "more dependent on the market convertible currencies of the north." His own alternative encourages Nigeria to trade primarily with those nations whose exports to Nigeria "contribute positively towards increased domestic production and domestic localisation of value added in consumption and production." He advocates the use of counter-trade and the setting up of two central banks to achieve this. One would cater for the financial system or domestic exchanges for short-, medium- and long-term financial instrument, while the second will supervise the domestic and international exchanges for short-, medium, and long-term domestic and internal contracts for goods and services.

What probably should worry the Babangida administration more is the fact that apart from local critics, the Economic commission for Africa, ECA, last week launched what it called the African alternative to SAP because of the unworkability of the system (SAP) in Africa. In its report, ECA criticises SAP and says: "In the African situation, the simple truth is that many countries have moved toward freer markets without being in position to take full advantage of available market opportunities because of low capacity to adjust their fragile production structures. The consequences of these structural rigidities are evident in many areas but most notably in the limited capacities of African farmers to respond to price incentives without assured supplies of relevant production inputs; in the failure of domestic production to respond to new opportunities in export and import markets, following a currency devaluation, because of a myriad of technical and supply difficulties; and in the slow response of savings to high interest rates. These rigidities imply that the main burden of adjustment has been borne by drastic reductions in domestic expenditures, with serious economic and social consequences that have tended in many cases to retard rather than promote the process of structural transformation."

ECA is therefore, encouraging an alternative adjustment with transformation which focuses on employment generation for the majority of the population, equitable income distribution, especially to household and vulnerable groups, and the satisfaction of the essential needs of the people. The alternative hopes to reform such SAP measures as: "drastic budgetary reductions, especially with respect to expenditures and subsidies in social services and essential goods, indiscriminate promotion of traditional exports; across-the-board credit squeeze, general devaluation through open foreign exchange markets, currency auctions and large and frequent currency depreciations; unsustainably high real interest rates; total import liberalisation; excessive dependence on market forces for getting the 'price right' in structurally distorted and imperfect market situations, and doctrinaire privatisation." The end result of the reforms would be to make transformation programmes more responsive to African needs.

No matter, the Babangida administration may take comfort in the fact that its own alternative has responded to some of the measures its critics are proposing. It may also take comfort in the fact that there are many economists who see SAP as the realistic approach to the nation's problems. As Abubakar Abdulkadir, managing director, Nigerian Industrial Development Bank, NIDB, and a member of NEWSWATCH Board of Economists told the magazine's editors two weeks ago, it is difficult to abandon SAP now. Rather, "what could be done, I think, is to reduce its pace. When the pace of implementation of the policies is reduced, the pains could be cushioned."

Gbenga Akinawo, managing director of African Paints, agrees. He says what SAP needs is fine-tuning. He says, for example, that the exchange rate of N3 to one dollar is the compromise rate at which most economic objectives will be satisfied. Boniface Chizea, an economic analyst in Lagos, too, thinks the economy has reached a stage where the exchange rate should not be absolutely determined by market forces. He suggests a short-term fixing of rates.

What perplexes most critics of SAP, however, is the inequitable distribution of its gains. In a country where it is gradually becoming difficult for people to eat, million-naira houses are springing up everyday on the "millionaires' row" at New Maroko Road in Lagos. Solarin sees such a development as incompatible with the realities of the economy. He attributes this to undiscipline on the part of the leaders. Such a situation in which wealth is openly flaunted, say the critics, would have to change, if Nigerians are to continue to bear the pains of SAP.

But for whatever it is worth, the government would no longer have control over the economy when it leaves in 1992. It cannot legislate how the economy should be run, except by leaving some useful guidelines. As Aluko said last week, "we have a right to run the country the best

way we know, and not the way another person thinks." Critics of SAP may yet have the last laugh.

#### \* Aminu Overruled Over Universities Closure

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[Text] Professor Jibril Aminu, Minister of Education, nearly lost his job while pleading with the government not to close any university in the country.

The Chief of General Staff, Vice-Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, disclosed this yesterday while briefing media executives on the activities of government in the last quarter, at Dodan Barracks, Lagos.

He told media barons who had been led to believe that Professor Jibril was the architect of the long closure order that "the Minister of Education, Aminu, nearly lost his job on this issue because, he did not want any university closed."

Vice-Admiral Aikhomu's exoneration of the education minister confirmed the defence of Professor Aminu by the President's spokesman, Chief Duro Onabule, who had earlier said "it was erroneous and unfair to blame the education minister for the severity of the punishment."

Thus unknown to his critics and antagonists, Professor Aminu had staked all at his disposal to ensure that sanity prevailed, but lost out because of the level of violence and destruction of private and public property by students and other irresponsible elements.

Justifying the hard decision of government, the Chief of General Staff said it was because the students started the demonstrations that undesirable elements got the opportunity to unleash mayhem on the society.

Vice-Admiral Aikhomu maintained that if the students had not started the wild demonstrations, "there would not have been that destruction of lives and property."

He said the decision of government was made to teach a lesson, "so that from these measures this type of thing won't happen next time because the government cannot be stampeded into certain decisions."

During the May riots, hundreds of criminals serving life jail terms and condemned armed robbers were freed by their colleagues from the Benin prison.

The same situation was reenacted in Lagos where all manner of criminals were freed by their colleagues and they proceeded to vandalise public and private property.

#### \* Abacha Advocates Continuation of SAP Policy

34000741a Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English  
7 Jul 89 pp 1, 3

[Article by Bala Mohammediolu Adebayo, Kaduna]

[Text] The Chief of Army Staff, Lt General Sani Abacha, has said it would be self-destructive to abandon the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) midway.

In a message on the occasion of the Nigerian Army Day celebration yesterday read by the General Officer Commanding (GOC), One Mechanised Division, Major-General Sani Sami, General Abacha said: "SAP is one of the surest means for the nation to achieve self-reliance."

He said in the spirit of SAP, the Nigerian Army had, like other sectors of the nation's economy "virtually avoided procurement of new military hardwares."

The implication of this, he added, called for better protection, storage, servicing of arms, ammunition and equipment under soldiers' care.

General Abacha said the sacrifices made by the soldiers in their resort to improvisation, thereby facilitating the extension of the life span of vehicles and weapons at this time of scarcity of resources, was highly commendable.

He said the calm exhibited by the soldiers reaffirmed the high standard of discipline in the Nigerian Army and implored them to remain calm, loyal and law-abiding under such circumstances. "You must continue to manifest this good example of character to our civilian brothers and sisters," he added.

He praised officers and men of the Nigerian Army for keeping "their heads against all provocations by criminals and rioters during the recent anti-SAP riots" and expressed happiness that despite the hardships the loyalty of the soldiers has remained unshaken.

The Chief of Army Staff noted that the Nigerian Army had continued to play an important and effective role in other aspects of our national life, in addition to its primary duties.

He said such duties ranged from countering economic sabotage to others assigned by the government.

He said it was reassuring to note that soldiers had lived up to these duties, "especially in containing illegal exportation and adulteration of petroleum products and smuggling."

"In the years ahead, the requirement for the Nigerian Army to be assigned such duties will be on the increase," General Abacha remarked.

On training, General Abacha expressed satisfaction with the current trend in this area and called for continued improvement in standards.



"As a citadel of trained manpower which emphasises rationality, efficiency and administration in our daily life, our training must inculcate in us all qualities that are relevant to our professional and national duties," he said.

He also expressed satisfaction with the achievement so far in the area of welfare which he had promised to give "special consideration" during last year's celebration.

Key areas of improvement include the replacement of 'bashes' with permanent living accommodation, rehabilitation of barracks, supply of drugs and equipment to military hospitals, provision of water, electricity, roads and vehicles, services which are complimentary to the existing welfare programmes like the army benevolent fund, Nigerian Army Welfare Insurance Scheme (NAWIS) and the housing loan scheme.

### Senegal

#### \* PIT Move Weakens Opposition, Fortifies PS

34190297b Dakar LE DEVOIR in French  
1-15 Jul 89 p 2

[Article by Pathe Mbodje: "Wade the Oracle Not Amused at Losing Muse"]

[Text] With Apollonian aplomb, Wade the oracle predicted that Diouf's efforts to gain and maintain influence over the ex-trio—now reduced to a duo—would quickly lead to his fall; but nothing happened, and that began to feed doubts, at least within the PIT [Party for Independence and Labor]. Perhaps, after all, his crystal ball was not so clear.... Ever since the elections, the PIT and PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] have been wrestling with such major disagreements that the Sopi [PDS slogan meaning "change"] alliance has been reaching lower and lower for a common denominator in an effort to save appearances.

Doubt became open suspicion when Dansokho flatly refused to involve himself in blind, gratuitous violence. That brought things to the breaking point, and the crisis was aggravated by the pro-Diouf consensus that came out of the Mauritanian crisis, when the PIT leader was received at his request by Diouf. At this point Wade, whom Diouf politely but firmly rebuffed, is probably ready to give his eyeteeth for an audience.

In fact, PIT had been distancing itself from Wade ever since 12 October 1988.

That was the day Amath Dansokho gave a press conference at which he urged students to go back to their classrooms, "even though we cannot force them to do so." Add the fact that Dansokho had already been shouting from the rooftops that PIT could as easily be a fireman as a pyromaniac, and the difference between Wade and Dansokho becomes clear: one was determined to be objective in its relations with the authorities, while

the other was presenting itself as the inevitable solution to the crisis born of the February 1988 elections.

To make things even more complicated, Dansokho was received by Diouf on 22 July 1988, under circumstances in which Wade doubtless would have preferred to be the president's sole interlocutor. And while never forgetting that "we are united and bound tightly to the PDS" (in the Sopi alliance), the PIT secretary general nonetheless continued to give out warnings, some clear and others veiled, against "attempts to destabilize the government."

All the same, there are unanswered questions about Dansokho's new position.

The fact that until now the PIT never said a word about its "diverse disagreements" with Wade after the elections lends itself readily to misunderstandings, while Wade's press attacks indicate that PIT's departure is more deeply resented than he lets on.

Most of all, the fact that PIT has exploited an external crisis to broaden Diouf's base of support with the addition of a "significant" opposition party would tend to suggest an attempt to find a different solution to the domestic political crisis, which the Mauritanian issue temporarily obscured.

In other words, once the wave of anti-"nar" [translation unknown] hatred died down, Amath Dansokho and his comrades could revise their strategy toward the regime, a strategy that had bound them to the Sopi locomotive. It is true that this strategy always excluded resorting to violence, as Dansokho is ready to tell anyone. If he needs to, he can show you a document from 1985 that says so in so many words.

All things considered, the PIT-PDS dispute seems, at first glance, a conflict between hyperactive political opportunism and a more thoroughly considered and level-headed strategy for coming to power over the longer term.

#### Distrust and Defection

After having embraced and fervently practiced the Sopi "religion," Dansokho and PIT have apostatized. Defrocked, they no longer believe in the prophet Abdoulaye Wade, who over time has perhaps become heretical, paranoid, almost ready for a padded cell. They had talks with the PS [Socialist Party] without first getting approval from their partners. Suddenly they were excluded from the so-called "significant" opposition, according to the joint communique put out by the LD [Democratic League] and the PDS.

And so, in this very pedestrian way, the problem of the solidity of alliances within the nation's political class has come to a head. One has the impression that the Senegalese opposition, in particular, is following in the footsteps of Sisyphus, always starting over again. Yesterday it was COSU [Coordination of the United Senegalese

Opposition], then ADS [Senegalese Democratic Alliance]; today it is Sopi. And tomorrow? A cure should be found to eradicate that syndrome of disintegration that attacks the alliances that are forged and broken with such disconcerting ease here.

It makes one wonder if Senegalese politicians are suffering from lack of faith in themselves: lurking irrationally behind their occasionally sincere desire for cohesion and unity is the ghostly shadow of the knife in the back. Defection follows defection, one coalition follows another, at the slightest pretext. Is the body politic infested with men quick to change sides, with "traitors" and renegades?

As everyone knows, politics is driven by interest, not sentiment. Still, for a party that has always vilified the PS and its leaders, PIT's new attitude comes as something of a surprise. Who has forgotten Amath Dansokho's passionate diatribes against Diouf and his regime?

Not long ago, when the "troika" met on 11 March 1989 at Niary Tally, he fulminated: "We won the elections, it is we who have legitimacy. There is an elected president, and he should take office... It seems increasingly as if the government has decided to restrict freedom of the press by punishing SOPI for having published the election results... They don't own this country. It was not bequeathed to them by their father or mother... We must keep up our attacks against the thieves, against those who are killing the economy..."

#### Words in the Air

At the time he said those words, Dansokho could hardly have imagined that 2 or 3 months later he would be smoking the peace pipe with the PS leaders. Were these words mere "wayside palaver," words that carry no commitment, as the Kanakas say? It is true that the situation has changed somewhat. In the meantime a lot of water has gone under the bridge, and there was the crisis with Mauritania—a crisis that should never have taken place.

But this latter crisis may be serving only to obscure Senegal's many domestic problems—problems that Dansokho himself described in PIT's party organ, DAAN DOOLE, on 9 March, namely: "an adjustment program that has aggravated the misery of the lower classes, increased unemployment that has nevertheless failed to put the economy back on its feet, a breakdown in the machinery of government in the midst of a general institutional crisis, an educational and vocational training system that is also in crisis, a rural sector ruined and practically left to its own devices, with no meaningful prospects for economic and social improvement, etc."

Is one to believe that the Mauritanian crisis, being more recent, wiped out those other problems the way an insect bomb eradicates mosquitos and cockroaches? No, according to many observers; yes, it seems, according to

the PIT and its leader, who have embarked on talks with the PS and its chief, now that the latter are no longer suspected of "simply shopping for allies." In other words, they are granting Diouf what they had withheld since the February 1988 elections: legitimacy.

They are not the only ones to do so; better still, they are offering him the chance to build, to construct the presidential majority he has always coveted, which might lead to the formation of a national unity government, if sufficiently broad and specific agreements can be worked out. Doudou Sine says so.

Diouf and Collin—who only yesterday was referred to as "Bonaparte"—must certainly be walking on cloud nine. They have accomplished quite a feat: sowing "bins" [translation unknown] in the ranks of their main adversaries, those "highway robbers" who used to lash out at them every time they made a public appearance.

In all this it is Mr Wade who is to be pitied. He is always being scalped<sup>1</sup>) by his supporters (the American Indians used to scalp their conquered enemies). After the defection of Doudou Ndiaye, Puritain Fall, Fara Ndiaye, and Serigne Diop, to name only a few, he has now lost Amath Dansokho, an ally, companion in misfortune and fellow prisoner. Has the time come for him to make out his will, to write out his last wishes? No, says Wade, who believes, in spite of everything, that he is still the arbiter of the nation's political life. "PIT or no PIT, the balance of forces is still the same. It is we who represent the masses," he told WAL FADJRI. And Abdoulaye Bathily is singing the same tune: "The masses do not support an affiliation with the PS. They are still in tune with what SOPI is saying."

Whether the PIT is to be congratulated or condemned for making a separate peace with the PS, the move does to some extent weaken the opposition. Dansokho has, so to speak, watered his vodka. Was he right or wrong? What repercussions or dividends will it bring for his organization? Because we cannot read the tea-leaves, we cannot make very definite predictions.

It is still generally accepted that dialogue is preferable to violence as a way of resolving Senegal's problems. Especially since we are a democracy. And there can be no democracy without debate. For debate means openness, the emergence of a field of possibilities and choices that give shape to the future.

Will the PS use its influence over certain players to establish a national democratic dialogue that doesn't exclude anyone?

#### Footnote

1. Scalping consists of removing the scalp after making a circular incision in the skin. The frightful custom of scalping the enemy increases the ferocity of the combat.

**\* Japanese Gift of Medical Supplies**

34190297a Dakar LE SOLEIL in French  
30 Jun 89 p 11

[Article by Moustapha Mbodj: "Health: Priority Concern"]

[Excerpt] Tawa—"Your exceptional turnout here honors us, in that it symbolizes the hospitality you have shown us. We most heartily thank you." The president of the Senegal-Japan Friendship Association, socialist deputy Issei Inoue, was visibly pleased to be speaking to the people of Mboudaye Tawa in the rural community of Ndiaffate (Gandiaye arrondissement).

On Sunday afternoon the delegation headed by Mr Inoue (including Mr Mitsuhei Murata, the new Japanese ambassador, and members of the Senegal-Japan Friendship Association) made formal presentation of a shipment of medicines and medical supplies worth 10 million CFA francs for the Tawa health station and a check in the amount of 5 million CFA francs for construction of a health center in the locality.

Attending the colorful ceremony were Professor Lamine Ndiaye, personal adviser to the president; Medical Commander Abdoulaye Ba, chief of the primary health care services division; the prefect of the department of Kaolack, Mr Ibrahima Diop; deputy Mamadou Mbodj of Ndiaffate, and a large crowd of people from Tawa and neighboring localities.

**Major Focus**

Mr Inoue has no doubt that this fully equipped health center will be a magnet for the villages around Mboudaye. During an audience with Senegal's head of state, the Japanese deputy was given to understand that improvement of public health conditions is a top priority for the government, and Inoue for his part pledged "we will do our best to support the efforts of the authorities in this field." For example, the Senegal-Japan Friendship Association has offered to make an annual contribution of this kind to the rural sector.

**Solidarity**

The association chose the village of Mboudaye Tawa because "it is the home of my friend, Keba Birane Cisse (Senegal's ambassador to Japan), who works tirelessly to strengthen the friendly ties between the two countries." The Japanese socialist deputy, who describes himself as "exceptionally fond of Senegal and its people," was also bearing another personal gift for the villagers: 20 kilograms of "ringue" seed. "Ringue" is a plant that has the advantage of enriching the soil in which it is cultivated, increasing its yield over time. Five residents of Mboudaye Tawa who had distinguished themselves in cultivation of the new plant were given airplane tickets to travel to Osaka, which will host a "ringue" exposition next year.

**\* PDS Rejects Concessions to Mauritania**

34190296a Dakar SOPI in French 7 Jul 89 p 6

[Communique of the national secretariat of the Senegalese Democratic Party dated 6 July]

[Excerpts] The national secretariat of the Senegalese Democratic Party [PDS], joined by delegations from its organizations of women and youth, held its weekly meeting on Wednesday 5 July at 1800 hours at national party headquarters, Boulevard Dial Diop in Dakar, under the chairmanship of brother Abdoulaye Wade, secretary general of the party. [passage omitted]

The national secretariat reviewed recent developments in relations between Senegal and Mauritania in light of the meeting between Mr Abdou Diouf and Maawiya Ould Taya at the time of the Ouagadougou summit. In that connection the national secretariat noted with consternation the sudden turnabout of the Senegalese Government in the face of the arrogant bellicosity of the Mauritanian side, which tries to bolster its ridiculous claims by a show of force on the border and by repeated provocations.

The national secretariat believes the new Taya/Diouf alliance is intended primarily at diverting public attention, so that under cover of the reconciliation that the people so earnestly desire they can be softened up for concessions intended to cover up the problem;

While firmly committed to a negotiated as opposed to military solution, the national secretariat nonetheless asserts there should be no question of making the slightest territorial concession, which according to the constitution would amount to high treason;

In consequence, the national secretariat:

Calls on all party officials and supporters to get to work immediately to sensitize the people to the gravity of the concessions Abdou Diouf is getting ready to make;

Reaffirms the determination of the PDS to carry out its responsibility to express and promote the deepest aspirations of the Senegalese people;

Solemnly warns Abdou Diouf against making any move to abandon the people of the river region or cede any of the nation's territory. [passage omitted]

Following the public statement by Mr Amath Dansokho, secretary general of the PIT [Party for Independence and Labor], proclaiming his party's intention to resume dialogue with the PDS, the secretary general brought delegations of the youth and women's organizations into the national secretariat to discuss the issue. Comments on all sides focused on attacks against our party, appeals for reconciliation, and—sad to say—the women reported overtures by Mr Amath Dansokho, who spoke very strangely to them, distributed money, and offered to get them an audience with Abdou Diouf, on whose authority he claimed to be acting;



Confronted with these acts of attempted destabilization, aggravated by the alliance between the youth of the PIT and the PS [Socialist Party], the national secretariat decided to close the books on the PIT and let the Senegalese people judge for themselves.

Forced to respond to these actions, the national secretariat solemnly warns the PIT against any new attack on our party or its leader.

Dakar, 6 July 1989

[Signed] Cheikh Koureysi Ba, National Secretary for Press and Information.

### \* Niasse's Influence Increases After Tension

34190288a Paris LA LETTRE DU CONTINENT [LC]  
in French 1 Jun 89 p 6

[Text] The rise in the conflict with Mauritania appears to have definitely played a part in regard to domestic policy (LC No. 93). All the opposition parties—some of which were at the origin of the slip when the first lootings of Mauritanian shops occurred—issued calls for national unity. In a joint press conference, Attorney Abdoulaye Wade of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), Abdoulaye Bathily of the Democratic League, and Amath Dansokho of the Party for Independence and Labor (PIT) advocated dispatching information missions throughout the world to explain the Senegalese position in its conflict with Mauritania. The three Senegalese opposition parties also stated they were in favor of creating a national crisis committee in which the government, the political parties, and the associations of repatriates from Mauritania would participate.

The PDS did not dissociate itself from PIT-Senegal, which organized a meeting with the ruling Socialist Party and the leader of which, Amath Dansokho, was received at his request in audience by President Abdou Diouf. It is true that Amath Dansokho was personally affected at the time of the Dakar incidents: his wife, who is of Romanian origin, was very nearly lynched in the street by some Senegalese who took her for a Mauritanian. The PIT leader—who is well established at the University of Dakar—issued a call for national unity over the national radio to “avoid the danger of the country slipping into anarchy.”

Within the government, the reconstitution of the political landscape following upon the conflict with Mauritania seems to be getting started with very quietly. One man in particular is very much in demand: Moustapha Niasse. The former foreign minister, who made a fortune—particularly in oil with International Oil Trading—is consulted more and more in affairs of state. Well connected in Saudi circles, he reportedly has the delicate task—despite the current split between the “black world” and the “Moorish region”—of keeping active, in particular, the plan to welcome to Dakar in 1991 the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OCI). Moreover, Saudi Arabia delivered on 22 May to Dakar-Yoff

Airport 94,000 metric tons of food and medicine for the repatriates from Mauritania. However, the payment by the OCI member countries of 60 billion CFA francs in cash to build new shelters remains quite uncertain.

LA LETTRE DU CONTINENT Commentary—The return of Moustapha Niasse, former director of the presidential office under Leopold Senghor, can, of course, be really considered only if Minister of State, Secretary General of the Presidency of the Republic Jean Collin leaves. In a case like this involving face, Niasse's supporters would not be opposed to forming a troika by including in the government the leader of the PDS, Abdoulaye Wade, in order to strengthen national cohesiveness. But the latter appears himself to be experiencing being called into question in his own party by personalities such as Ousmane Ngom (LC No. 92). As for the person principally concerned, Jean Collin, he appears to be far from preparing to retire.

### \* Causes for PIT Expulsion From Opposition

34190290a Dakar WAL FADJRI in French  
16 Jun 89 pp 6,7

[Article by A. Camara: “Sopi Alliance: The Rupture”; with introductory editorial paragraph]

[Excerpts] In December 1979 Wade invited PIT [Party for Independence and Labor] to enter into talks. A tactical alliance based on political exigency thus developed into a broader collaboration. And it took 10 years for that accommodation between liberals and communists to run up against its limits. The effects of PIT's meetings with the PS [Socialist Party] were not long in coming, and both the LD [Democratic League] and the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] are now looking at a path to “Sopi” [PDS slogan meaning “change”] that does not include Amath Dansokho's group.

It is virtually impossible to talk about the liberal-communist alliance without recalling how PIT and PDS have worked together since 1975. From now on, with the expulsion of Amath Dansokho's party, the project will embrace only the PDS and the LD/MPT [Democratic League-Movement for the Labor Party]. This new configuration of the Sopi alliance did not just spring out of nowhere. Analysis of what the three main leaders of the group are saying leads one to conclude that the rupture was not the result of procedural differences at all.

In other words, the catalyst for the rupture—the fact that PIT went off to negotiate without informing its partners—was not really the cause. The rupture was actually caused by an accumulation of contradictions that finally became insupportable: one more handicap for an opposition already suffering from profound divisions.

One must certainly go back to early April to see the first concrete harbingers of the split-up between PIT and PDS, two parties that had a track record of working together on specific issues for more than 10 years. First of all and above all, differences arose over a general

strike that Mr Wade planned to call in furtherance of his strategy of trying to force Abdou Diouf to step down. The question was whether political parties could take the place of workers in such an action. For Amath Dansokho the issue was this: "We cannot launch a general strike. The workers do not acknowledge our right to do so. They may have faith in us politically, but not necessarily with regard to their own demands. Moreover, the autonomy of the unions, their independence vis-a-vis the parties, should be accepted without question. Otherwise, we would be doing the same thing as the PS."

PDS, for its part, does not find the argument terribly convincing at first glance, especially since change is a goal shared by all Senegalese workers. Since PIT remained adamant, there could be no consensus. In the absence of consensus, the project had to be tabled for further discussion. When agreement proved impossible to reach, the idea was scrapped. It was the first major snag, since the elections, in relations between the members of the Sopi alliance—and the first crack in the plaster of the tactical coalition between PIT, PDS, and the LD/MPT.

Another deep split emerged over the proper path to change. Since May 1988 all three parties had proclaimed their support for a political solution to the national crisis. What remained to be decided was which attitude would become dominant—dialogue with the government at any price, or confrontation. Up to last March it looked like a middle ground might be found: ongoing dialogue while confrontation continued. And since there was no real dialogue (one recalls Ahmed Khalifa Niasse's unsuccessful initiative of 14 March and its aftereffects), the strategy of confrontation naturally became stronger, with a hardening of positions that would culminate in the events of 4 April.

What happened at the independence celebration, where the opposition organized a "counter parade" alongside the official one, seems to have been the critical factor leading PIT to question the uncompromising strategy of driving the government to the wall. In announcing his withdrawal today, Amath Dansokho underlines the "catastrophe" the country barely avoided that day. "What we did on 4 April, do you think there is any other country where that wouldn't have led to hundreds of deaths?" In fact, though, PIT had given broad support to the demonstration. But from that time on it became increasingly evident that PIT's commitment to stay the course "no matter what the cost" was cooling off. It became even more clear-cut when the dispute with Mauritania erupted. By April PIT no longer endorsed the "up against the wall" philosophy, and a strategy for approaching the government began to take shape. [passage omitted]

Now that the bridges have been burned, at least within the Sopi alliance, can we expect to see even more vitriolic polemics among the Marxists? For the moment, Abdoulaye Bathily refuses to make moral judgments about PIT or engage in polemics. Amath Dansokho is

taking the same position. But with all the statements coming out in communiques, public meetings, and press conferences, there is a risk that this restraint will break down.

#### \* Opposition Leaders Comment on PIT's Removal

34190290b Dakar WAL FADJRI in French  
16 Jun 89 pp 8-10

[Interviews with opposition leaders Abdoulaye Wade, Amath Dansokho, Abdoulaye Bathily, and Landing Savane, by A. Camara and O. Gueye, on 14 June; places of interviews not given]

[Text] In the beginning there was a principle—the principle of consultations beforehand within the Sopi alliance ["Sopi" is a Senegalese Democratic Party slogan meaning "change"]. And that principle is what the current crisis is about. Bathily and Wade make accusations. Dansokho talks about phony pretexts. Was it worth the rupture to make a move toward the Palace (and Socialist Party [PS] headquarters)? Landing Savane, who himself traveled awhile on that path, gives his views.

#### Abdoulaye Wade: 'Dansokho Is Going the Wrong Way'

[WAL FADJRI] Today the PIT [Party for Independence and Labor] is apparently being condemned by the other parties in the Sopi alliance for having entered into talks with the PS. But you yourself opened the way. What is the difference between the two situations?

[Wade] The Sopi alliance was made up of parties who never surrendered the principle of their independence. But until now we had applied another principle, the principle of having consultations before taking positions on any problem of national interest. Simply to keep ourselves informed and to see whether other parties might want to participate, thereby giving our views more weight. In any case, the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] always consulted with its partners throughout its discussions with Diouf and even with Collin. I can tell you that some things we wanted to do were influenced by PIT.

[WAL FADJRI] Which ones?

[Wade] For example, on two occasions I proposed to my party the idea of a general strike. And it was because of PIT's negative attitude toward it that it never happened. In other words, we always consult with our partners.

[WAL FADJRI] Were you surprised by PIT's demarche?

[Wade] We were in fact surprised, Abdoulaye Bathily of the LD/MPT [Democratic League-Movement for the Labor Party] and myself, when Amath Dansokho told us his party had decided to meet with Abdou Diouf and the PS. We were astonished by that position as well as by the fait accompli he presented to us. Especially since it was not theoretically out of the question for such a demarche to be made by all three parties. I must say, however, that

PIT did keep us informed about its meetings with Diouf and gave us an account of its initial discussions with the PS. But as for the most recent of those discussions, we don't know yet what came out of them, as we have not seen Dansokho or gotten a telephone call from him since then.

[WAL FADJRI] Is the rupture between you and PIT final?

[Wade] We must face the fact that PIT was responsible for the rupture. Because it was that party that broke off with us. The least it could do, I think, was to have given us a report on its most recent talks with the PS. And as of today, 14 June, it has not done so. But also, why did PIT present us with a *fait accompli*? We were together, and we had chosen a certain direction together. If PIT thought this direction was not the right one any longer, it had an obligation to try to convince us of the need to change our minds. I think its decision was taken quite deliberately and after thorough reflection.

[WAL FADJRI] Have you assessed the impact this rupture will have on Sopi?

[Wade] PIT's decision is not going to change Senegalese political realities. The PS itself is not under any illusions. In fact, as I told Dansokho, certain members of the PS had contacted me indirectly to tell me they believed I had sent him as an advance scout. And when they realized that PIT was all alone, they were disappointed. I might even say that it was after the appearance of an interview with Dansokho in our columns (WAL FADJRI No. 164) that Abdou Diouf suddenly realized there had been no follow-up to PIT's initial demarche.

I know that the PS is going to try to exploit this rupture for its own advantage, by contending it shows I have been weakened. Such a campaign might be believable abroad. But here everyone knows that PIT or no PIT the balance of forces is still the same. It is we who represent the masses.

[WAL FADJRI] What fault do you find in PIT's political reasoning?

[Wade] Before it made its 180-degree turn, PIT joined us in denying legitimacy to Abdou Diouf. I do not understand how any self-respecting party can reverse itself so diametrically. Moreover, I was not the only one claiming Diouf was incompetent. I think it is a very serious matter that a self-proclaimed marxist party like PIT should so suddenly find that Diouf is competent and not to blame for the current crisis.

There is also a fundamental difference between us. For example, in the dispute between Senegal and Mauritania, PIT believes the solution is to find a way to build a consensus around Diouf. Now in our view, that would be a big mistake, since that affair was just one more proof of Abdou Diouf's incompetence.

In any event, Abdou Diouf is going to fail in his search for a solution to the problem. Cooperating with him

would mean forcing the entire political class to go down in defeat with him, thus giving proof of its own incompetence. And in that event, what alternatives would remain except adventurism, except the military? So I think that PIT is headed in the wrong direction.

[WAL FADJRI] But PIT's initiative seems to belong to the process of reaching a political solution that goes to the heart of your own concerns.

[Wade] Does the search for unity, for union, necessarily imply renunciation of one's principles? No, I do not think so. Getting along with someone does not mean one must renounce everything one used to believe in...

[WAL FADJRI] But again, what difference is there between your overtures to Abdou Diouf and the one made by PIT?

[Wade] But it was Abdou Diouf who appealed to me in the press to meet with him, whereas PIT went to him. Also, from the start I rejected any one-on-one meeting, instead insisting on a public one. Moreover, the PDS concerns itself with the national scene as a whole, which is not the case for PIT. Finally, for the PDS it was a question of discussing a quite specific problem, the search for a solution to the political crisis. But PIT is engaging in across-the-board cooperation with the PS: women, young people, etc. One actually gets the impression that it is moving toward a merger with the PS. So it is completely different.

#### **Amath Dansokho: 'We Do Not Belong to Wade'**

[WAL FADJRI] Do you know that your party is about to be excluded from the Sopi group?

[Dansokho] I have just been informed of the existence of a joint communique publicly announcing our excommunication from the alliance. That decision surprises me. I question, first of all, how they are able to exclude us from the Sopi movement, to which we have contributed. A movement involving millions of Senegalese, a good many of whom do not belong to any of our parties. Also, how can Mr Wade exclude us from "Sopi" when that very slogan, as we know, was launched initially by the leaders of PIT, as a political watchword, when the journal AND SOPI was created. Mr Wade did not adopt the slogan until the 1978 elections. I do not see how we could be excluded. Finally, I consider that Mr Wade has made a grave political error, for which he unfortunately will have to pay the price. I am very sorry for him, for all he represented to the country.

[WAL FADJRI] And what about the allegation that you entered a dialogue with the PS without asking your allies for their views?

[Dansokho] All that is only a pretext for excommunicating us. In reality, when Mr Wade held talks with Jean Collin in Paris, were we consulted beforehand? No. He only told us the results of those meetings. But we found that to be typical of him, from the time he began looking



for political solutions to the crisis. He also failed to consult us about the Ahmed Khalifa Niasse mediation last March. Then, too, Mr Wade himself stated publicly on 11 March that he would not consider holding talks with Abdou Diouf until the latter would clearly state on the airwaves what the talks would be about. Finally, he and Abdoulaye Bathily gave everyone very distinctly to understand that they were not involved in the dialogue process. All that led us to conclude that it would be pointless to go to them to persuade them to hold talks with Diouf about the electoral dispute. So it is really just an issue with them about a judgment call. We will let history be the judge. No reason to get upset and agitated.

[WAL FADJRI] To date (14 June) you have not informed the LD and the PDS of the results of your meetings with the PS. Does this mean that you no longer consider your party a member of the alliance?

[Dansokho] Let them wait! I have my party responsibilities. Why didn't they wait until the three of us could meet to issue their communique excluding us? He (Wade) is going to have to understand that we do not belong to him.

**Abdoulaye Bathily: 'It Is a Bad Thing....'**

[WAL FADJRI] What is your opinion of PIT's move toward the PS?

[Bathily] We do not agree with those initiatives. Certainly PIT has the right to change its mind about the PS and the government. But given the ties between our parties within the Sopi alliance, we think that PIT should have explained to us its reappraisal of the national political situation before changing course so suddenly. We cannot concur, because PIT made its decision in the Political Bureau even before telling us about its demarche, at the time when the contacts with Abdou Diouf were made. Procedurally, therefore, it runs contrary to the spirit of the alliance.

But a more fundamental issue is also involved. We do not agree with the judgment PIT is making about the PS. Amath Dansokho maintains that not everyone in the PS is corrupt. Now in our view, the question is not whether there are decent people in the PS or not. We do not analyze the actions of the PS in terms of the individual positions of its people, but in terms of the fundamental issues facing the nation and its position as a party. We see that for 30 years now the PS has governed the country. Thus, the PS as a party is responsible for the malfeasance we have all had occasion to denounce. Less than 2 months ago, after the special congress of the PS, Amath Dansokho rejected the resolutions made by the congress, maintaining that they had come too late. This is documented.

In the last analysis it was a partisan demarche made solely by PIT; therefore, it cannot help solve the problem. And the objective of that demarche was to establish cooperation with the PS in every domain. That is something we do not understand.

[WAL FADJRI] So are these differences leading to a rupture within the alliance?

[Bathily] We would point out that it was PIT that took the initiative. Our alliance was built on the basis of struggle against the regime. We were a part of that ongoing dialogue, and we do not understand why someone who shared those views would decide to go over to the other side without discussion beforehand. We have had no contact with PIT since its latest meeting with the PS on 7 June. Dansokho does not even come to see us any more. The consequence in our view is that they have broken the contract that bound us together.

[WAL FADJRI] Why condemn the meetings between PIT and PS, when Mr Wade has had several contacts with the president and with Jean Collin?

[Bathily] One must tell things the way they really were. Even when Mr Wade was in prison, in May 1988, he kept us regularly informed about the emissaries the regime sent to see him. Right up to the time he left prison, we were constantly discussing modalities of action and strategies to be adopted. We even fully discussed his meeting with Diouf so as to have detailed responses ready to give the president. Every time the regime made an overture to one of us, we would all three discuss it. Thus, we followed the secret negotiations step by step. It is not the same with PIT, which set up a meeting without consulting us. They did it last year, and they are doing the same thing once again. They make their decision first, before telling us they are going to do so.

[WAL FADJRI] What are the consequences of what you call this "departure" for the alliance?

[Bathily] Certainly it is a bad thing when one of the members constituting it turns up in the enemy camp. It raises questions. Some people are wondering who in Senegal can be trusted. Psychologically, the effect of this departure is negative. It is also negative in a political sense, as the organization had been built up to embody the ideal of change.

But that is only in the short term. We all know how much influence the respective parties have with the people. Abdou Diouf knows that the main forces of the opposition are not with him. So we are not excessively worried, from the point of view of the balance of contending forces. The masses do not support an affiliation with the PS. They are still in tune with what Sopi is saying.

**Landing Savane: It Was a Logical Decision for PIT**

[WAL FADJRI] As an outside observer of the convulsions that are tearing the Sopi alliance apart, what do you think of PIT's overtures to the PS?

[Savane] Our differences with PIT are known to everyone. Especially with regard to the round table, the government of national unity, etc. But one must acknowledge that this demarche is consistent with PIT's orientation, even though we have no interest in the

process of change within that party. We ourselves are not interested in a government of national unity with the PS.

However, in a democracy everyone is entitled to march to his own beat. And if we ourselves have had contact with Abdou Diouf, it was in order to come up with a concrete initiative on the Mauritanian question in which we could play a role.

[WAL FADJRI] After two meetings with Abdou Diouf on the Senegalese-Mauritanian question, do you think it would be possible to hold talks with the regime, on other issues for example?

[Savane] Dialogue about what? And with what regime, actually? If I look just at the Mauritanian issue, which is one particular problem and which challenges neither the regime nor Diouf, nor his legitimacy nor his program of government, and if I look at the results of our two meetings, I see there was little to show for them. Now in regard to your question: the regime is not ready to make even minimal efforts, so how can one imagine any in-depth discussion?

[WAL FADJRI] So what is your opinion of PIT's initiative?

[Savane] We do not at all share PIT's views about how to resolve the crisis. We cannot give the PS the benefit of the doubt. Our plan is to define our positions and our line of action very plainly and very clearly, and let each party do what it thinks will be most helpful. Then let the masses be the judge.

Now if one looks at the arguments advanced by Dansokho, there are some very valuable ideas. For example, the situation is indeed very serious and it is necessary to find solutions, instead of continuing to play the frenetic game of power politics. But does that mean one must enter into a dialogue with the PS? There we disagree.

We do not think that an undemocratic party can advance the cause of democratic politics. Thus, we do not see any democratic solution coming out of a dialogue with the PS.

My feeling is that the PS and the government are not acting in good faith. They have shown this on numerous occasions in the past. Frankly, if PIT is acting in good faith, it is making a big mistake.

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